Gerry J. Gill

The appellant appealed from a summary judgment dismissing its claim for insurance coverage under a Builder's Risk Policy.

The motion judge found the roof collapse was caused by frost heaving, an excluded peril under the policy.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding summary judgment was appropriate where the respondent's expert evidence was uncontested, the frost or freezing exclusion applied, and the doctrine of nullification did not render the exclusion unenforceable because the policy still covered other perils.

G.E.S. Construction Limited appealed the dismissal of its motion seeking a declaration that Lloyd’s Underwriters had a duty to defend and indemnify it under a 2015 insurance policy.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge’s decision, finding no waiver or estoppel by Lloyd’s and no bad faith in its conduct.

The appeal was dismissed and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The applicant, a declared vexatious litigant, brought a 16-page Notice of Application.

The City of Toronto, as the first named respondent, sought dismissal of the application under Rule 2.1.03.

The court found that the applicant failed to follow the required procedure for vexatious litigants to seek leave to proceed, as established by a prior order.

Citing previous decisions involving the same applicant, the court dismissed the application in its entirety and ordered the applicant to pay costs on a substantial indemnity basis to each respondent.

The defendant, G.E.S. Construction Limited, brought a motion seeking a declaration that the third-party defendant, Lloyd’s Underwriters, had a duty to defend and indemnify G.E.S. in the action.

G.E.S. argued that Lloyd's attempt to void the insurance policy was ineffective due to waiver or estoppel.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that Lloyd's conduct did not demonstrate an unequivocal and conscious intention to waive its right to void the policy, nor was there evidence of detrimental reliance by the insured to establish estoppel.

Tara Atkinson, a fitness instructor, sued her employers for injuries.

Her minor daughter, Maya Atkinson, also made a Family Law Act claim.

Tara Atkinson settled her personal claim and sought court approval under Rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the settlement of Maya's derivative claim.

The court found the proposed $5,000 settlement for the minor fair and reasonable, noting that the loss of care and companionship was largely attributable to pre-existing family dynamics rather than the mother's injuries, and the overall settlement reached the defendants' policy limits.

The court approved the settlement for the minor.

In the context of CCAA proceedings for Carillion Canada Holdings Inc. and related entities, the affected parties reached an agreement on a Directors and Officers (D&O) Claims Process Order.

The Monitor supported the order to finally resolve D&O claims and complete the administration of the proceedings.

The court found the proposed order reasonable and granted the requested relief, noting that the D&O Insurers' participation does not constitute an admission of coverage or liability.

The applicant sought indemnification from the respondent insurer for defence costs incurred in a defamation lawsuit, arguing he was an insured under a Media Professionals Insurance Policy issued to his publisher.

The insurer denied coverage, asserting the applicant was not an independent contractor performing the publisher's professional business.

The court applied principles of contractual interpretation and found that the publishing agreement was a personal service contract and the applicant was an independent contractor engaged in the publisher's professional business.

The court ordered the insurer to pay the defence costs but dismissed the claim for punitive damages, finding no bad faith.

The Applicant, First Condo Group Ltd., sought an order for insurance coverage from the Respondent, Lloyd’s Underwriters, which was dismissed in a prior application.

This decision addresses the Respondent's claim for costs on a partial indemnity basis, totaling $31,548.48.

The Applicant argued the Respondent's counsel fees were excessive given the limited scope of the application and compared them to its own billable hours.

The court found the Respondent's costs claim reasonable, noting the serious nature of the underlying application (exposing Lloyd's to $2 million liability) and the helpfulness of the legal research, and granted the full amount requested.

The applicant, an engineering firm, sought insurance coverage from the respondent for a professional negligence claim.

The claim arose from a reserve fund study completed in November 2013, which allegedly failed to identify a corroded lamppost.

A worker was injured in October 2015 due to the lamppost's collapse.

