Robin Parker

A school principal was charged with assault for restraining a nine-year-old grade four student who was demonstrating disruptive and aggressive behaviour in the schoolyard during lunch period.

The defendant attempted to calm and de-escalate the situation verbally before resorting to a rear restraint technique after exhausting all other options.

The central legal issue was whether the defendant's actions fell within the defence provided by section 43 of the Criminal Code, which permits the use of reasonable corrective force by educators.

The court found that the defendant's actions were both corrective in purpose and reasonable in degree under the circumstances, and acquitted the defendant.

The offender pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm and failing to comply with a term of a recognizance.

The assault involved striking a vulnerable 66-year-old woman with an extremely low IQ in the face, causing significant bruising and swelling.

Days after release on bail, the offender breached a no-contact condition by approaching the victim.

The court imposed a sentence of 21 months imprisonment followed by 3 years probation, with credit for 305 days of pre-sentence custody at the 1.5:1 ratio plus an additional 5 months credit for harsh detention conditions at Toronto South Detention Centre, resulting in 1 month remaining to serve.

Ancillary orders included a 10-year weapons prohibition, a DNA order, and a non-communication order.

Toronto Community Housing Corporation (TCHC) sought certiorari to quash a Youth Court decision that denied TCHC access to a young person's (R.V.) criminal justice records.

TCHC intended to use these records to commence eviction proceedings against R.V. and his family at the Landlord and Tenant Board on grounds of "illegality" and "community safety." The Youth Court had denied access, prioritizing R.V.'s privacy, rehabilitation, and reintegration under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA).

By the time the certiorari application reached the Superior Court, R.V. had withdrawn from the proceedings, and TCHC had decided not to pursue eviction, rendering the matter moot.

The Superior Court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot application, finding no persisting adversarial context, no significant public interest that would justify hearing a hypothetical case, and that the issue of "desirable in the interest of the proper administration of justice" under s.119 of the YCJA was fact-driven and best left to the Youth Court's expertise.

The defendant was charged with common assault and assault with a weapon (a clothes iron) against his spouse on August 29, 2018.

The Crown and defence presented conflicting accounts of a domestic altercation that occurred in the morning following an unresolved dispute the night before.

The complainant testified that the defendant strangled her and pressed a hot iron against her chest, causing injury.

The defendant testified that the complainant initiated physical contact, that he did not strangle her, and that she applied the iron to his chest first, which he then removed to prevent further burns.

The court found that the Crown had not met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt due to significant evidentiary gaps and the irreconcilable nature of the two testimonial accounts.

The appellant, an inmate, appealed his convictions for weapons dangerous and possession of a concealed weapon, as well as his five-month concurrent sentences.

He argued the trial judge failed to consider alternative rational explanations for his possession of a knife hidden in his cell door frame.

He also argued his sentence should be reduced to a discharge to prevent his prior youth record for murder from converting to an adult record under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no other rational explanation for possessing the knife.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as a discharge would be markedly disproportionate to the gravity of possessing a weapon in a correctional facility and during transport.

This decision addresses a voir dire to determine the admissibility of police statements made by Marcia Gittens and Horace McCalla, who are charged with failing to provide the necessaries of life and criminal negligence causing bodily harm to their son.

The Crown sought to admit the statements, arguing voluntariness and constitutional compliance.

The defence contended that the statements were involuntary and obtained in violation of ss. 10(a) and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found Ms. Gittens' statement inadmissible due to involuntariness, influenced by inducements, her emotional state, and police misrepresentations regarding the video recording and the duty to caution.

Additionally, her s. 10(b) Charter rights were breached when psychological detention crystallized during the interview, leading to exclusion under s. 24(2).

Conversely, Mr. McCalla's statement was deemed voluntary and admissible, as the police adequately informed him of his rights and potential legal jeopardy, and he was not found to be detained.

The appellant appealed his conviction for arson relating to a fire at his home on April 5, 2011, claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The appellant advanced two main arguments: first, that counsel failed to properly cross-examine the only alternative suspect, his former fiancée; and second, that counsel overrode his desire to testify and improperly failed to call other defence evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to establish the prejudice component of the ineffective assistance of counsel test.

The court noted that the trial judge's conclusion that the alternative suspect's involvement was implausible was not subject to palpable and overriding error, and that the appellant had signed a written acknowledgement indicating his informed decision not to testify.

The appellant appealed a decision concerning the standard of care owed by a condominium corporation for common elements security.

The court found that the condominium corporation exercised reasonable care by implementing a motion sensor system, hiring a licensed security company, installing CCTV, and establishing security protocols.

The appellant failed to provide expert evidence to prove the Board's decision was unreasonable or foreseeably caused the loss.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

A motion for directions brought by counsel in an appeal alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.

The applicant sought access to transcripts of cross-examinations on affidavits to assess potential intervener status and to clear his professional reputation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no merit to the intervener application and no basis to provide transcripts to a non-party to support a collateral issue unrelated to the core appeal.

The defendant in a civil action for sexual assault brought a motion seeking a declaration that he had not breached the deemed undertaking rule (Rule 30.1.01) or, alternatively, an order to exempt certain documents from it.

The defendant's civil counsel had provided the plaintiff's compelled documentary productions, including sensitive medical and counselling records, to his criminal defence counsel for use in parallel criminal proceedings to impeach the plaintiff's credibility, without prior notice or court directions.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that the impeachment exception in Rule 30.1.01(6) is not automatic and requires parties to seek directions from the civil court, ordinarily on notice to the producing party, before using discovery evidence for impeachment in another proceeding.

