ONTARIO CIVILIAN POLICE COMMISSION

Safety, Licensing Appeals and Standards Tribunals Ontario

COMMISSION CIVILE DE L’ONTARIO SUR LA POLICE

Tribunaux de la sécurité, des appels en matière de permis et des normes Ontario

Citation: Welfare v. Peel Regional Police Service, 2018 ONCPC 15

Date: November 23, 2018

Appeal under section 87(1) of the Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.15, as amended

Between:

Cst. Sarah Welfare

Appellant

and

Peel Regional Police Service

Respondent

DECISION

Panel:

D. Stephen Jovanovic, Associate Chair Maureen Helt, Vice-Chair Jacqueline Castel, Member

Appearances:

Joseph Wilkinson and Maureen Salama, counsel for the appellant Lynda A. Bordeleau, counsel for the respondent

Place and date of hearing:

Toronto, Ontario May 22, 2018

Introduction

1This appeal arises from the decision of Superintendent Fawcett (the Hearing Officer), dated January 16, 2018 whereby she ordered that the appellant resign her employment with the respondent within seven days, or face termination of her employment effective January 16, 2018.

2The appellant had pleaded guilty to the following four counts of misconduct, as taken from the decision of the Hearing Officer:

Count One: Deceit

It is alleged that Constable Welfare committed Deceit in that on the 7^th^ day of August, 2015, she knowingly made or signed a false statement in a record constituting an offence against discipline, Deceit as prescribed in section 2(1)(d)(i) of the Code of Conduct, Regulation 268/10, as amended.

Count Two: Deceit

It is alleged that Constable Welfare committed Deceit in that on the 4^th^ day of November, 2015, she negligently made a false, misleading or inaccurate statement pertaining to official duties constituting an offence against discipline, Deceit as prescribed in section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the Code of Conduct, Regulation 268/10, as amended.

Count Three: Neglect of Duty

It is alleged that Constable Welfare committed Neglect of Duty in that on the 9^th^ day of June, 22^nd^ day of October, 2015, and the 3^rd^ day of November, 2015, she was absent without leave from or late for any duty without reasonable excuse constituting an offence against discipline, Neglect of Duty, as prescribed in section 2(1)(c)(x) of the Code of Conduct, Regulation 268/10, as amended.

Count Four: Neglect of Duty

It is alleged that Constable Welfare committed Neglect of Duty in that on the 4^th^ day of August, 2015, and the 5^th^ day of February, 2016, she failed to submit a Motor Vehicle Collision report and a Traffic Prosecution sheet, she failed to provide requested disclosure, and she failed to attend court without reasonable excuse constituting an offence against discipline, Neglect of Duty, as prescribed in section 2(1)(c)(i)(A) of the Code of Conduct, Regulation 268/10, as amended.

3The evidence before the Hearing Officer consisted of an Agreed Statement of Facts (the ASF) and two expert witnesses called by the defence: Dr. Paulette Laidlaw, a Psychologist and Dr. Jonathon Rootenberg, a Forensic and General Psychiatrist. The prosecution did not call any evidence.

4The Hearing Officer concluded that the appellant’s “usefulness as a police officer has [been] annulled” and consequently ordered that she resign or have her employment terminated as set out above.

Disposition

5For the reasons that follow, we confirm the decision of the Hearing Officer.

Background

6The events that gave rise to the four convictions in this matter began in December 2012 when the appellant investigated a motor vehicle collision for which she was required to file a report with a supervisor’s signature within three days.

7In February 2013, the appellant was asked about the report by a clerk in the Records Bureau and she responded that it had been submitted, when in fact she had not sent it. One month later, the appellant was questioned about the report by two superior officers and she again advised that it had been submitted. When asked to produce a copy of the report she emailed one to them that had the signature of another supervisor. When confronted with the fact that the supervisor whose signature appeared on the report had not been working in the appellant’s platoon at the relevant time, the appellant admitted signing the supervisor’s name to the report without the supervisor’s knowledge.

8Upon further investigation by the respondent, it was discovered that the appellant had investigated a motor vehicle accident in November 2012 and then submitted a report in February 2013, once again forging a supervisor’s signature on the report. The appellant carried out the same ruse regarding a third accident that occurred in December 2012.

