Samuel Isaac Weinstock

Nicholas Poku was convicted of possessing 1.347 kg of heroin for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought a 10-year sentence, while the defence requested a conditional sentence of two years, citing Mr. Poku's first-time offender status and strong rehabilitation prospects.

The court considered sentencing principles, including denunciation, deterrence, and proportionality, balancing the gravity of the offence (large quantity of heroin, sophisticated scheme) against Mr. Poku's personal circumstances (first-time offender, strong community support, no prior criminal record).

The court rejected a conditional sentence, finding Mr. Poku's role more significant than a mere facilitator.

Ultimately, a penitentiary sentence of six years was imposed, along with mandatory ancillary orders, falling at the lower end of the range for similar offences due to mitigating personal factors.

The applicant, charged with importing cocaine, sought a stay of proceedings alleging racial profiling by CBSA and RCMP officers under sections 7, 8, 9, 10, and 15 of the Charter.

The court found that Border Services Officer Coughlin did not racially profile the applicant, but Superintendent Ryan did, by relying on a stereotype based on the applicant's national origin (Jamaican-born Canadian travelling to a non-Jamaica Caribbean country) as an indicator of criminality.

This reliance on immutable characteristics was deemed discriminatory.

Consequently, the court found violations of the applicant's s. 7 and s. 15 Charter rights and ordered a stay of proceedings as the appropriate remedy.

The appellant, Dmitri Davidov, appealed his conviction for importation and conspiracy to import cocaine, and sought leave to appeal a non-communication order.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by improperly using inconsistencies between the appellant's pre-trial police statement and trial testimony to infer guilt, rather than solely for credibility assessment.

However, the court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, finding the evidence of guilt overwhelming and the conviction inevitable.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

Leave to appeal the non-communication order was granted, but the sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the order was deemed a reasonable exercise of discretion to protect witnesses.

The appellant, Frank Marrone, appealed his conviction for possession of powder cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He raised three grounds: unreasonable verdict, conflict of interest of his original defence counsel, and reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the first two grounds, finding the verdict was reasonable and no actual impairment of representation due to the alleged conflict.

However, the Court found that the trial judge's repeated, unjustified criticisms and characterizations of defence counsel's conduct, including accusations of "lulling" the Crown and misrepresenting facts, created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered for the possession for the purpose of trafficking charge.

The applicant challenged the police stop and subsequent search of his SUV on Charter grounds (sections 8 and 9), arguing arbitrary detention and unreasonable search.

A loaded handgun and fentanyl were found.

The applicant alleged police officers falsified notes and testimony regarding the reason for the stop (burnt-out headlight vs. prior BOLO) and the observation of cannabis in plain view.

The court found the police evidence untrustworthy, concluding the stop was based on stale BOLO information, not a burnt-out headlight, and the cannabis observations were inconsistent and unreliable.

The court found breaches of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter and excluded the evidence under section 24(2), emphasizing the seriousness of wilful Charter violations and testimonial dishonesty.

The court also commented on the police's failure to record interactions when attempting to enlist the applicant as a confidential informant, recommending a procedure for such records.

The case involved charges of importing and possessing heroin for trafficking against two accused.

The central issue was the accused's knowledge of the parcel's contents.

The court applied the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule and found one accused guilty, while the other was acquitted due to lingering doubt regarding their knowledge.

This ruling addresses a voir dire during a judge-alone trial to determine the admissibility of electronic documents (Kijiji messages and email attachments) proffered by the defendant Sebastian Zamora.

Zamora, charged with importing and possessing heroin, sought to admit these documents as circumstantial evidence of his state of mind, arguing they provided context to cellular phone extractions relied upon by the Crown.

The Crown objected, arguing the documents were inadmissible hearsay and akin to prior consistent exculpatory statements.

The court found that the electronic documents met the authenticity and best evidence rules under the Canada Evidence Act, having been verified by a police officer.

The court ruled that the documents were admissible as circumstantial evidence, noting that their weight would be determined at the conclusion of all evidence, and that trial fairness required their admission to provide context to the Crown's evidence.

The Defendant, Jeremiah Campbell, applied to withdraw his guilty plea for possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, entered prior to sentencing.

The prosecution opposed the application.

The court, applying the principles that a guilty plea must be voluntary, unequivocal, and informed, found that while the plea was unequivocal and informed, and the defendant's testimony was largely unconvincing, a miscarriage of justice would result if the plea were maintained.

The court exercised its residual discretion, considering the defendant's age, first-offender status, potential penitentiary sentence, existence of triable Charter issues, and the defendant's belief in his factual innocence.

The application to strike the guilty plea was granted.

The appellant appealed an 8-year sentence for fentanyl trafficking, arguing it was unfit and that the sentencing judge failed to properly credit pre-sentence custody, including lockdown credit during the early COVID period.

The Court of Appeal found the 8-year sentence was not unfit given the aggravating circumstances of fentanyl trafficking.

However, the court agreed that the sentencing judge's reasons did not demonstrate proper credit for pre-trial custody.

