Samuel Isaac Weinstock

The accused, a 39-year-old American citizen with no prior criminal record, was convicted by a jury of importing approximately 4.5 kilograms of cocaine into Canada.

The court considered the aggravating factor of the large quantity of cocaine and mitigating factors including the accused's background of poverty and systemic anti-Black racism, as well as harsh pre-trial custody conditions.

The court rejected the defence argument that the accused's status as a foreign national who would likely face a removal order and be ineligible for day parole warranted a sentence below the established range.

The accused was sentenced to 6 years' imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant appealed her convictions for possession of fentanyl and methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, and weapons-related offences.

The narcotics and weapons were found in her bedroom during a search warrant execution.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding she possessed the narcotics, suggesting a reasonable alternative inference that another individual in the room possessed them.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the principles of circumstantial evidence and reasonably concluded the alternative theory was implausible.

The trial judge's credibility findings regarding the other individual's testimony were entitled to deference.

In a criminal trial for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, the accused brought Charter applications challenging the police approach, detention, vehicle search, and access to counsel.

The court found the officers had lawful grounds to investigate based on the smell of burnt cannabis, an apparent lit cannabis cigarette, and an open cannabis container in the vehicle, and therefore found no breach of ss. 8 or 9 of the Charter.

The court did find two modest breaches of s. 10(b), including failure to ask whether the accused wished to contact counsel and failure to facilitate access after the right was asserted.

Applying the Grant framework, the court held the breaches were not sufficiently serious or impactful to justify exclusion of the reliable cocaine evidence, which was critical to the prosecution’s case.

The Charter application was dismissed.

The accused, charged with drug and firearm offences, brought a Charter motion challenging the validity of tracking and search warrants based on information from a confidential informant.

The court found that the police affiants engaged in deliberate deception by including false information and omitting material facts in the warrant applications, subverting the prior authorization process.

The court held that this egregious misconduct constituted an abuse of process violating section 7 of the Charter, warranting a stay of proceedings.

Alternatively, the court found the arrest unlawful and the search incident to arrest unreasonable, excluding the evidence under section 24(2).

The applicant brought a second motion under s. 11(b) of the Charter seeking a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay.

The total delay was calculated at 30 months and 19 days, but after subtracting defence delay, the net delay was 29.5 months, which is below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court trials.

The court found that while the defence took meaningful steps to expedite the proceedings, the case did not take markedly longer than it reasonably should have, particularly given the complexities of disclosure involving a confidential informant.

The motion for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

Nicholas Poku was convicted of possessing 1.347 kg of heroin for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought a 10-year sentence, while the defence requested a conditional sentence of two years, citing Mr. Poku's first-time offender status and strong rehabilitation prospects.

The court considered sentencing principles, including denunciation, deterrence, and proportionality, balancing the gravity of the offence (large quantity of heroin, sophisticated scheme) against Mr. Poku's personal circumstances (first-time offender, strong community support, no prior criminal record).

The court rejected a conditional sentence, finding Mr. Poku's role more significant than a mere facilitator.

Ultimately, a penitentiary sentence of six years was imposed, along with mandatory ancillary orders, falling at the lower end of the range for similar offences due to mitigating personal factors.

The applicant, charged with importing cocaine, sought a stay of proceedings alleging racial profiling by CBSA and RCMP officers under sections 7, 8, 9, 10, and 15 of the Charter.

The court found that Border Services Officer Coughlin did not racially profile the applicant, but Superintendent Ryan did, by relying on a stereotype based on the applicant's national origin (Jamaican-born Canadian travelling to a non-Jamaica Caribbean country) as an indicator of criminality.

This reliance on immutable characteristics was deemed discriminatory.

Consequently, the court found violations of the applicant's s. 7 and s. 15 Charter rights and ordered a stay of proceedings as the appropriate remedy.

The appellant, Dmitri Davidov, appealed his conviction for importation and conspiracy to import cocaine, and sought leave to appeal a non-communication order.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by improperly using inconsistencies between the appellant's pre-trial police statement and trial testimony to infer guilt, rather than solely for credibility assessment.

However, the court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, finding the evidence of guilt overwhelming and the conviction inevitable.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

Leave to appeal the non-communication order was granted, but the sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the order was deemed a reasonable exercise of discretion to protect witnesses.

The appellant, Frank Marrone, appealed his conviction for possession of powder cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He raised three grounds: unreasonable verdict, conflict of interest of his original defence counsel, and reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the first two grounds, finding the verdict was reasonable and no actual impairment of representation due to the alleged conflict.

However, the Court found that the trial judge's repeated, unjustified criticisms and characterizations of defence counsel's conduct, including accusations of "lulling" the Crown and misrepresenting facts, created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered for the possession for the purpose of trafficking charge.

The applicant, charged with firearms and drug trafficking offences, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing his right to a trial within a reasonable time was infringed.

The anticipated delay was 27.5 months, which is below the 30-month ceiling for Superior Court trials established in Jordan.

The applicant argued the Crown failed to conduct a diligent prosecution by delaying severance and the preferring of a direct indictment.

The court found that while the Crown's communication and timing on certain procedural steps were problematic, the overall delay did not markedly exceed what was reasonably required for a multi-accused case.

The motion was dismissed.

The applicant challenged the police stop and subsequent search of his SUV on Charter grounds (sections 8 and 9), arguing arbitrary detention and unreasonable search.

