Brian Dube

The accused brought a supplementary application under s. 24(2) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to exclude expert opinion evidence, arguing it was tainted by physical evidence previously found to be obtained in violation of his Charter rights.

The court dismissed the application, holding that expert opinion evidence does not constitute 'evidence obtained in a manner that infringed' Charter rights for the purpose of s. 24(2) exclusion.

The court clarified that s. 24(2) applies to physical, bodily, or derivative evidence, and that the admission of the expert opinion would not adversely affect the accused's ability to make full answer and defence.

The accused sought a stay of proceedings for abuse of process, arguing the Crown improperly repudiated a plea agreement and disclosed the accused's intention to plead guilty to witnesses.

The court found that the cumulative effect of the Crown's conduct—the arbitrary repudiation of a judicially approved plea agreement without full inquiry and the premature disclosure of the plea to witnesses—deprived the accused of the right to a fair trial under s. 7 of the Charter.

Instead of a stay, the court ordered the enforcement of the original plea agreement as a just and appropriate remedy.

The accused was charged with multiple firearm and drug offences.

The police conducted warrantless searches of the accused's rental property based on the consent of the landlord (the accused's mother).

The court found that the landlord did not have the authority to consent to the search of the tenant's residence, resulting in a breach of the accused's s. 8 Charter rights.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the firearm, marijuana, and a portion of the cocaine from evidence, finding that their admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute due to the seriousness of the police conduct.

At the commencement of their trial for a home invasion and assault, the accused brought an application to admit evidence of unknown third-party suspects.

The defence sought to cross-examine the complainant on three prior break-and-enter incidents and introduce Facebook photos of the complainant with firearms, arguing the attack was perpetrated by individuals in the drug subculture rather than the accused.

The court dismissed the application, finding an insufficient connection between the prior incidents and the current crime to meet the relevancy threshold required for third-party suspect evidence.

Six accused persons charged with offences under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and related Criminal Code firearms charges made dissimilar elections as to mode of trial.

Some accused elected trial by judge and jury, while others elected trial by provincial court judge.

Some accused subsequently re-elected without obtaining written Crown consent as required by statute.

The court addressed whether a justice presiding at a preliminary inquiry has residual jurisdiction to remedy or disregard recorded elections to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings.

The court held that elections and re-elections as recorded must stand, and that a justice has no power to strike down or disregard a recorded election after the fact.

Sentencing decision following convictions for attempted murder, criminal harassment, breach of recognizance, criminal negligence causing bodily harm with a motor vehicle, and failure to remain at the scene of an accident.

The offences arose from obsessive harassment of a former romantic partner culminating in the accused intentionally striking the partner’s new companion with a vehicle.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence in domestic‑context attempted murder cases but also considered the offender’s advanced age, severe health issues, lack of prior criminal record, and lengthy history of positive community contributions as mitigating factors.

A six‑year sentence for attempted murder was imposed with concurrent sentences on the remaining counts.

The court also granted enhanced credit of 1.5:1 for pre‑trial custody due to the unusually harsh impact of incarceration on the offender’s health.