Eric J. Adams

The plaintiff, a pizza delivery driver, brought a proposed class action against the franchisor and 141 franchisees alleging misclassification as an independent contractor.

Both the plaintiff and the franchisee defendants appealed the certification judge's decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the plaintiff's appeal, upholding the finding that the franchisees were not 'common employers' under the Employment Standards Act.

The Court granted the franchisees' appeal in part, finding the motion judge erred in certifying a conspiracy claim among all defendants because the pleadings only alleged the franchisor controlled the agreements, not that the franchisees conspired with each other.

The certification of employment status as a common issue and the negligence claim were upheld.

The moving party, a third party in the underlying action, brought a motion for leave to appeal a prior decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal in a brief endorsement, awarding costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

The moving party, a third party in the action, brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision of Kimmel J. The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision of Kimmel J. The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

The appellants, small and mid-size businesses, appealed a class action decision regarding business interruption insurance claims stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic.

They sought coverage for revenue losses, arguing that the presence of SARS-CoV-2 or civil authority orders constituted "physical loss or damage" to their property under their insurance policies.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that neither the virus's presence nor the civil authority orders met the "physical loss or damage" criteria for business interruption coverage.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents.

The plaintiffs, representing a class of small to medium-sized businesses, sought coverage under their business interruption insurance policies for losses sustained due to the COVID-19 pandemic and related civil authority orders.

The court held a common issues trial to determine whether the presence of the SARS-CoV-2 virus or government lockdown orders could cause 'physical loss or damage to property' within the meaning of the policies.

The court concluded that the virus does not physically alter or damage inanimate surfaces, and that the loss of use of the premises due to government orders does not constitute physical loss or damage.

Consequently, the court answered the certified common issues in the negative, finding no coverage under the business interruption provisions.

The defendants in a certified class action regarding COVID-19 business interruption insurance claims brought a motion seeking joint adjudication and common case management of common questions across approximately 79 overlapping proceedings.

The motion was opposed by several plaintiffs in individual actions who wished to proceed independently.

The court dismissed the motion, affording deference to a prior case management decision that declined to stay the individual actions, and finding that forcing joint adjudication would inappropriately undermine the plaintiffs' right to opt out of the class proceeding and cause undue delay.

The applicant sought indemnification from the respondent insurer for defence costs incurred in a defamation lawsuit, arguing he was an insured under a Media Professionals Insurance Policy issued to his publisher.

The insurer denied coverage, asserting the applicant was not an independent contractor performing the publisher's professional business.

The court applied principles of contractual interpretation and found that the publishing agreement was a personal service contract and the applicant was an independent contractor engaged in the publisher's professional business.

The court ordered the insurer to pay the defence costs but dismissed the claim for punitive damages, finding no bad faith.

The defendant brought a motion seeking answers to undertakings and questions refused during the continued examination for discovery of the plaintiff's representative.

The dispute centered on the plaintiff's claim of lawyer-client and litigation privilege over a draft internal report (the ASD Report) prepared in December 2002.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the report was prepared for the dominant purpose of litigation or for seeking legal advice.

The court ordered the plaintiff to answer the refused questions and produce the report.

The defendant, Chubb Insurance Company of Canada, brought a motion to transfer the action from the Central East Region (Newmarket) to the Toronto Region, pursuant to Rule 13.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs, Smartcentres Management Inc. and North Park Shopping Centres Limited, opposed the motion.

The court granted the transfer, finding that the events, subject matter, and damages were primarily located in Toronto, and that Toronto was "significantly better" in the interests of justice after a holistic application of the factors outlined in Rule 13.1.02(2)(b).

The applicant, Wawanesa, withdrew its application for a declaration of coverage and duty to defend, leading to a costs dispute.

The respondent, Dominion, sought costs for work incurred.

The court, exercising its discretion under the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01, found that costs should follow the event, as Wawanesa abandoned its application.

Despite Dominion's excessive costs claim, the court fixed costs at $10,000 plus HST and disbursements, deeming it a fair and reasonable amount for the unsuccessful applicant to pay.

