Maureen Salama

The applicants, charged with fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud in relation to a bid-rigging scheme, brought an application for the disclosure or third-party production of investigative files held by counsel for cooperating witnesses.

The cooperating witnesses had received immunity or leniency under the Competition Bureau's programs.

The applicants argued that the witnesses' lawyers acted as state agents when interviewing their clients and that solicitor-client privilege over those interview notes was waived.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the lawyers were not acting as state agents, the communications remained protected by solicitor-client privilege, and the privilege was never waived.

Consequently, the materials were not within the Crown's control for Stinchcombe disclosure and could not be produced as third-party records.

The applicants sought to quash charges of fraud on the public and conspiracy to defraud the public, arguing that the evidence identified 38 specific corporate victims, thus requiring individual naming in the indictment.

The Crown contended that the charges were properly framed against the public due to the impossibility of identifying all victims (e.g., individual condominium owners affected by increased fees) and the broad interpretation of "public" in the Criminal Code.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the charges were appropriately framed as offenses against the public, consistent with recent jurisprudence where a segment of the community or a regulated industry can constitute "the public," and where a ripple effect on unidentifiable parties exists.

The accused, a trucking dispatcher, was found guilty of importing 50 kilograms of cocaine and conspiracy to import cocaine.

The Crown sought 13 to 15 years imprisonment, while the defence sought 9 to 12 years.

The court considered the significant quantity of cocaine, the accused's role in directing an unknowing driver, and his lack of a criminal record.

The court sentenced the accused to 12 years for importing and 9 years for conspiracy, to be served concurrently, less 104 days of pre-sentence and Downes credit, resulting in a net sentence of 11 years and 261 days.

The accused, a head dispatcher for a trucking company, was charged with importing cocaine and conspiracy to import cocaine after 50 bricks of cocaine were found hidden in a shipment of plastic resin at the Canadian border.

The accused denied knowledge of the conspiracy, claiming he was unaware the shipment had been diverted to avoid a police search in Texas and that a co-worker had arranged the falsified customs documents.

The court rejected the accused's testimony as not credible, finding that his actions—including maintaining a cover story, rerouting the shipment, and sending falsified documents—provided overwhelming circumstantial evidence of his knowledge and participation.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

During a murder trial, the defence sought to call a forensic psychiatrist to testify that the accused may have been in a cocaine-induced psychosis at the time of the offence, and that the alleged conduct was out of character.

The court ruled that the expert could testify about the potential impact of cocaine consumption and the possibility of psychosis, as this was relevant to the defence of intoxication and the ability to form specific intent.

However, the court excluded the expert's opinion that the offence was out of character for the accused, finding it to be impermissible character evidence and oath-helping.

During a murder trial, the deceased's family brought an urn containing the deceased's ashes into the overflow courtroom.

The trial judge ruled that the urn must be removed from the courthouse.

The court found that leaving the urn overnight posed practical and security concerns, and carrying it in and out risked the jury seeing it, which could prejudice the accused's right to a fair trial.

The court also noted that the presence of the remains could adversely impact the appearance of neutrality.

In a first-degree murder trial involving an East Indian accused and a white victim, the court ruled on jury selection procedures following the Supreme Court's decision in Chouhan.

The court established specific anti-bias instructions and challenge for cause questions addressing conscious and unconscious bias regarding race, drug use, and the Indigenous status of Crown witnesses.

The court determined that the trial judge, rather than counsel, would ask the challenge for cause questions, and that prospective jurors would be given advance notice of the questions.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought a pre-trial application to exclude DNA evidence obtained under a warrant.

The defence argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) relied on unlawfully obtained information, specifically banking records from a US bank and a cast-off DNA sample seized by US Homeland Security Investigations.

The court found the banking information was obtained unlawfully and the extraction of the DNA profile from the cast-off sample potentially violated s. 8 of the Charter.