9The appellant was subsequently charged with and pleaded guilty to one count of discreditable conduct over her actions in submitting these three reports with forged signatures of supervisors. The penalty imposed, based on a joint submission, was the forfeiture of 12, 8-hour days for a total forfeiture of 96 hours, the requirement to attend a course and to meet with a superior officer to obtain information about programs offered by Organizational Wellness. This penalty was imposed in February 2015. The appellant began to work the penalty hours in May 2015. Her conduct in purporting to work some of those hours led to the four misconduct charges that are the subject of this appeal. The following summaries of that conduct are taken from the Hearing Officer’s decision and the ASF.

10Count One: Deceit. On August 7, 2015 the appellant sent an email to Detective Jodie Dawson advising that she had worked a penalty day on June 9^th^, but that those hours had not been removed from her penalty bank. After those hours were then removed from the penalty bank, it was discovered that the appellant had not in fact worked on June 9, 2015. On October 27, 2015 the appellant advised Detective Dawson that she had worked 18 penalty hours on October 22 and 25. Once again, it was subsequently discovered that she had not worked those hours.

11Count Two: Deceit. On October 28, 2015 the appellant advised Detective Dawson that she would work on November 3, a normal day off for her, as penalty hours in the Call Diversion Unit. On November 4, Detective Dawson texted the appellant asking her if she had worked the previous day. The appellant responded “Yes, unfortunately I did, LOL, it was terrible.” When asked by Detective Dawson who she had worked with as she had not been observed in the Call Diversion Unit, the appellant responded “I didn’t know I had to sit with them. I always just sit in the report room and help with packages. I don’t sit with the Criminal Investigation Bureau when C [C Platoon] isn’t working-they are pretty rude, so I stay away.” When further pressed by Detective Dawson as to her whereabouts on November 3, the appellant admitted that she had lied.

12Count Three: Neglect of Duty. The basis for this charge was that the appellant failed to report for work on June 9, October 22, October 23 and November 3, 2015.

13Count Four: Neglect of Duty. The appellant laid two Highway Traffic Act charges against two motorists on August 4 and 7, 2015. As the charges were contested, a trial date of February 5, 2016 was set for both. The appellant was asked by the prosecution office on January 5, 2016 to provide disclosure for one of the charges but she failed to do so. One charge arose from a motor vehicle accident. She then advised a supervisor that she would be working on February 5 as a penalty day. However, that morning she phoned a supervisor advising that as she had slept in, she would work another day instead. She did not advise the supervisor that she was scheduled to be in court that day. She then failed to attend and the two charges were withdrawn. The appellant never filed a Motor Vehicle Collision report. She was suspended from work on February 9, 2016, then began attending counselling sessions seven months later.

14The appellant experienced a number of personal difficulties in her life beginning in December 2012, when her grandmother, with whom she was extremely close and acted as her caregiver, passed away from cancer. A colleague and former boyfriend passed away from cancer six months later. On June 29, 2015 the appellant suffered a miscarriage. She became pregnant again in September 2015 and had difficulty coping with the pregnancy due to the previous miscarriage. The stress of these events played a large part in the defence submissions before the Hearing Officer as to the appropriate penalty. They will be discussed further below.

Issues

15The appellant submitted the following issues to be dealt with in this appeal.

I. What is the standard of review to be applied to a penalty decision?

II. Did the Hearing Officer err in finding that the miscarriage suffered by the appellant was not a disability?

III. Did the Hearing Officer err in the treatment of the medical evidence in that:

a) She applied too stringent a test regarding the nexus between disability and misconduct.

b) She discounted the medical evidence on the basis that it involved reliance on self-reporting.

c) She erred in rejecting the medical evidence on the basis that it relied on collateral information.

d) She erred in her treatment of the evidence related to the nexus between the misconduct and the appellant’s disabilities.

IV. Did the Hearing Officer err in the treatment of evidence related to remorse and potential for rehabilitation?

16The respondent also raised the standard of review to be applied by the Commission when reviewing a penalty and submitted that the Hearing Officer properly considered the relevant dispositional factors.

Analysis

I. What is the standard of review to be applied to a penalty decision?

17The role of the Commission in penalty appeals was confirmed by the Divisional Court in Karklins v. Toronto (City) Police Service, 2010 ONSC 747 where the court adopted the following statement made by the Commission:

The role of the Commission on a penalty is well established. Our function is not to second guess the Hearing Officer or substitute our opinion. Rather, it is to assess whether or not the Hearing Officer fairly and impartially applied the relevant dispositional principles to the case before him or her. We can only vary a penalty where there is clear error in principle or relevant material facts are not considered. This is something not done lightly.