At the opening of a scheduled 7-week trial, the defendant insurer brought a motion for an adjournment due to the plaintiff's late disclosure of physical evidence and additional documents.

The plaintiff had disclosed the existence of particles and other physical evidence relevant to the cause of the equipment failure just weeks before trial.

The court found that it would be unjust to force the defendant to proceed without an opportunity to obtain expert advice and conduct further discovery on the newly disclosed evidence.

The motion for an adjournment was granted.

The applicants, two municipalities, sought a declaration entitling them to appoint their own counsel and manage their defence in a main action at the expense of the respondent insurers.

The municipalities argued a clear conflict of interest existed because the insurers were also defending contractors (Miller and Langley) against whom the municipalities had alleged negligence and sought indemnification.

The court found an irremediable conflict of interest, as the insurers' pecuniary interests in limiting the contractors' liability directly conflicted with the municipalities' defence strategy.

The application was granted, allowing the municipalities to appoint independent counsel at the insurers' expense and be reimbursed for past defence costs, with reporting limited to settlement issues of covered claims.

Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (AECL) sought to amend its statement of claim in a long-running insurance indemnity action against Allianz Global Risks US Insurance Company (Allianz).

Allianz opposed the amendments, arguing they introduced new causes of action, were time-barred, lacked particulars, and caused prejudice due to inordinate delay and loss of evidence.

The court found that amendments related to causation theories advanced by Allianz's experts were not new causes of action, but the claim based on assignment of rights from MDS Nordion and Comstock was a new cause of action and time-barred.

The court granted leave to amend certain paragraphs, denied others, and required AECL to provide better particulars for the causation amendments to limit their scope to the theories advanced by Allianz's experts.

The plaintiff condominium corporation sued the developer and vendor for negligence and breach of warranty regarding HVAC system deficiencies.

The defendants and third parties moved for summary judgment, arguing the claim was statute-barred by the limitation period.

The court found a genuine issue requiring trial due to insufficient explanatory expert evidence regarding discoverability of the systemic defect versus localized leaks.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action against the LCBO for damages for conversion.

The appellant's credit card was used without his authorization to purchase over $37,000 in alcohol from the LCBO, which was delivered to a nightclub.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's finding that the LCBO did not commit conversion because there was no evidence of an intentional or wrongful act, as the LCBO had no knowledge the charges were unauthorized.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal from a Small Claims Court judgment, the court determined the issue of costs.

Applying the factors under Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court ordered the appellant to pay the respondent's costs fixed at $5,000 for fees and $406.72 for disbursements, inclusive of HST.

Following a summary judgment motion where the court found the plaintiff's claim for a duty to defend was time-barred, the court clarified that the claim for indemnification was premature and dismissed it without prejudice.

On the issue of costs, the court apportioned the defendant insurer's costs between the duty to defend and indemnification issues.

The court awarded the defendant $8,000 in costs for the duty to defend issue, payable within 60 days, and $5,000 for the deferred indemnification issue, payable in any event of the cause after the underlying actions are concluded.

The insured sought a declaration that his home insurer was required to defend and indemnify him in a personal injury action arising from a cycling accident with a pedestrian.

The insurer had denied coverage by letter and the insured commenced an action nearly three years later.

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court considered whether the claim was barred by the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The insured argued that an additional policy condition created ambiguity and delayed the limitation period until the underlying action was resolved.

The court rejected that interpretation, holding the condition applied only to indemnification claims and not to the duty to defend.

The action against the insurer was therefore commenced out of time.

A snow removal contractor brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing a personal injury slip-and-fall claim and related cross-claims.

The plaintiff filed no responding evidence and did not appear on the motion.

The court held that the absence of any admissible evidence regarding the fall, injuries, or sidewalk condition meant there was no genuine issue requiring a trial as against the contractor, and the claim against it was dismissed.

However, the municipality’s cross-claim for contribution and indemnity raised unresolved factual issues, including the interpretation of meteorological evidence and whether contractual snow-removal obligations were met.

Those issues required expert evidence and were determined to be genuine issues for trial.