Matthew Cornett

This endorsement addresses a motion for costs brought by the Toronto Police Service Board following the abandonment of an appeal by Gary Curtis and Tanya Rebello.

The court found that the Board was entitled to costs, as its responding materials were served before the Notice of Abandonment was filed.

The court rejected the applicants' arguments regarding entitlement and quantum of costs, and awarded the Board $19,365.37, inclusive of taxes and disbursements.

The applicant, a declared vexatious litigant, brought a 16-page Notice of Application.

The City of Toronto, as the first named respondent, sought dismissal of the application under Rule 2.1.03.

The court found that the applicant failed to follow the required procedure for vexatious litigants to seek leave to proceed, as established by a prior order.

Citing previous decisions involving the same applicant, the court dismissed the application in its entirety and ordered the applicant to pay costs on a substantial indemnity basis to each respondent.

The Applicant sought to quash a City of Toronto by-law (By-law 1515-2019, section 1(A)) that limited the issuance of new payday loan establishment licenses to renewals only, arguing it was ultra vires the City of Toronto Act, 2006, discriminatory, and in conflict with federal and provincial legislation.

The court dismissed the application, finding the by-law to be a valid exercise of the City's broad authority for consumer protection, not discriminatory in the municipal law sense, and not in conflict with higher legislation, as it did not prohibit all payday loan operations nor frustrate the purpose of the relevant Acts.

The plaintiff brought an action for malicious prosecution and Charter breaches against the Crown and the Toronto Police Services Board, arising from a 2013 police shooting during the execution of a search warrant and his subsequent criminal prosecution, which ended in acquittals in 2014.

The plaintiff sought leave under the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act to continue his claim against the Crown.

The Board moved for summary judgment based on the expiry of the limitation period, and the Crown moved to strike the Charter claims.

The court denied leave, finding no reasonable possibility of success for the malicious prosecution claim.

The court granted summary judgment to the Board, as the action was commenced more than six years after the acquittals and the plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption of discoverability.

The Charter claims against the Crown were also struck for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The defendant Toronto Police Services Board brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's amended statement of claim under Rule 21.01(1)(a) and (b).

The plaintiff claimed damages in negligence, alleging a police officer failed or refused to lay charges after investigating his complaint of assault.

The court held that police do not owe a private law duty of care to victims of crime regarding the investigation or prosecution of alleged crimes, as this duty is owed to the public as a whole.

Finding it plain and obvious that the claim had no reasonable chance of success, the court struck the claim without leave to amend.

The plaintiffs, taxicab plate owners, brought a proposed $1.7 billion class action against the City of Toronto, alleging negligence in the enforcement of its taxicab bylaws against Uber and in the enactment of a new bylaw permitting private transportation companies.

The plaintiffs moved for certification under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The court dismissed the certification motion, finding that the pleadings failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The court held that the City's enactment of the bylaw was a legislative function immune from private damage suits, and its enforcement of the bylaws was a public duty that did not create a private law duty of care to the taxicab plate owners for pure economic losses.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Superior Court of Justice in which the trial judge determined that the site occupied by the appellant belonged to the City of Toronto and that the appellant was not authorized to place his property there.

The appellant raised substantially the same arguments on appeal.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's determination regarding ownership of the site was a question of fact and that no palpable and overriding error had been committed.

The conclusion that the City had the authority to remove and destroy the appellant's property was well-founded.

The appeal was dismissed with no costs awarded.

The appellants appealed a Master's decision refusing to set aside a Registrar's dismissal of their action for delay.

The original action alleged negligence by police and Crown attorneys, and claims of terror, intimidation, assault, and unauthorized searches by police, stemming from a private prosecution that resulted in an acquittal.

The Master's decision was based on the appellants' failure to explain the delay, their lack of promptness in moving to set aside the dismissal, and the presumption of prejudice to the respondents.

The court found no palpable and overriding error in the Master's discretionary decision, noting that the appellants' action was also unlikely to succeed due to prosecutorial immunity.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The municipality sought an injunction requiring the respondents to obtain a licence as either a taxicab broker or a limousine service company under Chapter 545 of the City of Toronto Municipal Code.

The application alleged that the respondents, through their smartphone platform, accepted requests for transportation services and therefore carried on a regulated business.

The court interpreted the by‑law definitions of “taxicab”, “limousine service company”, and the requirement to “accept calls”, concluding that the automated software platform merely relayed digital requests between passengers and drivers.

Because acceptance occurred only when an individual driver chose to accept a trip request, the respondents themselves did not accept calls or requests within the meaning of the by‑law.

Accordingly, the respondents were not operating as a taxicab broker or limousine service company requiring a municipal licence.