18In Kobayashi and Waterloo Regional Police Service, 2015 ONCPC 12, the Commission summarized its function on a penalty appeal:

[T]he Commission is not permitted to reweigh the disposition factors to come to a conclusion on penalty which it believes is more appropriate. Unless there has been an error in principle or relevant factors have been ignored, the Commission cannot interfere with a decision on penalty even if it might have come to a different conclusion.

19Subject to the foregoing, the ultimate question is whether the penalty imposed was reasonable.

II. Did the Hearing Officer err in finding that the miscarriage suffered by the appellant was not a disability?

20The Hearing Officer wrote the following at page 49 of her decision:

I have concluded that Constable Welfare’s medical condition did not cause her to lie, and it is clear from the testimony that deceitfulness is not a symptom of a disability. The Tribunal has not received any medical evidence that prior and during the period of misconduct Constable Welfare had any cognitive impairment or disability that interfered with her ability to make decisions. There has been no clear nexus made by the Defence that established that Constable Welfare had a disability at the time of the misconduct, and therefore I reject that it is a mitigating consideration.

21The appellant submitted that a miscarriage is a disability in law, relying on the decision in Mou v. MHPM Project Leaders, 2016 HRTO 327. In that case, the applicant suffered from a slip and fall and then a miscarriage, which she asserted were the reasons why she could not complete the required number of working hours. This inability led to the termination of her employment. The adjudicator held that a miscarriage was a disability under the definition set out in section 10(a) of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19.

22The issue in Mou was the applicant’s absences from work because of the miscarriage and whether the termination of her employment was related to those absences and the miscarriage. In a subsequent decision, Mou v. MHPM Project Leaders, 2017 HRTO 246, the adjudicator held that there was no connection between the miscarriage and the decision terminate the applicant’s employment and dismissed the application.

23In our view, even if a miscarriage may fall under the definition of a disability, the question to be asked is whether there was a connection between the disability and the misconduct. On a fair reading of the Hearing Officer’s entire decision she concluded that the evidence did not establish that the miscarriage, or more accurately, the impact of the miscarriage on the appellant led to, explained or excused the misconduct.

24The Hearing officer reviewed at some length the evidence of Dr. Laidlaw and Dr. Rootenberg early in her decision and in her comments leading up to her conclusion about the relationship between the miscarriage and the misconduct. That evidence will be dealt with below.

III. Did the Hearing Officer err in the treatment of the medical evidence?

a) Did the Hearing Officer apply too stringent a test regarding the required nexus between disability and misconduct?

d) Did the Hearing Officer err in her treatment of the evidence related to the nexus between the misconduct and the appellant’s disabilities?

25The appellant submitted that the proper test to be applied when considering whether her disability was a relevant factor in mitigation of her misconduct was stated in Moraru v. Ottawa Police Service, 2008 ONCPC 1, where the Commission wrote the following at page 13 of its decision:

However, during the penalty phase of a disciplinary hearing, not unlike the sentencing phase of a criminal trial, it is incumbent upon the trier-of-fact to consider whether PTSD, a medically recognized illness, influenced the actions of the officer and, if so, to what extent. Having concluded that Constable Moraru was suffering from PTSD, the real issue before the Hearing Officer was what weight the effect of PTSD should be given as a mitigating factor in assessing penalty.

26The appellant submitted that instead of determining the extent her disability “influenced” her actions, the Hearing Officer incorrectly applied a causation test when she wrote: “I have concluded that Constable’s Welfare’s medical condition did not cause her to lie, and it is clear from the testimony that deceitfulness is not a symptom of a disability.”

27A similar argument was rejected by the Commission in the case of Orser v. Ontario Provincial Police, 2018 ONCPC 7. The Commission wrote the following:

48. We are also not persuaded by the appellant’s argument that the Hearing Officer erred in law by applying a causation test instead of determining whether the PTSD “influenced” the misconduct, the test applied by the Commission in Moraru.

49. It is true that the Hearing Officer used the term “cause” or “causation” multiple times in his decision. The appellant submitted that this shows the Hearing Officer applied a different and higher standard. However, we note that the Hearing Officer uses a number of other words and phrases in his decision that clearly demonstrate he did not apply a strict causation test, and that he turned his mind to whether there was a link, connection, relationship or nexus between PTSD and his misconduct.

