Bradley Ross Halfin

The plaintiff, Morguard Investments Limited, brought a negligence claim against the defendants, Alectra Inc. and Alectra Utilities Corporation, for damages resulting from a power outage during emergency electrical repairs.

The defendants cut power to the plaintiff's commercial premises in freezing temperatures to repair a broken electrical switch.

The power outage caused the plaintiff's hydronic heating system to freeze and burst, resulting in water damage.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action.

The court found that while the defendants may have owed a duty of care, the plaintiff failed to establish a breach of the standard of care.

The court determined that the plaintiff, as the building owner, was in the best position to know its heating system and should have alerted the defendants to the risk of pipes freezing in freezing conditions.

The motion was granted and the action was dismissed.

The plaintiff general contractor sued the Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) and other owners for approximately $193 million in damages arising from the delayed construction of the Steeles West Subway Station.

The project was delayed by 1,047 days due to incomplete designs, utility issues, and numerous changes directed by the TTC.

The court found the TTC responsible for the delay and awarded the plaintiff damages for extended contract performance, acceleration costs, underfunded change directives, and unpaid notices of intent to claim.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's attempt to flow through subcontractor claims where liquidating agreements had extinguished the plaintiff's liability.

The TTC's counterclaim for liquidated damages was dismissed as a penalty.

The plaintiff was granted a construction lien for $57,697,627.06.

The City of Oshawa sought a declaration that MEARIE had a duty to defend it in a slip-and-fall action arising from an uneven sidewalk where Oshawa PUC had previously performed work.

The City was an additional insured on Oshawa PUC's policy.

The court found that MEARIE had a duty to defend because there was a mere possibility that the claim fell within coverage, as the liability could arise from Oshawa PUC's operations.

However, the court held that the City must bear its share of defence costs for uncovered claims and denied the City's request to appoint its own counsel, finding that MEARIE's proposed safeguards adequately addressed any conflict of interest.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 25.11 to strike portions of the defendant's Statement of Defence and Counterclaim, arguing they pleaded facts protected by settlement privilege.

The defendant brought a cross-motion to amend the pleading.

The court granted leave for the interlocutory motion under the Construction Act.

The court declined to make a pre-emptive ruling on the admissibility of the communications at the pleadings stage, noting the factual dispute over whether they were 'without prejudice' settlement discussions or efforts to mitigate ongoing contractual issues.

The court struck the impugned paragraph but allowed the defendant's proposed amendment, which focused on the plaintiff's knowledge rather than the settlement proposal itself.

Walsh Construction Company Canada (WCC) brought a motion to compel the Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) to produce approximately 1,600 documents over which TTC claimed litigation privilege.

The court applied the "dominant purpose" test for litigation privilege, conducting a contextual analysis of when litigation was reasonably contemplated and whether the documents were created primarily for litigation or for other purposes such as contractual claims review, project completion, or budget management.

The court found that while litigation was anticipated, many documents served multiple purposes, and TTC failed to establish dominant litigation purpose for a significant portion of the disputed documents.

The court ordered the production of most documents, with specific exceptions for those genuinely created for the dominant purpose of litigation or solicitor-client privilege, and provided directions for redactions.

The appellant, a contractor, challenged an international commercial arbitral award arising from a US$258 million pipeline construction project in Madagascar.

The appellant sought to set aside portions of the award on grounds of lack of jurisdiction over counterclaims, failure to exercise jurisdiction over prolongation costs, denial of procedural fairness regarding retention monies, hydro seeding costs, and costs awards, and violation of public policy regarding alleged double recovery from forfeiture of tranche payments and liquidated damages.

The application judge dismissed all claims.

On appeal, the court upheld the dismissal, finding that the tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the counterclaims, that the prolongation costs claim was addressed by the tribunal, that procedural fairness was afforded on all issues, and that the award did not violate public policy.

The applicant sought to set aside an international commercial arbitration award under the International Commercial Arbitration Act.

The arbitration involved a dispute over the construction of a pipeline in Madagascar.

The applicant argued the arbitral tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction, denied the applicant the right to present its case, and made findings contrary to Ontario public policy.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding no jurisdictional errors, no denial of procedural fairness, and no double recovery that would offend public policy.

The court also noted it would have exercised its discretion to uphold the award even if minor procedural errors had occurred.

The appellant appealed an order granting a stay of proceedings pending arbitration.

The parties had a Services Agreement with an arbitration clause and a survival clause that did not explicitly list the arbitration clause.

After the respondent terminated the agreement, the appellant sued for breach of contract and torts, and sought a declaration that the arbitration clause did not apply.

The motion judge stayed the proceedings, finding it arguable whether the arbitration clause survived, and referred the jurisdictional issue to the arbitrator under the competence-competence principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's application of the competence-competence principle or his decision to defer the jurisdictional question to the arbitrator.

Following a successful summary judgment motion dismissing a collection action as statute-barred under the two‑year limitation period, the defendants sought costs of $17,047.26 on a partial indemnity basis.

The court considered the governing principles under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including fairness, reasonableness, and proportionality.

The judge found the claimed amount excessive given the simple nature of the statute‑bar issue and the approximately 90 hours of legal work performed.

The court also noted that the defendants’ conduct had fostered the impression that payment would eventually be made and that they had already received insurance compensation related to the underlying loss.

Costs were therefore reduced and fixed at a lower amount.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing a collection action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff sought recovery of approximately $62,000 for construction work performed in 2006–2007 but did not commence the action until 2012.

The plaintiff argued that promissory estoppel prevented reliance on the limitation defence and that a breach of trust claim under the Construction Lien Act was only discovered in 2011.

The court held that the claim for breach of contract was discovered by August 2008 at the latest and that there was no written acknowledgment of liability sufficient to restart the limitation period or support promissory estoppel.

The court further held that the breach of trust claim was discoverable at the same time as the breach of contract through reasonable diligence, rendering the entire action statute-barred.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment enforcing a settlement agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that there was no genuine issue for trial regarding whether an unconditional settlement offer was made on July 8, 2008, and accepted the following day.

Costs of $3,500 were awarded to the respondent.