John Keefe

The appellant, a contractor, challenged an international commercial arbitral award arising from a US$258 million pipeline construction project in Madagascar.

The appellant sought to set aside portions of the award on grounds of lack of jurisdiction over counterclaims, failure to exercise jurisdiction over prolongation costs, denial of procedural fairness regarding retention monies, hydro seeding costs, and costs awards, and violation of public policy regarding alleged double recovery from forfeiture of tranche payments and liquidated damages.

The application judge dismissed all claims.

On appeal, the court upheld the dismissal, finding that the tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the counterclaims, that the prolongation costs claim was addressed by the tribunal, that procedural fairness was afforded on all issues, and that the award did not violate public policy.

The applicant sought to set aside an international commercial arbitration award under the International Commercial Arbitration Act.

The arbitration involved a dispute over the construction of a pipeline in Madagascar.

The applicant argued the arbitral tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction, denied the applicant the right to present its case, and made findings contrary to Ontario public policy.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding no jurisdictional errors, no denial of procedural fairness, and no double recovery that would offend public policy.

The court also noted it would have exercised its discretion to uphold the award even if minor procedural errors had occurred.

The municipality sought an injunction requiring the respondents to obtain a licence as either a taxicab broker or a limousine service company under Chapter 545 of the City of Toronto Municipal Code.

The application alleged that the respondents, through their smartphone platform, accepted requests for transportation services and therefore carried on a regulated business.

The court interpreted the by‑law definitions of “taxicab”, “limousine service company”, and the requirement to “accept calls”, concluding that the automated software platform merely relayed digital requests between passengers and drivers.

Because acceptance occurred only when an individual driver chose to accept a trip request, the respondents themselves did not accept calls or requests within the meaning of the by‑law.

Accordingly, the respondents were not operating as a taxicab broker or limousine service company requiring a municipal licence.

On a motion for a sealing order in the context of a municipal enforcement application concerning ride-sharing services, the moving parties sought to keep an insurance policy confidential under s. 137(2) of the Courts of Justice Act.

Applying the Sierra Club test, the court held the evidence did not establish a real and substantial risk to an important commercial interest capable of being expressed as a public interest in confidentiality.

The absence of evidence from the insurer and the nature of the document as an insurance policy undermined the claim of confidentiality and competitive harm.

The court further indicated that, even if the first branch had been met, the salutary effects would not outweigh the deleterious effects given the open court principle and the public interest nature of the underlying proceeding.

The motion was dismissed.

In a contested shareholder proxy fight arising from a requisitioned special meeting, the applicants sought court supervision over meeting procedures under the Business Corporations Act, including appointment of an independent chair and invalidation of the management proxy form.

The court held that an independent chair would not be imposed absent evidence of demonstrated impropriety or a likelihood the proposed chair would act unfairly, and speculation about associations with incumbent management was insufficient.

The court also declined to invalidate the current proxy, finding it reflected the requisitioned resolutions, did not conflict with the governing statute or securities requirements, and better avoided voter confusion.

Issues relating to compliance of the dissident slate with the corporation's by-laws and proxy inspection logistics were left to be addressed in context if necessary after the meeting.

The respondent loaned a killer whale to the appellant under a Breeding Loan Agreement.

The respondent later gave notice to terminate the agreement, but the appellant refused to return the whale, arguing the termination right was qualified by a prior Interchange Agreement and extrinsic evidence.

The application judge found the Breeding Loan Agreement was a clear, unambiguous, stand-alone contract permitting termination without cause.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding no ambiguity that would allow the admission of extrinsic evidence and concluding the termination provision was not commercially unreasonable.

The appellants, residents of Ecuador, brought negligence actions against Copper Mesa Mining Corporation, its directors, and the TSX defendants for alleged human rights abuses committed by security forces in connection with a mining project in Ecuador.

The appellants claimed the TSX defendants owed a duty of care not to list Copper Mesa's shares, and the directors owed a duty to avoid acts contributing to the abuses.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's decision to strike the claims under Rule 21.01(1)(b), finding that the pleadings failed to establish the requisite foreseeability and proximity under the Cooper-Anns test to ground a novel duty of care.

The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order transferring three related actions to the Commercial List.

The plaintiffs argued that the actions, which alleged negligence against the defendants for their involvement in mining operations in Ecuador, were not commercial in nature.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's discretionary decision to transfer the actions, as the pleadings relied on commercial statutes and raised issues of corporate governance.

The court also found that the proposed appeal did not involve matters of general public importance.

The appellants appealed an order of the motions judge which concluded that there was no real and substantial connection to support jurisdiction and that jurisdiction should be declined on the ground of forum non conveniens.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motions judge's cogent and persuasive reasons and finding no grounds to interfere with the result.

Multiple appeals and a Crown appeal challenged Ontario's Sunday retail closing regime under division of powers and the Charter.

The Court held the legislation was intra vires provincial authority and that it had a secular common-pause-day purpose, not a religious one.

A majority held the Act infringed the freedom of religion of Saturday-observing retailers by imposing a non-trivial economic burden, but that the infringement was justified under s. 1 because the legislation pursued a pressing social objective and included a constitutionally sufficient exemption scheme.

The s. 7 challenge failed, and no answer was given on s. 15 because it was not yet in force at the relevant time.

The retailer appeals were dismissed and the Crown's appeal against the kosher retailer was allowed.

The applicant union sought certification for employees of the respondent, a non-profit social service organization for Metis and non-status Indians.

The respondent argued that its operations fell under federal jurisdiction pursuant to section 91(24) of the British North America Act because its members and beneficiaries were 'Indians' and its activities were of a federal character.

The Ontario Labour Relations Board held that the respondent's operations did not constitute a federal undertaking or business, as they lacked a sufficient connection to Indian lands, the administration of reserves, or the exercise of rights under the Indian Act.

The Board concluded that provincial labour relations legislation applied and granted the certificate.