Meghan Solveig Bridges

The parties sought to enforce Minutes of Settlement regarding the division and sale of jointly owned commercial properties.

The respondents alleged the applicants breached the agreement by failing to extend a bid deadline during the property auction.

The court found the applicants did not breach the agreement, as the independent broker recommended against the extension and the contract did not require it.

The respondents were found in breach for refusing to execute the backstop purchase agreement without unauthorized amendments.

The court ordered specific performance, compelling the respondents to execute the agreement as drafted.

The plaintiff moved to certify a class action against the defendants regarding their practice of automatically renewing residential mortgages at maturity into six-month closed terms at higher posted rates.

The plaintiff alleged this practice breached section 8 of the Interest Act, breached the standard form contracts, and constituted unjust enrichment.

The court found that the pleadings disclosed viable causes of action, including that the automatic renewal could trigger 'arrears' under the Interest Act.

The court certified the class action, finding an identifiable class, common issues predominating over individual ones, and that a class proceeding was the preferable procedure.

The appellants appealed an order declaring them vexatious litigants under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The application judge found that the individual appellant, who was the sole officer and employee of the corporate appellant, had serially engaged in vexatious litigation since 2017, including bringing proceedings outside the court's jurisdiction and failing to pay significant costs awards.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's application of the relevant factors and concluding that the order against both the corporation and the individual directing its litigation was entirely justified.

The University of Toronto brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to dismantle a protest encampment set up by students and others on Front Campus.

The protesters argued the encampment was a protected exercise of their rights to freedom of expression, association, and assembly.

The court granted the injunction, finding that the University established a strong prima facie case of trespass and ejectment.

The court held that the protesters' appropriation of University property to the exclusion of others constituted irreparable harm.

The balance of convenience favoured the University, as the injunction only prohibited camping and erecting structures, while allowing the protesters to continue demonstrating elsewhere on campus.

In an alternative analysis, the court found that the Charter does not apply to the University's management of its property, and even if it did, the trespass notice was a justified limit under section 1.

Glycobiosciences Inc. (Glyco) sought leave for its non-lawyer president, Kevin Drizen, to represent the corporation in an application before the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.

This application sought the same relief previously denied by the Federal Court, specifically an order requiring L'Oreal to delete confidential information.

The court dismissed the motion, affirming that corporations must generally be represented by lawyers and that the desire to save legal fees does not constitute a barrier to access to justice.

The court also noted Mr. Drizen's history of unsuccessful litigation and abuse of process in previous related matters.

The defendant, Dr. Sheldon Victor Pollack, brought a motion to dismiss a certified class action for delay under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, and Rule 24.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The class action, initiated in 2003 by the representative plaintiff Anna Barbiero, alleged medical negligence and battery related to Dr. Pollack's injection of Injectable Grade Liquid Silicone (IGLS) for lip augmentation.

The court found the 21-year delay inordinate and inexcusable, with significant periods of unexplained inactivity.

The plaintiff failed to rebut the strong presumption of prejudice, and actual prejudice was established due to the loss of the IGLS sample, which was crucial for the defendant's ability to test its composition and defend against liability and causation claims.

The court granted the motion, dismissing the class action for delay, and ordered that notice be provided to class members.

The defendant brought a motion for security for costs under Rule 56.01(1)(d), arguing there was good reason to believe the plaintiff corporation had insufficient assets in Ontario.

The defendant relied on an unsatisfied foreign arbitral award and the plaintiff's delay in paying a previous costs order.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the foreign award was likely statute-barred in Ontario and the payment of the previous costs order demonstrated an ability to pay, not an inability.

The court also noted the defendant's unexplained 28-month delay in bringing the motion would have been fatal regardless.

The respondents were involuntarily admitted to a maximum-security psychiatric facility between 1966 and 1983, where they were subjected to experimental and abusive treatment programs, including mind-altering drugs and severe solitary confinement.

The trial judge found the province and the treating physicians liable for breach of fiduciary duty, battery, and assault, awarding substantial general and punitive damages.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the findings of breach of fiduciary duty and battery for certain respondents, but reversed the findings of assault and battery for others due to a lack of direct physical interference or imminent threat.

The Court rejected defences based on Crown immunity and historic limitation periods, and largely upheld the damages awards, including those exceeding the Andrews cap, while making specific adjustments for individual respondents.

This is an appeal from a Divisional Court decision that upheld a trial judge's refusal to enter judgment in accordance with a jury verdict in a medical malpractice case.

The jury found the defendant physicians negligent and that their negligence caused the plaintiff's severe disabilities.

The trial judge ordered a new trial, finding the jury's answers on causation insufficient.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in refusing to enter judgment.

The court emphasized the high standard for setting aside jury verdicts and the presumption that juries understand and apply judicial instructions, even if their answers are conclusory.

The judgment of $14.9 million in damages was reinstated.

Following a 71-day trial where the plaintiffs were awarded nearly $10 million in damages, the plaintiffs sought costs of approximately $8.5 million on a substantial indemnity basis or $5.3 million on a partial indemnity basis.

The defendants argued that substantial indemnity costs were unwarranted and that the partial indemnity claim included costs for interlocutory matters already decided.

The court found no reprehensible conduct by the defendants to justify an elevated scale of costs.

Applying the partial indemnity scale and deducting amounts attributable to prior interlocutory motions, the court fixed the plaintiffs' costs at $4,900,000 all-inclusive.

This is the damages phase of a multi-party action brought by 28 former patients of the Oak Ridge Division of the Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre.

