Greta Hoaken

The appellants sought production of trust ledgers of the respondents' law firms and unredacted bank statements in a civil fraud action, arguing that the records were necessary to trace funds and determine if the respondents breached Mareva injunctions.

The courts below held that the trust ledgers were presumptively privileged, the presumption was not rebutted, and the crime-fraud exception did not apply.

The Divisional Court also remitted the issue of privilege over the unredacted bank statements to the motion judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trust ledgers were presumptively privileged and the presumption was not rebutted.

The Court also held that while the crime-fraud exception could apply in a civil action for fraud or breach of a court order, the appellants failed to establish a prima facie case for its application.

The Court found no error in remitting the bank statements issue to the motion judge.

The provincial legislature passed legislation to remove certain bicycle lanes in Toronto to reduce traffic congestion.

The respondents successfully challenged the legislation in Superior Court, arguing it violated section 7 of the Charter by depriving cyclists of security of the person in an arbitrary and grossly disproportionate manner.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision, holding that the Charter does not create a positive right to bicycle lanes and that the legislature's decision to repeal or amend prior policy choices regarding road use does not violate section 7.

The Court found the legislation was neither arbitrary nor grossly disproportionate.

The court determined the costs for seven different motions in a complex commercial action involving Mareva injunctions and proprietary claims.

Applying the principles from Boucher and Rule 57.01, the court awarded partial indemnity costs to the successful parties on each motion, balancing divided success and the reasonableness of the amounts claimed.

In total, the plaintiffs were ordered to pay net costs to various defendants, while some defendants were ordered to pay costs to the plaintiffs for motions where the plaintiffs were successful.

Application and cross-application concerning a municipal site-specific by-law aimed at clearing a longstanding homeless encampment to facilitate a transit hub project.

The court held that the by-law infringed s. 7 because closing the only lawful sheltering site of last resort in a region with grossly insufficient accessible indoor shelter exposed chronically homeless persons to serious risks to life, liberty, and security of the person in a manner grossly disproportionate to the by-law’s objective.

The court further held that the by-law infringed s. 15 by disproportionately burdening homeless persons who were women, gender-diverse, disabled, and Indigenous, and also recognized homelessness itself as an analogous ground under s. 15.

The infringements were not saved under s. 1, the bad-faith challenge under s. 273 of the Municipal Act failed, and the court declared the by-laws of no force and effect, restrained enforcement, and retained jurisdiction for further directions if a lawful alternative tenting protocol or site is implemented.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking a declaration that the defendant waived litigation privilege over a 'Proffer' document provided to the Attorney General of Canada for national security vetting under s. 38 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The court held that while the document was created for the dominant purpose of litigation, the defendant's stated intention of using it to promote trial efficiency constituted a waiver of privilege vis-à-vis the trial judge.

The court ordered the unredacted Proffer to be provided to the judge and established a comprehensive trial protocol, including the appointment of amicus curiae and advance vetting of sensitive evidence, to balance national security concerns with trial fairness.

The appellant sought to enforce a Chilean arbitral award in Ontario against the respondent, a non-party to the arbitration, arguing the respondent assumed the judgment debtor's liabilities through an Italian spin-off agreement.

The motion judge stayed the enforcement application on the basis of forum non conveniens, finding that the threshold issue of liability must be determined first and that Italy was the clearly more appropriate forum.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge did not err in severing liability from enforcement, applying the forum non conveniens doctrine, or granting a temporary stay pending the resolution of Italian proceedings.

The appellants appealed an order requiring them to disclose the identities of third parties financing their living expenses, arguing that disclosure posed a risk to the funders' personal safety.

The motion judge had failed to address this safety issue.

The respondents argued the appeal was moot because the underlying motion to vary the Mareva injunction had already been decided using a counsels' eyes-only agreement.

The Divisional Court found the appeal was not moot due to the ongoing safety controversy.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the case management judge to determine the safety risk.

Five organizations brought motions for leave to intervene in an appeal concerning the constitutionality of provincial legislation that required the removal of bicycle lanes in Toronto.

The underlying judgment found the legislation violated section 7 of the Charter.

The motion judge granted leave to all five proposed interveners, but limited the scope of their interventions to specific issues such as the positive/negative rights dichotomy, the interpretation of recent section 7 jurisprudence, and the application of equality and child-interest principles to the gross disproportionality analysis.

The interveners were restricted to 10-page factums and brief oral submissions.

This is a case management decision in an appeal of a Superior Court judgment that declared section 195.6 of the Highway Traffic Act infringed section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and could not be justified under section 1 of the Charter.

The decision addresses the timetable for the appeal and the appellants' motion to expedite the hearing.

The Court of Appeal established a detailed timetable culminating in a hearing date of January 28, 2026, balancing the public importance of the issues with the need for proper briefing and consideration of intervention requests.

The Regional Municipality of Waterloo sought a declaration that its Site-Specific By-Law Number 25-021 regulating 100 Victoria Street North in Kitchener complies with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The by-law prohibits temporary structures and sheltering on the property, with a December 1, 2025 deadline for vacant possession to facilitate construction of the Kitchener Central Transit Hub.

Persons Unknown and to be Ascertained, chronically homeless individuals sheltering at the encampment, sought an interlocutory injunction restraining enforcement of the by-law pending determination of their Charter claims.

The court granted the injunction, finding serious issues to be tried regarding violations of section 7 Charter rights (life, liberty, and security of the person) and potential illegality under the Municipal Act, 2001, irreparable harm to vulnerable homeless persons, and balance of convenience favoring the injunction.

