Meghan Solveig Bridges

Glycobiosciences Inc. (Glyco) sought leave for its non-lawyer president, Kevin Drizen, to represent the corporation in an application before the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.

This application sought the same relief previously denied by the Federal Court, specifically an order requiring L'Oreal to delete confidential information.

The court dismissed the motion, affirming that corporations must generally be represented by lawyers and that the desire to save legal fees does not constitute a barrier to access to justice.

The court also noted Mr. Drizen's history of unsuccessful litigation and abuse of process in previous related matters.

The defendant, Dr. Sheldon Victor Pollack, brought a motion to dismiss a certified class action for delay under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, and Rule 24.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The class action, initiated in 2003 by the representative plaintiff Anna Barbiero, alleged medical negligence and battery related to Dr. Pollack's injection of Injectable Grade Liquid Silicone (IGLS) for lip augmentation.

The court found the 21-year delay inordinate and inexcusable, with significant periods of unexplained inactivity.

The plaintiff failed to rebut the strong presumption of prejudice, and actual prejudice was established due to the loss of the IGLS sample, which was crucial for the defendant's ability to test its composition and defend against liability and causation claims.

The court granted the motion, dismissing the class action for delay, and ordered that notice be provided to class members.

This is an appeal from a Divisional Court decision that upheld a trial judge's refusal to enter judgment in accordance with a jury verdict in a medical malpractice case.

The jury found the defendant physicians negligent and that their negligence caused the plaintiff's severe disabilities.

The trial judge ordered a new trial, finding the jury's answers on causation insufficient.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in refusing to enter judgment.

The court emphasized the high standard for setting aside jury verdicts and the presumption that juries understand and apply judicial instructions, even if their answers are conclusory.

The judgment of $14.9 million in damages was reinstated.

The defendants brought a mid-trial motion to exclude the expert testimony of Professor Bernard Dickens, an ethicist, regarding the ethical standards of psychiatric care and research applicable in the 1960s and 1970s at the Oak Ridge Division of the Penetanguishine Mental Health Centre.

The defendants argued that Prof. Dickens, not being a physician, was unqualified to speak on psychiatric standards of care and that his reports primarily constituted legal analysis.

The court dismissed the motion, finding Prof. Dickens highly qualified as an expert in medical ethics, distinguishing ethical standards from medical standards of care and legal analysis.

The defendants brought a mid-trial motion to determine the admissibility of two reply expert reports (Prof. Shane O’Mara and Dr. Stephen Xenakis) served by the plaintiffs just before trial.

The defendants argued the reports were late and constituted impermissible case splitting.

The plaintiffs contended the lateness was due to unforeseen circumstances and that the evidence would assist the court.

The court found that the issues addressed by the reply reports were foreseeable and had already been covered by the plaintiffs' initial experts, thus constituting new evidence rather than proper reply.

The court dismissed the motion, ruling the reports inadmissible to avoid prejudice to the defendants and further trial delays, emphasizing the importance of adhering to trial schedules in a long-standing action.

The plaintiffs brought a mid-trial motion to amend their statement of claim to include reliance on section 16(1)(h.2) of the Limitations Act, 2002, and the common law doctrine of discoverability.

The claims arose from their treatment as involuntary patients at a mental health facility between 1966 and 1983, alleging assault through abusive experimentation and physical abuse.

The defendants opposed the amendment, arguing prejudice due to lack of particularity and insufficient discovery on discoverability.

The court granted the motion, finding no prejudice to the defendants as the allegations of assault and dependency were already pleaded, and the defendants had prior notice of the plaintiffs' intent to rely on section 16(1)(h.2) and had extensively explored issues related to discoverability (laches) during previous discovery examinations.

The respondents appealed an order from the Superior Court of Justice directing a new trial on the basis that the jury's answers on causation were fatally flawed.

The moving parties brought a motion to quash the appeal, arguing that the order was interlocutory and therefore only appealable to the Divisional Court with leave.

The Court of Appeal held that an order directing a new trial is interlocutory in nature, as it does not finally determine the substantive rights of the parties but rather requires another trial for that purpose.

The appeal was quashed and transferred to the Divisional Court.