Cara Faith Zwibel

The provincial legislature passed legislation to remove certain bicycle lanes in Toronto to reduce traffic congestion.

The respondents successfully challenged the legislation in Superior Court, arguing it violated section 7 of the Charter by depriving cyclists of security of the person in an arbitrary and grossly disproportionate manner.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision, holding that the Charter does not create a positive right to bicycle lanes and that the legislature's decision to repeal or amend prior policy choices regarding road use does not violate section 7.

The Court found the legislation was neither arbitrary nor grossly disproportionate.

Five organizations brought motions for leave to intervene in an appeal concerning the constitutionality of provincial legislation that required the removal of bicycle lanes in Toronto.

The underlying judgment found the legislation violated section 7 of the Charter.

The motion judge granted leave to all five proposed interveners, but limited the scope of their interventions to specific issues such as the positive/negative rights dichotomy, the interpretation of recent section 7 jurisprudence, and the application of equality and child-interest principles to the gross disproportionality analysis.

The interveners were restricted to 10-page factums and brief oral submissions.

This is a case management decision in an appeal of a Superior Court judgment that declared section 195.6 of the Highway Traffic Act infringed section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and could not be justified under section 1 of the Charter.

The decision addresses the timetable for the appeal and the appellants' motion to expedite the hearing.

The Court of Appeal established a detailed timetable culminating in a hearing date of January 28, 2026, balancing the public importance of the issues with the need for proper briefing and consideration of intervention requests.

The applicants challenged the constitutionality of section 195.6 of the Highway Traffic Act, which required the removal of protected bicycle lanes on Bloor Street, University Avenue, and Yonge Street in Toronto and their replacement with lanes for motor vehicle traffic.

The applicants argued that the provision violated section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by putting cyclists at increased risk of injury and death, and that the infringement was arbitrary and grossly disproportionate to the stated objective of reducing traffic congestion.

The court found that the provision was unconstitutional, as the evidence established that removing the protected bike lanes would not achieve the stated objective of reducing congestion and would instead increase the risk of collisions and injuries for all road users.

The court also found that the government had been advised internally that the removal would not reduce congestion, yet proceeded with the legislation anyway.

The application was not moot despite subsequent amendments to the legislation, as the government retained the power and stated intention to remove the bike lanes.

The moving parties (Ontario) sought to schedule a motion for leave to appeal and a motion to stay an earlier order on an expedited basis.

The court declined to schedule the stay motion before a single judge prior to the leave to appeal motion, noting the responding parties needed time to respond to new affidavit material and that the matter was better suited for a panel.

The court established a schedule for the exchange of materials for the leave to appeal motion to be heard in writing by a panel.

The applicants sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the implementation of s. 195.6 of the Highway Traffic Act, which requires the removal of certain protected bike lanes in Toronto.

The court found that the applicants met the test for an interlocutory injunction, including a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm, and a balance of inconvenience favouring the applicants.

The injunction was granted, suspending the operation of the provision until the court’s decision on the constitutional application.

The applicants sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent the removal of certain bike lanes in Toronto, arguing that the removal would unjustifiably infringe the section 7 Charter rights of cyclists by exposing them to a heightened risk of injury or death.

The court found that while there was a serious issue to be tried and irreparable harm was established, the balance of convenience favoured the respondents due to the presumption that legislation serves the public interest.

The motion for an interlocutory injunction was dismissed.

The Advocacy Centre for the Elderly challenged the constitutionality of Bill 7, which allows hospitals to transition alternate level of care patients to long-term care homes without their consent.

The applicants argued the legislation violates sections 7 and 15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms by forcing patients to move or pay a daily fee.

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding no violation of Charter rights.

The court concluded that the legislation is a constitutional measure designed to manage scarce hospital resources.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard motions for leave to intervene from three public interest organizations (1492 Windsor Law Coalition, Aboriginal Legal Services, and Canadian Civil Liberties Association) in an appeal concerning the striking of an Indigenous appellant's pleadings and a substantial costs award in an injunction proceeding related to a land dispute.

The motions judge had found the appellant in contempt of court.

The Court dismissed all motions for intervention, finding that 1492 WLC and ALS's submissions inappropriately expanded the legal issues on appeal by focusing on injunctions, and CCLA's submissions largely overlapped with the appellant's arguments.

The court concluded that the appellant could adequately address the Indigenous perspective.

No costs were awarded against the proposed interveners.

The appellant, a lawyer, appealed a finding of professional misconduct by the Law Society Appeal Panel related to his uncivil in-court conduct during a lengthy securities fraud trial.

The appellant argued that trial judges, not the Law Society, should oversee in-court conduct and that the Appeal Panel's test for incivility failed to protect zealous advocacy.

The Court of Appeal held that the reasonableness standard of review applied to the Appeal Panel's decision.

The Court found that the Law Society has the statutory authority to discipline lawyers for in-court incivility, independent of a trial judge's actions.

The Court upheld the Appeal Panel's test for incivility and its finding that the appellant's repeated, unfounded allegations of prosecutorial misconduct constituted professional misconduct.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a paediatric dental surgeon, appealed a trial judgment regarding damages for a wrist injury sustained in a fall at the respondent hospital.

She argued the trial judge erred in calculating her 2007 and future income loss, provided insufficient reasons, and failed to apply the 'real and substantial risk' test for future loss.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly determined that the 2007 income drop was not caused by the injury, provided adequate reasons, and properly applied the real and substantial risk test to award $100,000 for future pecuniary loss based on the risk of a tendon rupture.

The Registrar appealed a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) concerning the registration of a real estate broker and brokerage.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the LAT exceeded its jurisdiction by failing to make the necessary threshold determinations under s. 10(1)(a) of the Real Estate and Business Brokers Act, 2002 before ordering remedies.

Furthermore, the LAT exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering the registration of the respondent as a salesperson, which was not an issue before it.

The matter was remitted to a differently constituted panel for a rehearing.

The Court also provided guidance for the rehearing, noting that the civil standard of proof is a balance of probabilities and that interfering with trust accounts is inherently wrongful.

The applicant, a child with autism, sought judicial review of a decision to discharge her from a regional Intensive Behaviour Intervention (IBI) program.

The program's clinical director determined after a 12-month assessment that the therapy was not resulting in cognitive and learning improvements.

The applicant argued the decision was unreasonable and the process lacked procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the clinical decision was reasonable and the applicant was afforded procedural fairness through evaluations, meetings, and an independent review mechanism.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action.

The Court of Appeal found that while there was enough evidence to raise a genuine issue for trial regarding the standard of care, the appellants failed to put forward sufficient evidence on causation to raise a genuine issue for trial.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant, a lesbian woman, sought to conceive a child using semen from a known gay donor.

She challenged the definition of 'assisted conception' in the Processing and Distribution of Semen for Assisted Conception Regulations, which exempted women using semen from a spouse or sexual partner from rigorous screening requirements.

The appellant argued this violated her equality and liberty rights under ss. 15 and 7 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the exemption was based on health considerations rather than sexual orientation, as women using a spouse's semen are already exposed to any existing risks.

The court also upheld the exclusion criteria for donors over 40 and men who have had sex with men, concluding they were factually based on health risks and not discriminatory.