Kimberley M. Bertholet

In a first-degree murder trial involving an East Indian accused and a white victim, the court ruled on jury selection procedures following the Supreme Court's decision in Chouhan.

The court established specific anti-bias instructions and challenge for cause questions addressing conscious and unconscious bias regarding race, drug use, and the Indigenous status of Crown witnesses.

The court determined that the trial judge, rather than counsel, would ask the challenge for cause questions, and that prospective jurors would be given advance notice of the questions.

The offender, a 27-year-old man with intellectual delays and a traumatic upbringing, was found guilty of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching against his girlfriend's 8-year-old daughter, who had special needs.

Applying the Kienapple principle, the court entered convictions only for sexual interference.

Emphasizing the Supreme Court's direction in Friesen that sentences for sexual offences against children must prioritize denunciation and deterrence, the court sentenced the offender to 4 years' imprisonment and imposed various ancillary orders, including a 10-year s. 161 prohibition order.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought a pre-trial application to exclude DNA evidence obtained under a warrant.

The defence argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) relied on unlawfully obtained information, specifically banking records from a US bank and a cast-off DNA sample seized by US Homeland Security Investigations.

The court found the banking information was obtained unlawfully and the extraction of the DNA profile from the cast-off sample potentially violated s. 8 of the Charter.

While bound to excise this information from the ITO, rendering the warrant invalid, the court ultimately admitted the DNA evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder and sexual assault, brought a motion to introduce evidence suggesting an alternate perpetrator.

The proposed evidence included trace DNA found on the deceased, social media posts by the deceased expressing fear of her neighbours, and evidence of criminal activity at the neighbouring rooming house.

The Crown opposed the admission, arguing it was speculative and prejudicial.

The court ruled the evidence admissible, finding it relevant as circumstantial context that could raise a reasonable doubt, and held that its probative value was not substantially outweighed by any prejudicial effect.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching involving a young girl with disabilities.

The Crown relied on the complainant's video-taped statements, DNA evidence found on a used condom, and the accused's inculpatory statements to police.

The accused recanted his confession at trial, claiming it was false and induced by his nonverbal learning disability.

The court rejected the false confession claim, found the DNA evidence and confession corroborated the complainant's statements, and found the accused guilty of the sexual offences.

A young person pleaded guilty to a historical sexual assault committed at age 17 against a very young child.

The sentencing court was required to determine whether the offender should receive a youth or adult sentence under s. 72 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

Applying the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness and considering the seriousness of the offence, the offender’s age at the time, and intervening circumstances, the court held that a youth sentence could adequately hold the offender accountable.

The court also found the offence constituted a violent offence under the YCJA because psychological harm could be inferred from the degrading nature of the conduct against a child.

A custodial youth sentence was imposed.