Robin Parker

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision to surrender him to the United States under the Extradition Act.

Due to an administrative error, the applicant was prematurely removed to the United States before his application was heard.

The applicant argued the court should order his return or seek assurances before hearing the merits.

The Court of Appeal dismissed this argument, finding no prejudice to the fair hearing as he was represented by competent counsel.

On the merits, the applicant argued he should not be surrendered without assurances that his Canadian guilty plea would not be used against him in the US.

The Court dismissed the application, holding that the guilty plea was voluntary and the use of evidence in the US is a matter for American prosecutors.

The appellant, a Canadian citizen, was convicted of hostage-taking for his role in capturing UN military observers in Bosnia in 1995 and using them as human shields against NATO air strikes.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by refusing to leave certain statutory defences with the jury, misdirecting on other defences, and refusing to stay the proceedings due to alleged Charter violations under ss. 7 and 11(b).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no air of reality to the proposed defences, no error in the jury instructions, and that the complex national security disclosure process and trial delay did not violate the appellant's Charter rights.

The applicants sought judicial review of the Minister's decision to order their surrender to the Republic of Hungary.

However, the applicants failed to surrender into custody as required by their bail orders and could not be located by their counsel or surety.

The Court of Appeal concluded that the applicants had absconded and dismissed the application for judicial review as abandoned.

The appellant appealed an order committing him for extradition to the United States on charges of conspiracy and attempt to launder proceeds of crime obtained by trafficking in a controlled substance.

The Court of Appeal found that while the evidence supported an inference that the cash was from illicit activity, there was no evidence specifically linking it to drug trafficking.

The Court rejected the respondent's argument that the specific offence named in the Authority to Proceed was mere surplusage, holding that section 29(1) of the Extradition Act requires evidence justifying committal for the specific offence set out.

The appeal was allowed and the appellant discharged.

The appellant appealed his committal for extradition to the United States on drug and sexual offences, and sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order.

The appellant argued the Authority to Proceed was insufficient for lacking particulars, and that there was no evidence he held out the substance he supplied as a controlled drug.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sufficiency argument but allowed the appeal regarding the ecstasy charge, finding no evidence that "ecstasy" corresponded to the specific chemical listed in the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The Court dismissed the judicial review application regarding the Minister's jurisdiction and consideration of the appellant's statelessness, but remitted the surrender order to the Minister for reconsideration in light of the quashed committal on the ecstasy charge.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to import cocaine.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred during the jury selection process by failing to adequately instruct the triers on the challenge for cause process and by interfering with his peremptory challenge rights.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the triers were not instructed on the standard of proof or the need for unanimity.

Furthermore, the trial judge's failure to pre-screen prospective jurors for personal hardship forced counsel to waste peremptory challenges.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant challenged a summary conviction appeal order on the basis that his right under s. 11(b) of the Charter had been infringed by delay.

The court held that the primary consideration was the appellant's lack of reasonable diligence in seeking special disclosure, and the police disclosure delays could not be treated as running consecutively for the s. 11(b) analysis.

In light of the limited prejudice shown and the nature of the charge, the court found no constitutional breach.

The appeal was dismissed.