In the liability phase, the defendants (two psychiatrists and the Crown) were found liable for breach of fiduciary duty and battery for subjecting the plaintiffs to experimental and harmful psychiatric programs (DDT, Capsule, and MAPP) between the 1960s and 1980s.

The court assessed general, punitive, and income loss damages on an individual basis.

General damages were awarded to all plaintiffs, ranging from nominal amounts to over $2 million for the most severely impacted.

Punitive damages were awarded in cases involving particularly egregious conduct, such as the treatment of underage patients or the administration of alcohol to known alcoholics.

Income loss claims were largely limited or barred by the ex turpi causa doctrine, which prevented recovery for periods the plaintiffs spent lawfully incarcerated or institutionalized for subsequent criminal offenses.

During a trial, the plaintiffs brought a motion to qualify a forensic accountant to give expert evidence on the quantification of income loss and to respond to the defendants' experts' use of the HALS/PALS statistical approach.

The defendants argued the accountant was not qualified to comment on the HALS/PALS approach.

The court held that while the accountant lacked medical or vocational expertise to apply the HALS/PALS data, his experience in valuation methodology qualified him to opine on the comparative merits of individualized versus statistical approaches to discount rates.

The expert was qualified to give opinion evidence on accounting issues and valuation methodology.

During the damages phase of a trial concerning institutional abuse, the defendants moved to exclude the expert testimony of the plaintiff's treating psychologist, arguing her long-term therapeutic relationship compromised her objectivity.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the expert's changing opinions over time were reasonably explained by her subsequent review of the plaintiff's clinical records from the institution, rather than an assumption of an advocacy role.

The court held that the expert maintained the requisite independence and objectivity to assist the court.

During the damages phase of a trial concerning historical abuses at the Oak Ridge Social Therapy Unit, the defendants moved to strike portions of the plaintiffs' expert reply report authored by Dr. Roy O'Shaughnessy.

The defendants argued the impugned paragraphs raised irrelevant issues or issues already addressed in the liability phase.

The court granted the motion in part, striking paragraphs that opined on alternative treatments or whether the plaintiffs should have been at Oak Ridge, as these fell outside the scope of the damages inquiry.

Paragraphs addressing the impact of the programs on the plaintiffs' institutionalization and employment trajectories were deemed admissible.

The defendants requested the court to issue a formal judgment following the liability phase of a bifurcated trial to establish res judicata for the upcoming damages phase.

The plaintiffs consented to the form of the draft judgment but argued it was unnecessary at this stage.

The court declined to issue the formal judgment, finding that the trial is a single proceeding and a comprehensive judgment should be issued after the damages phase is completed, though the liability findings remain binding.

In the second phase (damages) of a bifurcated trial concerning institutional abuse at the Oak Ridge mental health facility, the defendants moved to exclude three expert reports tendered by the plaintiffs.

The court found that the reports of the two psychiatrists and one psychologist improperly repeated and elaborated on causation evidence that had already been adjudicated in the first phase of the trial.

The court ruled the reports inadmissible under the Mohan test as they were unnecessary and prejudicial, but granted the plaintiffs leave to submit revised reports focused strictly on the quantification of damages and economic loss.

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action against the defendant obstetricians, alleging that their negligence caused the infant plaintiff to suffer a severe brain injury.

Following a jury trial, the jury found that the defendants breached the standard of care and that the breaches caused the injuries.

However, the trial judge refused to enter judgment on the verdict, finding that the jury's answers explaining how the breaches caused the injuries were insufficient and non-responsive.

The trial judge ordered a new trial.

The plaintiffs appealed, arguing the trial judge exceeded her jurisdiction.

The defendants cross-appealed, arguing the action should have been dismissed for lack of evidence on causation.

The Divisional Court dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal.

The majority held that the trial judge correctly concluded the jury's answers on causation were insufficient, as they merely repeated the breaches of the standard of care and failed to explain the causal link, leaving the central issue in doubt.

The plaintiffs, former involuntary patients at the maximum-security Oak Ridge division of the Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre, brought an action against two doctors and the provincial Crown.

They alleged they were subjected to abusive and experimental psychiatric programs, including hallucinogenic drugs, solitary confinement, and harsh disciplinary regimes, without informed consent.

The court found that the doctors breached their fiduciary duties and committed assault and battery.

The court also found the Crown directly and vicariously liable for these breaches and torts, rejecting the Crown's arguments of statutory immunity, limitation periods, and laches.

The trial was bifurcated, with this decision addressing liability and causation, leaving damages to be quantified later.

During a trial, the defendants brought a motion to exclude a new reply report by the plaintiffs' expert, Dr. John Bradford.

The plaintiffs sought to introduce the report to address six questions they claimed arose unexpectedly from the defendants' experts' testimony.

The court reviewed the principles governing late-filed expert reports, noting they are only admissible to address new, unanticipated matters raised by the defence.

The court analyzed each of the six questions and found that only one (Question 4, regarding the difference between segregation in a hospital versus a prison setting) addressed a genuinely new opinion.

The motion to exclude was partially granted, with only Question 4 of the reply report admitted.

In a voir dire during a trial, the plaintiffs challenged the qualification of the defendants' proposed expert witness, a forensic psychiatrist, arguing that a previously undisclosed 2002 draft report demonstrated a lack of independence.

The plaintiffs alleged that the expert's subsequent 2003 and 2019 reports were substantively altered to align with the defendants' legal position.

The court held that while the differences between the reports raised a suspicion sufficient to lift any litigation privilege over the draft report, they did not warrant disqualifying the expert at the threshold stage.

The expert was qualified to testify, with the draft report permitted to be used for cross-examination, and the ultimate assessment of his credibility and independence reserved for the trial judgment.