50. The reasons make clear that the Hearing Officer took the PTSD issue seriously, and engaged in meaningful analysis of the evidence on the role that PTSD might have played in the misconduct. The Hearing Officer accepted the appellant suffered from PTSD, but was not convinced that the appellant’s misconduct was in any way related to his PTSD diagnosis. His conclusions are reasonable and supported by the record. We owe then deference. We find he did not commit an error in principle in his treatment of the PTSD issue.

28At page 47 of her decision the Hearing Officer wrote; “She cannot explain why she did what she did other than to point to medical issues that have no established nexus to the misconduct.” She also used the word nexus at page 51 of her decision.

29We are satisfied that the Hearing Officer applied the appropriate test in considering the relationship between the appellant’s disabilities and her misconduct.

30The appellant submitted that there was “overwhelming” evidence before the Hearing Officer that would establish a connection between her misconduct and her disabilities. When asked about any connection between the appellant’s “stressors” and her misconduct, Dr. Rootenberg answered as follows:

I think what she had- the difficulty was, was getting over the accumulative stressors. She had the loss of a family member and [sic] the end of 2012. She lost a fellow officer and ex-partner in May 2013. She’d had a pregnancy. A miscarriage in fairly short order. So, yes, I think the accumulation of these stressors was linked to how she was able to function optimally. She appeared to be having significant and [sic] difficulty keeping up, for instance, and various work obligations. Consequently, I think she did have panic symptoms, anxiety, mood changes. So I think those psychological – those issues and those difficulties did affect her.

31As in the case of Orser, we find that the Hearing Officer “engaged in a meaningful analysis of the evidence” and that her conclusion as to the lack of any relationship, nexus or connection between the disability and the misconduct was reasonable.

32The respondent points to the following extracts from the evidence of Dr. Rootenberg in support of its position that no link was established between the misconduct and any disability:

• “Certainly I would not say that they [the diagnoses] caused her to lie or possibly get involved in the actions she obviously did.”
• “So while there is no direct cause or link between these psychological underlying issues and fabricating her story or signing someone else’s name, I think her poor judgment and her impulsivity and her fear that she was being scrutinized and that she was not meeting her work expectations led her to make further bad choices.”
• “Nothing compels someone to actually lie.”
• In answer to a question of whether deceitfulness is listed as a feature of an adjustment disorder, Dr. Rootenberg answered “no.”
• When asked if the symptoms described in the DSM relating to adjustment disorders included deceit, Dr. Rootenberg answered “I don’t see it there, no.”

33The Hearing Officer noted that Dr. Rootenberg did not see the appellant until September 2016 when he diagnosed her with adjustment disorder. Dr. Rootenberg acknowledged that there was no evidence as to the appellant’s state of mind from 2012 through to September 2016.

34The appellant first sought psychological treatment from Dr. Laidlaw in September 2016 and was administered the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI). The results of the PAI showed elevated levels of depression, anxiety and anxiety-related symptoms. Dr. Laidlaw agreed with the prosecution that the PAI presents a clinical picture of a client at the time it is administered.

35The appellant did not simply fail to do her job assignments due to stress, but she repeatedly lied to her superior officers and others employed by the respondent. When caught in a lie, she lied again. On count one, she proactively began the series of lies by claiming to have worked penalty hours on three days when she had not worked. The Hearing Officer did weigh the evidence and provided a rational explanation for her findings of a lack of a connection between the disabilities and the misconduct. We see no reason to interfere with those findings.

b) Did the Hearing officer err in rejecting the medical evidence on the basis that it involved self-reporting?

c) Did the Hearing Officer err in rejecting the medical evidence on the basis that it relied on collateral information?

36The Hearing Officer wrote the following beginning at page 48 of her decision:

I concur with the prosecution that Dr. Rootenberg’s report is of limited assistance for two reasons. Firstly, it is based on self-reporting by Constable Welfare, and on collateral information that came from the social worker’s conversations with Constable Welfare’s husband and sister. The second limitation relates to the time at which Dr. Rootenberg sees Constable Welfare which is 15 months after the initial misconduct. The report lacks any medical or psychological evidence that provides a nexus bv [sic] to the time of the misconduct.

