Roseanna R. Ansell-Vaughan

In a motor vehicle chain-reaction collision case, the moving defendants in the lead vehicle sought summary judgment dismissing the action and a co-defendants' cross-claim against them.

The responding defendants argued the motion was premature because the police file had not yet been produced and further discovery remained outstanding.

Applying the summary judgment approach in Hryniak, the court held the record was sufficiently developed, the responding defendants had ample time to investigate, and there was no air of reality to the suggestion that further evidence would establish negligence by the lead vehicle.

The court further relied on the settled presumption that the striking rear vehicle is generally at fault in a rear-end collision and dismissed the action and cross-claim against the moving defendants.

In an appeal concerning underinsured motorist coverage under the OPCF 44R, the insurer argued that the limitation period began when the insured knew or ought to have known that the tort claim exceeded the tortfeasor's policy limits.

The court held that the discoverability rule in s. 5 of the Limitations Act, 2002 governs, not the discoverability wording in s. 17 of the endorsement.

Applying the reasoning in Markel, the court held that a legally enforceable indemnity claim is discovered only once a demand for indemnification has been made and default has occurred.

The limitation period therefore begins to run the day after the demand for indemnity is made.

The appeal was dismissed, subject to a minor amendment to the order.