While bound to excise this information from the ITO, rendering the warrant invalid, the court ultimately admitted the DNA evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder and sexual assault, brought a motion to introduce evidence suggesting an alternate perpetrator.

The proposed evidence included trace DNA found on the deceased, social media posts by the deceased expressing fear of her neighbours, and evidence of criminal activity at the neighbouring rooming house.

The Crown opposed the admission, arguing it was speculative and prejudicial.

The court ruled the evidence admissible, finding it relevant as circumstantial context that could raise a reasonable doubt, and held that its probative value was not substantially outweighed by any prejudicial effect.

The Crown sought to introduce historical text messages sent by the accused to his wife, which were obtained by police pursuant to a valid general warrant.

The accused sought to exclude the messages on the basis of spousal privilege under s. 4(3) of the Canada Evidence Act and s. 189(6) of the Criminal Code.

The court dismissed the application, holding that spousal privilege is a testimonial privilege that protects a spouse from being compelled to testify, but does not render the communications themselves inadmissible when independently and lawfully obtained by police.

The appellant was convicted of possession of crack cocaine and fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking following two field strip searches conducted by police in a motel room.

The appellant appealed on the ground that the strip searches violated his Charter rights under section 8.

The Court of Appeal found that both strip searches violated the appellant's section 8 rights because they were conducted in the field rather than at a police station, and the Crown failed to establish exigent circumstances justifying the field searches.

However, the Court of Appeal did not exclude the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was dismissed.

Three appellants were convicted of first degree murder, attempted murder, and committing those offences for the benefit of a criminal organization arising from a drive-by shooting in Toronto.

The Crown's case relied heavily on testimony from two gang members who testified the appellants confessed to the shooting.

The appellants challenged numerous aspects of the trial including jury selection procedures, joinder of counts, admission of bad character evidence, ballistics evidence, jury instructions on Vetrovec witnesses, and alleged Charter violations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals of Atkins and Riley but allowed Wisdom's appeal, finding the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of an attempted theft four months after the shooting, which had minimal probative value but significant prejudicial effect.

The accused was charged with forcible confinement, threatening bodily harm, assault, and criminal harassment arising from events on March 20, 2011, involving his former romantic partner.

The Crown's case consisted primarily of the victim's testimony.

The assault charge was dismissed at the conclusion of the Crown's case for lack of prima facie case.

Following trial, the accused was acquitted on all remaining charges.

The court found reasonable doubt on the confinement charge regarding whether the victim's presence in the vehicle was unwilling, on the threat charge regarding whether the words conveyed a genuine threat in context, and on the harassment charge regarding whether the conduct caused the victim to reasonably fear for her safety.

The Crown sought leave to call reply evidence from a former federal drug prosecutor regarding general expectations of the federal Crown concerning the preparation of police Crown briefs, disclosure obligations, and the handling of confidential informants.

The proposed evidence was intended to rebut defence testimony suggesting disclosure had been made in accordance with Department of Justice policy.

The court held the evidence remained only marginally relevant because no evidentiary link connected those general expectations to the accused police officers or their training.

Given its limited probative value and the risk that calling a sitting Superior Court judge as a witness would unduly influence the jury, the court found the potential prejudice outweighed the minimal probative value.

The application to introduce the reply evidence was therefore refused.

In a criminal trial involving allegations of assault, theft, perjury, and conspiracy to obstruct justice by police officers, the Crown sought to introduce Toronto Police Service directives and evidence of standard police practices.

The defence objected on grounds including irrelevance, prejudice, and hearsay.

The court held that the directives and expert evidence regarding general police norms were admissible because they provided context for assessing the accused officers’ conduct and state of mind, particularly regarding omissions in memo books, handling of seized property, disclosure practices, and use of informants.

However, testimony about how particular directives were implemented at a specific police division without personal knowledge was excluded as hearsay.

Selected directives and limited expert evidence were admitted subject to these constraints.