37In our view, the Hearing Officer did not commit an error when she placed limited weight because of the appellant’s self-reporting. The appellant did not testify, as was her right. A number of examples in the evidence, however, established that she was not always truthful to the healthcare professionals. By way of an example, Dr. Rootenberg testified that the appellant told his social worker that when facing the first set of PSA charges she was not aware that she could call the Association or have legal representation, yet she in fact had a lawyer and an Association representative at the hearing.

38It is not clear from the decision why the Hearing Officer decided to place limited weight on the report because it contained references to information provided by the appellant’s husband and sister, relayed to Dr. Rootenberg by his social worker. This “collateral information” in the report was at least double hearsay that could not be tested through cross-examination. We see no error in the Hearing Officer giving it limited weight.

39Dr. Rootenberg acknowledged the potential problems with self-reports stating that some people tell the truth and others do not.

40The Commission wrote the following in Kobayashi, above, at paragraph 38:

A decision-maker is not required to accept evidence of an expert, even when the expert evidence is uncontradicted. It is up to the decision-maker to determine the weight to be accorded to an expert’s evidence. The final decision rests with the decision-maker, not the expert. As the Ontario Court of Appeal stated in R. v. M.(R.), 2007 Carswell Ont. 8013 (C.A.) at paragraph 41: “Just with any other witness, it is open to a trial judge to accept some, all or none of an expert witness’s evidence.” (Leave to appeal to SCC refused 2008 Carswell Ont. 3171)

41Accordingly, we see no error in the Hearing Officer placing limited weight on aspects of the report of Dr. Rootenberg. It is not our role or function to dispute that weight.

IV. Did the Hearing Officer err in the treatment of evidence of remorse and potential for rehabilitation?

42The appellant submitted that the Hearing Officer committed an error in principle when she gave no weight to the appellant’s guilty pleas. In Allen v. Ottawa Police Service, 2006 ONCPC 6, the Commission wrote “…a guilty plea should always be recognized as a mitigating factor and that giving no weight to a guilty plea is an error in principle.” The Hearing Officer acknowledged that the appellant pleaded guilty at the earliest opportunity but also wrote that “a guilty plea can be motivated by many different things including the strength of the case against the person.” Ultimately she decided to “…attribute limited weight to her guilty plea as a mitigating factor.”

43In Kobayashi, above, the Commission wrote the following at paragraph 60:

The Hearing Officer is entitled to consider the circumstances surrounding the guilty plea and apology when determining the level of mitigation, if any, to attribute to them. Surrounding circumstances include the timing of the apology and the strength of the case against the accused. A guilty plea or apology does not result in automatic unqualified mitigation (citations omitted).

44We see no error in the Hearing Officer ascribing limited weight to the guilty pleas.

45The appellant submitted that the Hearing Officer failed to take into consideration her “remorseful remarks to the Tribunal.” Over the objection of the prosecution, the Hearing Officer allowed the appellant the opportunity to make a statement expressing remorse for her actions on the day that the decision was to be rendered. The appellant submitted that after she made her comments, the Hearing Officer proceeded to deliver her decision with no reference to the remorse she expressed.

46The respondent submitted that the apology or the appellant’s belated expression of remorse was a case of “too little too late” and cited Clough v. Peel Regional Police Service, 2014 ONCPC 12. In Clough, the Commission wrote: “Hearing Officers are entitled to assess the sincerity of a letter of apology. In our view, the mere existence of a letter of apology does not equate to automatic mitigation.”

47The appellant submitted a letter of apology to the Hearing Officer dated July 21, 2017, which was admitted over the objection of the prosecution. The Hearing Officer assigned it little weight in terms of mitigation. There was no need, in our view, for the Hearing Officer to then address the appellant’s statement given just before the decision was delivered.

48The appellant submitted that the Hearing Officer committed an error when she wrote “Constable Welfare has had no character references or letters presented to the Tribunal.” In Gregg v. Midland Police Service, 2001 CanLII 56735 (ONCPC) the Commission wrote the following at paragraph 99:

Furthermore, we agree with the submissions of Mr. Clewley that the Hearing officer erred in finding the failure to call evidence from co-workers as an aggravating factor in reaching the sentence. There is no doubt that evidence in support of a police officer from either co-workers or other members of the community can be helpful in assessing penalty. We disagree, however, that the lack of such evidence should give rise to a negative inference. The Hearing Officer must only consider the evidence before him or her and should not be drawing conclusions on evidence or the lack thereof that was not submitted at the hearing.

