Nikolas Charles De Stefano

Five organizations brought motions for leave to intervene in an appeal concerning the constitutionality of provincial legislation that required the removal of bicycle lanes in Toronto.

The underlying judgment found the legislation violated section 7 of the Charter.

The motion judge granted leave to all five proposed interveners, but limited the scope of their interventions to specific issues such as the positive/negative rights dichotomy, the interpretation of recent section 7 jurisprudence, and the application of equality and child-interest principles to the gross disproportionality analysis.

The interveners were restricted to 10-page factums and brief oral submissions.

The appellant was convicted of possessing cocaine and methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking and possessing proceeds of crime following a police investigation that began with a confidential informant tip.

The appellant appealed on grounds that the police violated his Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b), and that evidence should be excluded under section 24(2).

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding no violation of sections 8 or 9, acknowledging a section 10(b) breach but finding the evidence admissible under section 24(2) analysis.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of two easements: a 15-foot wide right-of-way for ingress and egress, and a right-of-access to a well.

The appellants (servient tenement owners) sought declarations that the right-of-way did not include vehicular turnaround activity and that the well access was null and void.

The respondents (dominant tenement owners) sought declarations affirming their rights, an injunction against obstructions, and damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's findings that the right-of-way included the turnaround area based on latent ambiguity and ancillary rights, and that the right-of-access to the well had not been extinguished.

The University of Toronto brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to dismantle a protest encampment set up by students and others on Front Campus.

The protesters argued the encampment was a protected exercise of their rights to freedom of expression, association, and assembly.

The court granted the injunction, finding that the University established a strong prima facie case of trespass and ejectment.

The court held that the protesters' appropriation of University property to the exclusion of others constituted irreparable harm.

The balance of convenience favoured the University, as the injunction only prohibited camping and erecting structures, while allowing the protesters to continue demonstrating elsewhere on campus.

In an alternative analysis, the court found that the Charter does not apply to the University's management of its property, and even if it did, the trespass notice was a justified limit under section 1.

This decision addresses a motion for partial indemnity costs arising from a successful pleadings motion brought by the defendants.

The plaintiffs, whose statement of claim was found deficient, sought costs themselves or costs in the cause, arguing mixed success.

The court determined that the defendants were substantially successful, as several claims were struck, some without leave to amend.

The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments, emphasizing that a deficient pleading necessitated the defendants' motion.

Costs were fixed in favour of the defendants, payable by the plaintiffs.

This is a pleadings motion brought by the defendants to strike various causes of action and allegations from the plaintiffs' statement of claim, including claims for piercing the corporate veil, fraud, breach of court orders, negligent misrepresentation, conversion, unjust enrichment, oppression, and conspiracy.

The court considered the legal sufficiency of the pleadings under Rule 21.01(1)(b) and Rule 25.11, and the possibility of granting leave to amend.

The court struck claims for breach of court orders, negligent misrepresentation, and conspiracy without leave to amend, finding they disclosed no reasonable cause of action or were frivolous/vexatious.

Claims for fraud, conversion, unjust enrichment, and oppression were struck with leave to amend, as the plaintiffs might be able to plead sufficient material facts.

The claim to pierce the corporate veil against individual defendants for fraudulent conduct was found sufficiently pleaded, but a declaration to treat corporate plaintiffs as one defendant was struck.

Allegations of false affidavits were struck due to absolute privilege, but allegations of pressuring employees to provide false statements were not.

The City of Kingston sought a permanent injunction to dismantle a homeless encampment in Belle Park, citing safety and public use concerns.

Respondents argued the By-Law prohibiting camping violated sections 7 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the By-Law was unconstitutional insofar as it prohibited homeless individuals from erecting temporary overnight shelter in public parks, as this grossly disproportionately affected their life, liberty, and security of the person.

However, the court did not extend this finding to daytime sheltering due to insufficient evidence.

The City's application for injunctive relief was dismissed because the proposed terms were too broad and did not comply with the ruling.

This appeal concerned the appropriate remedy for a party who deliberately accessed the opposing party's privileged information.

The application judge had struck the appellant's Notice of Appearance, barred them from filing evidence, and ordered the Partition Application to proceed undefended.

The appellant argued that this remedy was unpleaded, unproven, and that lesser remedies were available.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the application judge's decision.

The court found no error in applying the three-part test for unauthorized access to privileged documents, particularly given the appellant's failure to rebut the presumption of prejudice or propose effective alternative remedies.

This endorsement addresses the quantum of costs following a successful application by Costco Wholesale Corporation to enforce arbitral awards and a U.S. judgment on costs against TicketOps Corporation.

Costco sought $65,000 on a partial indemnity basis, while TicketOps proposed $50,000 plus HST.

The court, considering factors under Rule 57.01, found that while the time spent by Costco's counsel was not disputed, the hourly rates of some junior lawyers were higher than reasonably expected.

The court awarded Costco $60,000 on a partial indemnity basis, deeming it a fair and reasonable amount within the parties' reasonable expectations.

Costco brought an application to enforce an international arbitral award and a U.S. District Court judgment against TicketOps for failing to remit funds owed to suppliers.

TicketOps opposed the application and brought a motion to convert it into an action, arguing a denial of natural justice and public policy concerns, including an allegation of bias because the arbitrator was Facebook friends with Costco's U.S. counsel.

The court dismissed TicketOps' motion and granted the application, finding no valid grounds under the Model Law to refuse recognition and enforcement of the arbitral awards.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an earlier order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $5,000 to each of the two responding party groups.