Professor Bernard Dickens

The respondents were involuntarily admitted to a maximum-security psychiatric facility between 1966 and 1983, where they were subjected to experimental and abusive treatment programs, including mind-altering drugs and severe solitary confinement.

The trial judge found the province and the treating physicians liable for breach of fiduciary duty, battery, and assault, awarding substantial general and punitive damages.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the findings of breach of fiduciary duty and battery for certain respondents, but reversed the findings of assault and battery for others due to a lack of direct physical interference or imminent threat.

The Court rejected defences based on Crown immunity and historic limitation periods, and largely upheld the damages awards, including those exceeding the Andrews cap, while making specific adjustments for individual respondents.

The plaintiffs, former involuntary patients at the maximum-security Oak Ridge division of the Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre, brought an action against two doctors and the provincial Crown.

They alleged they were subjected to abusive and experimental psychiatric programs, including hallucinogenic drugs, solitary confinement, and harsh disciplinary regimes, without informed consent.

The court found that the doctors breached their fiduciary duties and committed assault and battery.

The court also found the Crown directly and vicariously liable for these breaches and torts, rejecting the Crown's arguments of statutory immunity, limitation periods, and laches.

The trial was bifurcated, with this decision addressing liability and causation, leaving damages to be quantified later.

The defendants brought a mid-trial motion to admit three sur-reply expert reports.

The plaintiffs opposed, arguing the reports were unnecessary, prejudicial, and served late.

The court admitted two of the reports, finding them to be narrowly tailored responses to specific criticisms raised by the plaintiffs' experts.

However, the court excluded the third report, finding it to be an advocacy piece that improperly introduced new evidence and amounted to case-splitting.