The applicants challenged the constitutionality of section 195.6 of the Highway Traffic Act, which required the removal of protected bicycle lanes on Bloor Street, University Avenue, and Yonge Street in Toronto and their replacement with lanes for motor vehicle traffic.

The applicants argued that the provision violated section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by putting cyclists at increased risk of injury and death, and that the infringement was arbitrary and grossly disproportionate to the stated objective of reducing traffic congestion.

The court found that the provision was unconstitutional, as the evidence established that removing the protected bike lanes would not achieve the stated objective of reducing congestion and would instead increase the risk of collisions and injuries for all road users.

The court also found that the government had been advised internally that the removal would not reduce congestion, yet proceeded with the legislation anyway.

The application was not moot despite subsequent amendments to the legislation, as the government retained the power and stated intention to remove the bike lanes.

The moving parties (Ontario) sought to schedule a motion for leave to appeal and a motion to stay an earlier order on an expedited basis.

The court declined to schedule the stay motion before a single judge prior to the leave to appeal motion, noting the responding parties needed time to respond to new affidavit material and that the matter was better suited for a panel.

The court established a schedule for the exchange of materials for the leave to appeal motion to be heard in writing by a panel.

The applicants sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the implementation of s. 195.6 of the Highway Traffic Act, which requires the removal of certain protected bike lanes in Toronto.

The court found that the applicants met the test for an interlocutory injunction, including a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm, and a balance of inconvenience favouring the applicants.

The injunction was granted, suspending the operation of the provision until the court’s decision on the constitutional application.

The decision addresses a motion by Saad Aljabri, Mohammed Aljabri, and various corporate defendants to vary Mareva orders freezing their worldwide assets, seeking the release of frozen funds to pay legal fees.

The court grants the motion for all moving parties except Dreams International Advisory Services Ltd., finding that the Mareva Defendants have shown they lack access to other assets or reliable third-party funding, and that a variation is necessary to ensure a fair trial.

The court dismisses the motion by Dreams, finding insufficient evidence that it lacks access to other funds.

The decision reviews the legal test for varying Mareva orders and applies a balancing of interests, including the merits of the case, the complexity of the litigation, and the conduct of the parties.

The applicants sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent the removal of certain bike lanes in Toronto, arguing that the removal would unjustifiably infringe the section 7 Charter rights of cyclists by exposing them to a heightened risk of injury or death.

The court found that while there was a serious issue to be tried and irreparable harm was established, the balance of convenience favoured the respondents due to the presumption that legislation serves the public interest.

The motion for an interlocutory injunction was dismissed.

This decision addresses a motion by the plaintiffs for production and directions regarding claims of privilege over thousands of documents and answers to questions refused on discovery in a complex, multi-party commercial litigation.

The court reviews the legal principles governing solicitor-client privilege, litigation privilege, and common interest privilege, and applies them to various categories of documents and questions.

The court provides detailed directions on the production of documents, the sufficiency of evidence to support privilege claims, and the process for resolving ongoing disputes about privilege.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing their motion to compel the production of law firm trust ledgers and unredacted bank statements from the respondents.

The underlying action involves allegations of a massive international civil fraud.

The Divisional Court upheld the motion judge's finding that the law firm trust ledgers were presumptively privileged and that the appellants failed to rebut the presumption.

The Court also agreed that the 'future crimes and fraud' exception to solicitor-client privilege did not apply to civil fraud.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, finding that the motion judge erred in presuming privilege over redacted entries in non-law firm bank statements without requiring the respondents to prove the privilege claim.

The issue of the unredacted bank statements was remitted to the motion judge.

The applicants sought judicial review of a Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal decision that allowed an injured Ontario worker to sue an out-of-province employee and his Schedule 1 employer in Ontario.

The tribunal had held that the statutory bar to civil actions under s. 28 of the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997 did not apply because the out-of-province employee had no connection to Ontario, relying on the constitutional doctrine of extra-territoriality.

The Divisional Court allowed the application, finding that the tribunal misapplied the constitutional doctrine, as the legislation regulates the property and civil rights of the injured Ontario worker, not the out-of-province defendant.

The matter was remitted to a differently constituted tribunal to interpret s. 28 without the extra-territoriality considerations.

The respondent, Webuild S.P.A., brought a motion to stay an application by Sociedad Concesionaria Metropolitana De Salud S.A. (SCMS) to enforce a Chilean arbitral award in Ontario.

The award was originally against Astaldi S.p.A., and SCMS sought to enforce it against Webuild, arguing Webuild assumed Astaldi's liabilities through an Italian restructuring proceeding.

Webuild contended that the threshold issue of liability assumption under Italian law should be determined in Italy.

The court granted Webuild's motion for a temporary stay, finding Italy to be the forum non conveniens for this complex issue, citing the need to avoid conflicting judgments and costly duplication of resources across multiple jurisdictions.

The applicant brought an application for judicial review seeking an order requiring the respondent ministries to conduct an environmental assessment for the redevelopment of the West Island at Ontario Place.

Shortly after the application was commenced, the provincial government passed the Rebuilding Ontario Place Act, 2023, which explicitly exempted the Ontario Place lands from the Environmental Assessment Act.

The respondents brought a motion to quash the application.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, finding it was plain and obvious the application could not succeed given the statutory exemption.

The court also declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot issue of whether the government's conduct prior to the new legislation was unlawful.

No costs were awarded as the applicant was a public interest litigant.