Ghazala Zaman

The appellant, Blake Robson, appealed a global sentence of five years' incarceration for drug trafficking and breach of a release order, arguing that the sentencing judge failed to adequately consider his Métis heritage (Gladue factors).

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge's analysis, noting that while the judge considered the principles from R. v. Kehoe and R. v. F.H.L. regarding the relevance of Indigenous heritage even if disconnected or not causally linked to the offence, there was no evidence on the record that systemic, background, or intergenerational factors related to the appellant's Indigenous heritage contributed to his involvement in the criminal justice system or impacted his moral blameworthiness.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Dmitri Davidov, appealed his conviction for importation and conspiracy to import cocaine, and sought leave to appeal a non-communication order.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by improperly using inconsistencies between the appellant's pre-trial police statement and trial testimony to infer guilt, rather than solely for credibility assessment.

However, the court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, finding the evidence of guilt overwhelming and the conviction inevitable.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

Leave to appeal the non-communication order was granted, but the sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the order was deemed a reasonable exercise of discretion to protect witnesses.

The applicant, convicted of drug possession and trafficking and sentenced to 34 months' incarceration, sought bail pending appeal.

The Crown opposed the application on grounds of public safety and public confidence in the administration of justice, pursuant to s. 679(3)(c) of the Criminal Code.

While the court found the applicant met the public safety onus, it noted residual concerns due to his recent criminal history involving firearms and disregard for previous release conditions.

Ultimately, the court dismissed the application, concluding that the serious nature of the drug offences, the substantial sentence, and the grounds of appeal not clearly surpassing the "not frivolous" standard, meant that releasing the applicant would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, arguing that his rights under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter were violated by an unlawful arrest and an illegal strip search.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the police had reasonable grounds to arrest the appellant based on a confidential tip and observed behavior consistent with a drug transaction.

The Court also found that while the rearrangement of the appellant's clothing constituted a strip search, it was conducted reasonably and was necessary for officer safety.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused, Raamkumar Raaman, was charged with fraud over $5,000 and found not guilty by a jury.

This endorsement provides reasons for two trial rulings: a defence request for a Vetrovec caution regarding Crown employee witnesses and the answer to a jury question during deliberations.

The judge determined that a Vetrovec caution was required for the employee witnesses, who were considered potential accomplices, and provided a concise answer to the jury's question about the existence of evidence regarding software used to alter paperwork found on the accused's computer.

This endorsement addresses a voir dire during a criminal trial for fraud over $5,000, concerning the admissibility of documents seized from a shredder box.

The court ruled on the application of the "documents in possession" rule, distinguishing between circumstantial evidence and adoptive admissions.

Exhibit P (invoice and emails) and Exhibits 27, 41, and 45 were deemed admissible as adoptive admissions, contingent on the jury finding the accused had possession.

Exhibits 19 and 25 (business cards and pricing sheet) were admissible only as circumstantial evidence, also contingent on proof of possession.

The jury must be instructed on the necessity of establishing possession for all admitted documents.

The accused, charged with fraud over $5,000, challenged the admissibility of income tax records belonging to his wife and son, arguing they constituted inadmissible double hearsay under s. 30 of the Canada Evidence Act and would cause unfairness.

The court affirmed its earlier ruling, holding that business records containing double hearsay are admissible under s. 30, with the weight of such evidence being a matter for the trier of fact, not admissibility.

The court also outlined specific limiting instructions to be given to the jury to mitigate any potential unfairness to the accused.

The accused, charged with fraud over $5,000 for allegedly defrauding the government of customs duties, brought a pre-trial motion to adduce alternate suspect evidence implicating five employees.

The Crown conceded for three employees but opposed for two.

The court granted the accused's application, finding sufficient connection between the employees and the crime.

The Crown also brought a motion to admit the videotaped statement of a deceased employee.

The court dismissed the Crown's application as premature, without prejudice to renew it before the close of its case.

The appellants were convicted of three counts of possessing narcotics for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime following a warrantless search of their apartment and a subsequent search pursuant to a warrant.

The trial judge found the warrantless search unconstitutional but admitted the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellants appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in his section 24(2) analysis by failing to consider the searching officer's misleading testimony and by improperly emphasizing objective grounds while diminishing the lack of subjective grounds.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge committed material errors in his Charter analysis, excluded the evidence, and substituted verdicts of acquittal on all charges.

The appellant appealed his sentence of five years imposed upon conviction for fraud over $5,000.

The appellant argued that the sentence was excessive, particularly in light of civil penalties levied by the Canada Revenue Agency arising from the same events.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge was entitled to increase the sentence to reflect the appellant's history of fraud convictions, including two prior convictions for which he received three-year sentences each.