The insurer denied coverage based on a retroactive date exclusion clause (September 11, 2015), arguing the "incident" was the negligent study preparation (2013), which occurred before the retroactive date.

The applicant contended the "incident" was the worker's injury (2015), which occurred after the retroactive date.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the word "incident" in the exclusion clause unambiguously referred to the alleged misconduct in 2013, not the subsequent injury in 2015.

The defendant insurer, Lloyd's Underwriters, brought a motion to compel the plaintiffs, S.H.W. Investment Inc., Yau Wing Wong, and Yau Kwan Wong, to participate in the appraisal process under section 128 of the Insurance Act for fire damage to two of their three properties.

The plaintiffs resisted, arguing prejudice due to a separate action against their broker and the exclusion of the third property from appraisal, as well as alleged delay by the insurer.

The court found the appraisal process mandatory under Statutory Condition 11 of the Insurance Act, noting limited discretion to refuse such applications.

It dismissed the plaintiffs' arguments regarding prejudice and delay as speculative or unfounded, emphasizing that the appraisal process is independent of other questions and concurrent litigation.

The motion was granted, compelling the plaintiffs to appoint an appraiser and setting a timeline for the appraisal process for the two covered units.

Costs were awarded to the defendant on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff in a proposed securities class action moved for certification for settlement purposes, approval of a partial settlement with the auditor defendant, dismissal of the action against individual defendants, and approval of class counsel fees.

The action alleged misrepresentations in the corporate defendant's financial statements.

The court approved the $1 million (USD) settlement with the auditor, finding it fair and reasonable, particularly given the statutory liability limits for experts.

The court also approved the dismissal against the individual defendants and class counsel's fee request of 30% of the settlement funds plus disbursements.

The respondent bank sought indemnity under an insurance policy for losses arising from a Ponzi scheme operated by a customer.

The bank obtained partial summary judgment on the interpretation of the "direct financial loss" element of the fidelity coverage section.

The appellants (insurers) appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in granting partial summary judgment on a constituent element of a claim rather than on the claim itself, failed to interpret the policy as a whole, adopted a theory of liability not advanced by the parties, and misconstrued the relief sought by the appellants.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the order, and directed the action to proceed to trial.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision granting summary judgment and finding no genuine issue for trial regarding the respondent's possible negligence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the limited evidence of erratic driving was too ill-defined to permit an inference that the oncoming driver could have or should have reasonably taken evasive action.

Costs of $6,000 were awarded to the respondent.

The minor plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident while riding as a passenger in a stolen car.

He claimed damages against his mother's automobile insurer under the uninsured motorist provisions of the Ontario Standard Automobile Policy (OAP 1).

The insurer moved to determine whether paragraph 1.8.2 of OAP 1 excluded the claim.

The motion judge found the claim was not excluded.

The Court of Appeal allowed the insurer's appeal, holding that the second clause of paragraph 1.8.2 refers to an occupant of 'an automobile' rather than 'the automobile' as defined in the policy, thereby excluding coverage for an occupant of any automobile driven without consent.

The plaintiffs appealed a Master's order dismissing their action against one defendant for failing to pay costs and serve an Affidavit of Documents.

The plaintiffs sought to introduce fresh evidence explaining that the defaults were caused by their previous counsel and that their newly retained counsel did not have sufficient time to prepare for the dismissal motion.

The Divisional Court admitted the fresh evidence, finding the due diligence test was met.

The court held the Master erred in denying an adjournment, as the lack of written material led to an erroneous conclusion about the plaintiffs' conduct.

The appeal was allowed and the action reinstated.

The defendant appealed a Master's order dismissing an application to appoint a litigation guardian and brought a motion to stay the order pending appeal.

The court dismissed the motion for a stay, finding that the psychiatric evidence was vague and failed to establish a serious issue to be tried.

The court also found no irreparable harm and that the balance of convenience favoured the plaintiffs due to the defendant's history of procedural delay.

Costs of $1,500 were awarded to the plaintiffs.