49In other cases, the Commission has commented on the lack of supporting letters and how such letters could speak to the future usefulness of an officer: see Buckle v. Ontario Provincial Police, 2005 CanLII 84857 (ONCPC), aff’d 2006 CanLII 3963 (Ont. Div. Ct.) and Nelles v. Coburg Police Service, 2010 ONCPC 4. It does not appear to us that the Hearing Officer considered the lack of letters of support as an aggravating factor. She simply stated the fact that there were no letters presented.

V. Did the Hearing Officer properly apply the dispositional factors?

50The appellant takes little issue with the Hearing Officer’s application of the dispositional factors other than as stated above. In our view, even if the Hearing Officer erred in her treatment of the medical evidence, and in particular with respect to the appellant’s disabilities, the penalty of dismissal was reasonable.

51The Hearing Officer referred to the oft-cited Commission decision in Krug v. Ottawa Police Service, 2003 ONCPC 1 and set out the following factors, taken from Krug, that she thought were relevant to the case before her:

• Public Interest
• Seriousness of the Misconduct
• Recognition of the Seriousness of the Misconduct
• Damage to the Reputation of the Police Service
• Procedural Fairness
• Employment History
• Potential to Reform or Rehabilitate the Police Officer
• Effect on the Police Officer and Family
• Disability and Other Relevant Personal Information
• Specific and General Deterrence
• Consistency of Disposition

52In Krug the Commission wrote the following:

There is no requirement that any one factor be given more weight than another. The seriousness of the offence alone may justify dismissal. Aggravating factors can serve to diminish the weight of any mitigating factors.

Our role is to assess whether or not the hearing officer fairly and impartially applied the relevant factors or sentencing principles to the case before him or her. Where there is a manifest error in principle or the proper factors are not considered, we may vary a disposition.

53In Husseini v. York Regional Police Service, 2018 ONSC 283, the Divisional Court upheld the decision of the Commission confirming the dismissal of a police officer for benefits fraud. The Court wrote the following:

In keeping with the principles set out in Purbrick, the [Commission] resisted second-guessing the decision of the Hearing Officer and properly gave deference to the assessment of and weight given by the Hearing Officer to the 13 factors.

We agree that the OCPC properly concluded that no one of the 13 factors is paramount over the others and that the factors are intended to be flexible, contextual and may evolve over time.

54As we read these cases, the factor of disability is of no more importance than the other factors. It is but one factor among several to be considered by the Hearing Officer who then decides the weight it is to be given.

55In our view, the seriousness of the appellant’s misconduct alone would justify her dismissal. The Hearing Officer wrote the following when she considered the public interest factor:

The amount of deceitfulness committed by Constable Welfare in combination with her evasiveness and blatant disregard for her duties leads inexorably to the conclusion that she lacks trustworthiness and responsibility. Constable Welfare’s credibility has been diminished to a point of extinction and creates concern as to her suitability as a police officer and her usefulness in the future. The public’s trust and confidence have been broken because of Constable Welfare’s misconduct. To restore this, the Peel Regional Police needs to send out a very strong message that they cannot accept, condone, or tolerate her misconduct. This is an aggravating factor.

56In dealing with the seriousness of the misconduct, the Hearing officer wrote:

Constable Welfare’s misconduct entails a series of serious deceitful and neglectful incidents. I am aware of the excerpts in Ceyssens which note “Misconduct involving a high degree of turpitude or multiple events will more likely aggravate a disposition.” I concur with Mr. Migicovsky [the prosecutor] that Constable Welfare’s prior misconduct and her current misconduct is a continuum of continual deception and lies.

57Finally, when dealing with the consistency of penalty, the Hearing Officer wrote:

On the higher range of penalty for deceitful misconduct with similar aspects to the present case, are the cases of Cirillo, Parsons, Wilson, Husseini, Martin, Buckle and Chatsfield. The penalty in all of the cases resulted in the dismissal of the officer.

58It cannot be seriously argued that the penalty of dismissal was not within the range of penalties for the appellant’s four convictions. The Hearing Officer’s conclusion that the appellant’s usefulness as a police officer has been annulled is, in our view, reasonable.

ORDER

59Pursuant to section 87(8) of the PSA the Commission confirms the penalty that the appellant resign within seven days, or face termination from her employment with the respondent effective January 16, 2018.