The court found that civil penalties levied against the appellant's company were of limited relevance to the criminal sentencing.

The appellant brought two motions: one for bail pending appeal and one for the appointment of counsel.

The motions judge found no material change in circumstances since the previous bail decision by MacPherson J.A., and the concerns that led to the denial of bail remained present.

Regarding the appointment of counsel, while the appeal was found not to be devoid of merit, the appellant failed to establish insufficient means to retain counsel.

Both motions were dismissed.

The appellant appealed her convictions for possession of morphine and possession of morphine for the purpose of trafficking, as well as an eight-month sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility of a key defence witness and failed to properly apply Gladue principles in sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding that the trial judge properly rejected the defence evidence and adequately considered the appellant's Aboriginal background and personal circumstances in imposing a fit sentence.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The respondent consented to the appeal being allowed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and varied the weapons prohibition order from five years to ten years pursuant to section 109(2)(a) of the Criminal Code and imposed a lifetime prohibition order pursuant to section 109(2)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking cocaine, seeking to set aside his guilty plea on the ground that it was uninformed.

The appellant, a permanent resident, was not advised of the immigration consequences of his conviction, which rendered him inadmissible to Canada and subject to removal with no right of appeal.

The trial judge had accepted the plea after a complete plea comprehension inquiry, and the sentence was imposed pursuant to a joint submission.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence establishing that the appellant was unaware of the immigration consequences and would not have pleaded guilty had he known.

The court found the plea was uninformed and therefore invalid, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of firearms offences and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking following a police stop of a van in a residential neighbourhood where break-ins had occurred.

The Court of Appeal found that the initial traffic stop constituted an arbitrary detention in breach of section 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, as the officer had no reasonable grounds to suspect the occupants were involved in the break-ins and no legitimate highway traffic purpose for the stop.

Although the arrest and search incident to arrest were found to be lawful based on the smell of fresh marijuana, and the post-arrest strip search was found to be unlawful, the Court determined that the arbitrary detention tainted all subsequent police conduct.

Applying the section 24(2) analysis, the Court excluded all evidence obtained as a result of the Charter violations, finding that the seriousness of the police misconduct and its strong negative impact on the appellant's Charter-protected interests outweighed society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The self-represented applicant brought three applications for prerogative relief (certiorari, prohibition, mandamus) challenging rulings made by a judge during a preliminary inquiry.

The applicant faced charges of breaching a recognizance and unauthorized immigration representation.

The Superior Court dismissed all three applications, finding that the preliminary inquiry judge's rulings on stay of proceedings, constitutional issues, validity of the Information, and arraignment were within her jurisdiction and did not constitute jurisdictional error.

The court also held that the applications were brought prematurely and lacked merit.

The appellant was convicted of unlawfully producing marijuana and possession for the purpose of trafficking after being found at a marijuana grow-op.

He told police he believed his boss had a licence to produce marijuana at that location.

The trial judge convicted him as an aider and abettor, finding the defence had an onus to establish the honest belief defence and could only do so if the appellant had seen a licence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge erred in placing an onus on the appellant and that the Crown was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant knew his boss did not have a licence.

The appellant was convicted of possession of heroin and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

He appealed his convictions, challenging the validity of search warrants executed at two properties.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the appellant lacked standing to challenge the search of a garage where he only had a key and permission to store tools, as he had no reasonable expectation of privacy.

The Court also upheld the validity of the search warrant for his residence, finding that detailed information from a confidential informant, corroborated by police surveillance of hand-to-hand transactions, provided reasonable and probable grounds for the warrant.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a sentence order directing it to pay a $200 victim surcharge out of $170 seized from the offender upon his arrest for drug trafficking, with the balance forfeited.

The Court of Appeal held that a trial judge cannot order a victim surcharge paid out of funds forfeited as proceeds of crime, as the obligation rests on the offender.

Furthermore, the Court found the trial judge erred by reversing the onus regarding the forfeiture of the remaining $150, as there was no finding beyond a reasonable doubt that it constituted proceeds of crime.

The appeal was allowed, the offender was ordered to pay the $200 surcharge, $20 in buy money was forfeited, and the remaining $150 was returned to the offender.

The appellant appealed his conviction and a forfeiture order, arguing that errors and omissions in the Information to Obtain (ITO) for search warrants invalidated them.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the drafting errors were innocent mistakes.

Even assuming negligence, the Court held that the warrants could have issued based on the totality of the circumstances, including post-tip surveillance and prior police knowledge, after excising erroneous information and including omitted details about the confidential informant.

The appeal was dismissed.