The appeal was allowed in part, and the sentence was reduced by 204 days, reflecting a 1.5:1 credit for 136 days of pre-trial custody.

The court found no error regarding lockdown credit.

The offender, Narmatha Satkunananthan, was convicted by a jury of possession of Oxycodone for the purpose of trafficking.

The court considered sentencing submissions, noting the disastrous impact of opiates on the community.

Mitigating factors included the offender's lack of criminal record, strong family and community support, youthful age at the time of arrest, and a prior Charter breach related to her arrest.

The Crown sought 16-18 months custody, while the defence sought a suspended sentence.

The court, balancing denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation, determined that a suspended sentence with two years' probation and ancillary orders was appropriate, concluding that specific and general deterrence could be achieved without incarceration given the unique circumstances and mitigating factors.

The Crown sought to amend the Information to change the charge from possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking to simple possession under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and to proceed summarily rather than by way of preliminary hearing.

The defendant opposed the amendment, having prepared for and requested a preliminary hearing.

The court denied the Crown's application, finding it inappropriate to permit the amendment given that the defendant had requested a preliminary hearing, had not prepared for trial, and had not been given timely notice of the Crown's intention to change the mode of proceeding.

The defendants, Tanisha Evans and Chantelle Rochester, were found guilty by a jury of importing cocaine, contrary to section 6(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

They were arrested at Pearson International Airport with approximately 2.4 kg of cocaine each, concealed in their luggage.

Both claimed they believed they were importing money, but the jury rejected their defence.

The court considered mitigating factors such as their lack of criminal records, consistent employment, and strong support systems, as well as the aggravating factor of importing a significant quantity of cocaine.

Applying the sentencing guidelines from R. v. Cunningham, the court imposed a sentence of six years imprisonment for each defendant, along with ancillary orders for DNA samples, a ten-year weapons prohibition, and forfeiture of the cocaine.

The accused, Vincent Ham, faced charges of possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime exceeding $5,000.

He brought an application to exclude all evidence, arguing violations of his sections 7, 8, and 9 Charter rights due to an alleged lack of reasonable and probable grounds for his arrest.

The court determined that the relevant time for assessing reasonable and probable grounds was at the time of arrest, not when the decision to arrest was initially made.

Based on extensive police surveillance (Project Union) of a suspected drug stash house and Hoang's activities, including two observed drug-related transactions on the day of the arrest, the court found that the police had both subjective and objective reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused.

Consequently, the application to exclude evidence was dismissed, and the accused was found guilty on both counts.

The accused, Deanna Passera, was found guilty by a jury of importing cocaine.

Prior to sentencing, she filed a constitutional challenge to sections 719(1) and 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code, arguing that the provisions, which govern the commencement of sentences and credit for pre-sentence custody, violated sections 7 and 12 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

She contended that the legislative scheme resulted in offenders detained pending trial serving a lengthier period in custody before parole eligibility compared to identically situated offenders released on bail, thereby being overbroad, arbitrary, and grossly disproportionate.

The court dismissed the constitutional challenge, finding that the legislative scheme, when considered holistically with the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, was not unconstitutional.

It held that Parliament's intent was to create reasonable parity at the statutory release date and that any disparity in parole eligibility was justified by public safety and rehabilitation objectives.

The court then proceeded to sentence Ms. Passera to six years imprisonment for importing 1.994 kg of cocaine, crediting her 1.5:1 for 992 days of pre-sentence custody (1488 days) and an additional 90 days (3 months) for harsh lock-down conditions, resulting in a remaining sentence of 613 days.

This decision addresses a voir dire concerning the voluntariness of statements made by the accused, Anne Marie Asia Maerkl, to Canada Border Services Officers (CBSA).

The accused had abandoned a Charter application.

The court reviewed the testimony of three CBSA officers and applied legal principles regarding the admissibility of unrecorded and partially recorded statements.

While some statements were found voluntary and admissible, others were excluded due to issues with contemporaneous recording and clarity of attribution, particularly those made during the initial roving inspection.

Babak Rajaei-Mehrabadi was convicted by a jury of importing 6.45 kilograms of opium into Canada.

The court considered the gravity of the offence, the significant quantity and value of the opium, and the accused's lack of criminal record, good rehabilitation prospects, and history of depression and anxiety.

The court established a sentencing range of three to seven years for commercial importation of multiple kilograms of opium, distinguishing it from more addictive drugs like heroin or cocaine.

A sentence of four years four months and 22 days imprisonment was imposed, along with a DNA order and a 10-year weapons prohibition.

The applicants sought a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay in their criminal trial for production and possession of controlled substances.

The court found a total delay of 44.5 months, with 10 months attributable to egregious Crown delay and 9 months to institutional delay.

Despite minimal prejudice to fair trial rights, the significant impact on the applicants' liberty and security interests, exacerbated by the Crown's failure to manage the case responsibly, led the court to conclude that the right to be tried within a reasonable time was violated.

A stay of proceedings was granted.