A loaded handgun and fentanyl were found.

The applicant alleged police officers falsified notes and testimony regarding the reason for the stop (burnt-out headlight vs. prior BOLO) and the observation of cannabis in plain view.

The court found the police evidence untrustworthy, concluding the stop was based on stale BOLO information, not a burnt-out headlight, and the cannabis observations were inconsistent and unreliable.

The court found breaches of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter and excluded the evidence under section 24(2), emphasizing the seriousness of wilful Charter violations and testimonial dishonesty.

The court also commented on the police's failure to record interactions when attempting to enlist the applicant as a confidential informant, recommending a procedure for such records.

The case involved charges of importing and possessing heroin for trafficking against two accused.

The central issue was the accused's knowledge of the parcel's contents.

The court applied the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule and found one accused guilty, while the other was acquitted due to lingering doubt regarding their knowledge.

This ruling addresses a voir dire during a judge-alone trial to determine the admissibility of electronic documents (Kijiji messages and email attachments) proffered by the defendant Sebastian Zamora.

Zamora, charged with importing and possessing heroin, sought to admit these documents as circumstantial evidence of his state of mind, arguing they provided context to cellular phone extractions relied upon by the Crown.

The Crown objected, arguing the documents were inadmissible hearsay and akin to prior consistent exculpatory statements.

The court found that the electronic documents met the authenticity and best evidence rules under the Canada Evidence Act, having been verified by a police officer.

The court ruled that the documents were admissible as circumstantial evidence, noting that their weight would be determined at the conclusion of all evidence, and that trial fairness required their admission to provide context to the Crown's evidence.

The Defendant, Jeremiah Campbell, applied to withdraw his guilty plea for possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, entered prior to sentencing.

The prosecution opposed the application.

The court, applying the principles that a guilty plea must be voluntary, unequivocal, and informed, found that while the plea was unequivocal and informed, and the defendant's testimony was largely unconvincing, a miscarriage of justice would result if the plea were maintained.

The court exercised its residual discretion, considering the defendant's age, first-offender status, potential penitentiary sentence, existence of triable Charter issues, and the defendant's belief in his factual innocence.

The application to strike the guilty plea was granted.

The accused, a trucking dispatcher, was found guilty of importing 50 kilograms of cocaine and conspiracy to import cocaine.

The Crown sought 13 to 15 years imprisonment, while the defence sought 9 to 12 years.

The court considered the significant quantity of cocaine, the accused's role in directing an unknowing driver, and his lack of a criminal record.

The court sentenced the accused to 12 years for importing and 9 years for conspiracy, to be served concurrently, less 104 days of pre-sentence and Downes credit, resulting in a net sentence of 11 years and 261 days.

The accused, a head dispatcher for a trucking company, was charged with importing cocaine and conspiracy to import cocaine after 50 bricks of cocaine were found hidden in a shipment of plastic resin at the Canadian border.

The accused denied knowledge of the conspiracy, claiming he was unaware the shipment had been diverted to avoid a police search in Texas and that a co-worker had arranged the falsified customs documents.

The court rejected the accused's testimony as not credible, finding that his actions—including maintaining a cover story, rerouting the shipment, and sending falsified documents—provided overwhelming circumstantial evidence of his knowledge and participation.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

The appellant appealed an 8-year sentence for fentanyl trafficking, arguing it was unfit and that the sentencing judge failed to properly credit pre-sentence custody, including lockdown credit during the early COVID period.

The Court of Appeal found the 8-year sentence was not unfit given the aggravating circumstances of fentanyl trafficking.

However, the court agreed that the sentencing judge's reasons did not demonstrate proper credit for pre-trial custody.

The appeal was allowed in part, and the sentence was reduced by 204 days, reflecting a 1.5:1 credit for 136 days of pre-trial custody.

The court found no error regarding lockdown credit.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, arguing that the police violated his Charter rights during the execution of a search warrant at his home.

The police used a forced entry without knocking, handcuffed the appellant, and delayed his access to counsel.

The Court of Appeal found no breaches of s. 8 (search and seizure) or s. 9 (arbitrary detention), as the forced entry and handcuffing were justified for officer safety and to prevent the destruction of evidence.

However, the Court found two breaches of s. 10(b) (right to counsel) due to the police questioning the appellant before he could consult a lawyer and failing to facilitate contact with his counsel of choice.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the Court concluded that the evidence should not be excluded, as the breaches were not causally connected to the discovery of the drugs and exclusion would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was dismissed.

During a jury trial for importing cocaine, the Crown objected to the defence counsel's reference to 'blind couriers' in their closing address, arguing there was no evidence of their existence.

The trial judge declined to instruct the jury to ignore the remark, finding it was a permissible submission that a person could import a substance without knowledge.

The judge noted that in a circumstantial case, inferences consistent with innocence do not require proven facts, and the agreed statement of facts already implied the existence of blind couriers.

The Crown brought a pretrial application to admit lay opinion evidence from a border services officer that the accused's empty small suitcase felt abnormally or unusually heavy.

The accused was charged with importing cocaine.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the officer lacked the necessary experiential capacity to form the opinion due to his inexperience.

Alternatively, the court held that the evidence's prejudicial effect outweighed its limited probative value, as the jury might unreasonably rely on it to infer the accused's knowledge of the cocaine.