Howard Wise

CS Capital Limited, a secured creditor and mortgagee, brought a motion seeking a declaration that its mortgage had priority over construction lien claims on a property.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the mortgage was not registered prior to the time the first lien arose in respect of the overall improvement project.

Furthermore, the court determined that the mortgage was a collateral mortgage securing a guarantee of a separate debt, and therefore no "advance" was made in respect of it for the purposes of priority under the Construction Act.

The plaintiff general contractor sued the Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) and other owners for approximately $193 million in damages arising from the delayed construction of the Steeles West Subway Station.

The project was delayed by 1,047 days due to incomplete designs, utility issues, and numerous changes directed by the TTC.

The court found the TTC responsible for the delay and awarded the plaintiff damages for extended contract performance, acceleration costs, underfunded change directives, and unpaid notices of intent to claim.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's attempt to flow through subcontractor claims where liquidating agreements had extinguished the plaintiff's liability.

The TTC's counterclaim for liquidated damages was dismissed as a penalty.

The plaintiff was granted a construction lien for $57,697,627.06.

The appellants, a group of subcontractors and a bank, appealed an application judge's decision that rescission of surety bonds might be possible even if it affects innocent third parties.

The bonds were issued by Zurich Insurance Company Ltd. for a large construction project, but Zurich later discovered alleged fraudulent misrepresentations and collusion that induced it to issue the bonds.

The appellants sought a declaration that rescission was unavailable as a matter of law due to the involvement of innocent third parties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that prejudice to third parties is not an absolute bar to rescission, especially in cases of fraudulent misrepresentation, and that such a determination requires a full factual record at trial.

The applicants, a syndicate of lenders and various construction trades, sought declarations that the respondent surety could not rescind performance and payment bonds issued for a hospital redevelopment project.

The surety had discovered alleged fraud and collusion in the procurement process and commenced a separate action for rescission.

The applicants argued they were innocent third parties whose rights under the bonds could not be defeated by the alleged fraud of the principals.

The court dismissed the applications, finding that the applicants' rights were derivative of the principals and that rescission remained a possible equitable remedy that must be determined on a full factual record at trial.

The Bondfield Group, a major construction company, sought CCAA protection due to insolvency, over $1 billion in active contracts, and over 200 lawsuits.

The application was unopposed and resulted from extensive stakeholder negotiations.

The court granted an initial order for CCAA protection, including a stay of proceedings, approval of a tailored $8 million Debtor-in-Possession (DIP) facility funded by Zurich Insurance, an Administration Charge for professional fees, and a Directors' Charge for $3 million (excluding John Aquino).

The court emphasized the public interest in completing critical infrastructure projects and the preference for CCAA over receivership to preserve enterprise value.

This case conference endorsement outlines procedural progress in a complex, multi-party construction litigation involving Carillion Construction Inc., the City of Toronto, and NORR Limited, among others.

The court addressed the schedule for executive discoveries, ruling that they must proceed as planned, contrary to the City's submission.

It also confirmed the mediation schedule for March-April 2019, involving various claimants and insurers.

Further directions were given regarding documentary production by subcontractors and the City's amended third-party claim against Metrolinx, setting deadlines for Metrolinx's response or motion.

The applicant, Covanta, brought an application to set aside an arbitrator's decision to join two subcontractors to an ongoing arbitration between Covanta and the general contractor.

The arbitrator had joined the subcontractors under Article 17(5) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.

Covanta argued the arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction because the subcontractors were not parties to the arbitration agreement.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the arbitrator's decision was jurisdictional in nature and subject to review on a standard of correctness.

The Court found that the subcontractors were not parties to the arbitration agreement, as the subcontract did not properly incorporate the arbitration clause by reference.

The Court set aside the arbitrator's ruling and awarded costs of $50,000 to the applicant.

Following a summary judgment decision awarding damages for conversion, the plaintiff requested clarification regarding unresolved claims for unjust enrichment and punitive damages.

The court held that the unjust enrichment claim had been pleaded only as an alternative to conversion and therefore did not require adjudication once conversion was established.

The court acknowledged that the prior reasons failed to address the punitive damages claim and considered it in this supplementary endorsement.

It concluded that the defendants’ conduct did not meet the exceptional threshold required for punitive damages.

The claim for punitive damages was therefore dismissed.

The plaintiff subcontractor moved for summary judgment arising from a bridge construction dispute after the original general contractor became insolvent.

The motion concerned customized arch assembly jigs and a modified power container that remained on site and were then used by a replacement contractor to complete the project.

The court held that title to the equipment never passed under the subcontract, that the defendants’ refusal to permit removal was unreasonable, and that both defendants were liable in conversion.

Summary judgment was granted, damages were fixed at $135,600, and motion costs of $20,000 were awarded on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff subcontractor brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant property owner and new general contractor for the tort of conversion.

After the original general contractor became insolvent, the plaintiff sought to remove its custom-built equipment from the construction site.

The defendants refused access, claiming the equipment had been paid for under the original contract.

The court found that title to the equipment never passed to the defendants and their refusal to allow the plaintiff to retrieve it constituted conversion.

Summary judgment was granted and damages were awarded based on the defendants' previous counter-offer to purchase the equipment.

Following a successful summary judgment motion dismissing a collection action as statute-barred under the two‑year limitation period, the defendants sought costs of $17,047.26 on a partial indemnity basis.

The court considered the governing principles under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including fairness, reasonableness, and proportionality.

The judge found the claimed amount excessive given the simple nature of the statute‑bar issue and the approximately 90 hours of legal work performed.

The court also noted that the defendants’ conduct had fostered the impression that payment would eventually be made and that they had already received insurance compensation related to the underlying loss.

Costs were therefore reduced and fixed at a lower amount.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing a collection action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff sought recovery of approximately $62,000 for construction work performed in 2006–2007 but did not commence the action until 2012.

The plaintiff argued that promissory estoppel prevented reliance on the limitation defence and that a breach of trust claim under the Construction Lien Act was only discovered in 2011.

The court held that the claim for breach of contract was discovered by August 2008 at the latest and that there was no written acknowledgment of liability sufficient to restart the limitation period or support promissory estoppel.

The court further held that the breach of trust claim was discoverable at the same time as the breach of contract through reasonable diligence, rendering the entire action statute-barred.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment enforcing a settlement agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that there was no genuine issue for trial regarding whether an unconditional settlement offer was made on July 8, 2008, and accepted the following day.

Costs of $3,500 were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed an order of Master MacLeod, arguing procedural unfairness because the order was allegedly made without formal notice or supporting materials, precluding an explanation for its defaults.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the record disclosed full notice to the appellant and there was no palpable and overriding error or erroneous exercise of discretion by the Master.

The appellant, a sub-lessee of commercial space, appealed the dismissal of its application for relief from forfeiture under s. 21 of the Commercial Tenancies Act and s. 98 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The landlord had exercised its right under the main lease to terminate the lease after receiving a request from the tenant to assign the lease.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that relief from forfeiture is only available where a landlord seeks to enforce a right of re-entry or forfeiture due to a tenant's breach or default.

Because the landlord was exercising a contractual option to terminate rather than responding to a default, the statutory relief provisions did not apply.