The court found that the defendant had breached the deemed undertaking.

The Attorney General of Canada sought an order requiring a lawyer to reimburse approximately $500,000 in costs for a Monitor's investigation into his practice regarding Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement (IRSSA) claims.

The lawyer resisted and sought a public statement clearing his name, along with costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court found that while the lawyer had breached the IRSSA by facilitating third-party loans, he had not misappropriated funds or acted with malicious intent.

The court dismissed both Canada's request for investigation costs and the lawyer's request for costs and a public statement.

The appellant, a lawyer, appealed a finding of professional misconduct by the Law Society Appeal Panel related to his uncivil in-court conduct during a lengthy securities fraud trial.

The appellant argued that trial judges, not the Law Society, should oversee in-court conduct and that the Appeal Panel's test for incivility failed to protect zealous advocacy.

The Court of Appeal held that the reasonableness standard of review applied to the Appeal Panel's decision.

The Court found that the Law Society has the statutory authority to discipline lawyers for in-court incivility, independent of a trial judge's actions.

The Court upheld the Appeal Panel's test for incivility and its finding that the appellant's repeated, unfounded allegations of prosecutorial misconduct constituted professional misconduct.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court decision granting judgment to the respondent insurer for $5,567.10.

The insurer had paid for massage therapy treatments but later discovered the appellant was not a licensed massage therapist.

The appellant argued the insurer paid her even after discovering she was unlicensed and raised a limitation period defence.

The Divisional Court found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant was not entitled to compensation as an unlicensed practitioner who had misrepresented her status on the treatment forms.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a sentence order directing it to pay a $200 victim surcharge out of $170 seized from the offender upon his arrest for drug trafficking, with the balance forfeited.

The Court of Appeal held that a trial judge cannot order a victim surcharge paid out of funds forfeited as proceeds of crime, as the obligation rests on the offender.

Furthermore, the Court found the trial judge erred by reversing the onus regarding the forfeiture of the remaining $150, as there was no finding beyond a reasonable doubt that it constituted proceeds of crime.

The appeal was allowed, the offender was ordered to pay the $200 surcharge, $20 in buy money was forfeited, and the remaining $150 was returned to the offender.

The appellant appealed a committal order for extradition to Japan, arguing that the extradition was an abuse of process because Japanese authorities intended to question him on an unrelated matter in addition to prosecuting the offence for which extradition was sought.

The appellant also raised concerns about potential mistreatment during custodial interrogation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a legitimate dual purpose does not render the proceeding an abuse of process.

The court also found no evidence before the extradition judge regarding potential mistreatment, noting that the Minister had already addressed this issue and obtained undertakings from Japanese authorities.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's order surrendering him to the United States.

He argued the Minister exceeded his jurisdiction by surrendering him on offences not included in the Authority to Proceed or committal order, and that the surrender was unreasonable given the potentially severe penalty in the U.S. The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding the jurisdictional argument was precluded by Supreme Court jurisprudence and deferring to the Minister's evaluation of the potential sentence severity.

In the context of a mutual legal assistance proceeding under the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, individuals sought Charter remedies against both the provincial and federal Crowns following withdrawn criminal charges and a discontinued extradition process.

The Attorney General of Canada brought a motion to be removed as a party and to strike portions of the requested relief.

The court held that the federal Crown was not a party to the sending order application because the Attorney General of Ontario was the “competent authority” responsible for the process under the Act.

The court further found that the requested Charter remedies relating to extradition proceedings could not be pursued in the absence of an active proceeding under the Extradition Act and would improperly interfere with executive and prosecutorial functions.

The motion was granted and the impugned relief was struck.

The Attorney General of Canada, on behalf of Japan, applied to commit the respondent for extradition to face a charge of using a forged passport.

The respondent cross-applied for a stay of proceedings, arguing the extradition was an abuse of process because Japan's true motive was to interrogate him about an unsolved 1995 triple murder.

The respondent also sought to exclude evidence obtained from an accomplice who was on death row in China.

The court dismissed the cross-applications, finding that Japan's dual investigative and prosecutorial purposes did not constitute an abuse of process, and that the accomplice evidence was neither manifestly unreliable nor gathered abusively.

Finding sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case and the respondent's identity, the court ordered the respondent committed for extradition.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of counselling to commit murder against his ex-wife and her boyfriend.

While incarcerated, the appellant agreed to pay an undercover police officer to kill the intended victims.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in admitting an audiotape of a telephone conversation under s. 24(2) of the Charter, admitting his police interview under ss. 10(a) and (b), instructing the jury, and dismissing his entrapment motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's Charter rulings, jury instructions, or conclusion that the police acted on reasonable suspicion without inducing the offence.

The appellant pleaded guilty to multiple serious offences, including assaulting a police officer with a sawed-off shotgun while on his way to commit arson.

The trial judge imposed a global sentence of 8 years and 9 months, which significantly exceeded the Crown's submission of 6 years.

On appeal, the appellant argued the sentence was too harsh and that the trial judge erred by 'jumping' the Crown's submission without notice.

The Court of Appeal held that while trial judges should advise counsel before significantly exceeding Crown submissions, the sentence imposed was warranted given the extreme seriousness of the offences and the appellant's prior record.