Jennifer Ann Comand

The accused was charged with being a party to sexual assault, sexual interference, and procuring a person under 18 for sexual activity.

The Crown alleged that the accused allowed two masked men to sexually assault her 10-year-old daughter in exchange for cigarettes and cash.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework to assess the conflicting testimony of the accused and the child complainant.

The court found the child's evidence credible and reliable, rejecting the accused's denials.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

This ruling addresses two Crown applications in a Youth Criminal Justice Act case: one to admit evidence of prior discreditable conduct and another (Seaboyer application) to introduce evidence of other sexual activity.

The accused, J.B., a young person charged with sexual assault, was 13 at the time of the alleged assault, but the prior incidents occurred when he was 11 and thus legally a child incapable of forming criminal intent.

The court dismissed both applications, finding that the prejudicial effect of admitting evidence of acts committed when the accused was a child, and therefore lacked mens rea, outweighed its probative value.

The court emphasized the unique considerations for young persons and the significant time gap between the incidents.

This criminal trial involved multiple allegations of sexual assault and sexual interference against A.R., a substitute teacher.

The court meticulously assessed the credibility and reliability of each child complainant's testimony, noting significant internal and external inconsistencies and pervasive evidence of collusion among the witnesses, particularly influenced by one central complainant.

The defence did not call evidence.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt for all complainants, concluding that the evidence was unreliable and insufficient to support convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, or even simple assault.

A.R. was acquitted of all charges.

The offender, Robert Hearns, pleaded guilty to aggravated assault.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the brutal, unprovoked attack on a vulnerable victim and the offender's substantial criminal record, and mitigating factors, such as the guilty plea and rehabilitation efforts.

The joint sentencing position of time served plus probation was accepted, largely influenced by the global COVID-19 pandemic and the increased risk of infection faced by inmates in custodial institutions.

The court took judicial notice of the pandemic's impact on sentencing principles, noting that it affects the fitness of sentence and may justify a departure from usual ranges, without granting a "get out of jail free" card.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

He argued that the trial judge erred in finding no violation of his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter, specifically claiming that his statement 'I don't know who' to call should have prompted police to facilitate his understanding, and that police improperly directed him to call a specific lawyer.

The summary conviction appeal judge dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions were reasonable and supported by the evidence, as the appellant had indicated he understood his rights and was not directed to call a specific lawyer.

The accused was charged with sexual assault following an encounter with a developmentally delayed and visually impaired resident at a rest home.

The central issue was whether the complainant consented to the sexual activity.

The court found that the complainant's initial statements to staff indicated the encounter was consensual, and she only alleged assault after her mother arrived and reacted angrily.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court concluded that the evidence raised a reasonable doubt regarding consent, resulting in an acquittal.

The accused pled guilty to possession of Dilaudid for the purpose of trafficking after being caught with 1,700 pills valued at $34,000.

The Crown sought a five-year sentence, while the defence sought two to three years.

The court considered the accused's lengthy criminal record for crimes of greed, his age, and his health issues.

Emphasizing denunciation and specific deterrence, the court sentenced the accused to 3.5 years in a federal penitentiary, less credit for pre-trial custody.

The accused was charged with possessing Dilaudid and Fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and elected trial by judge of the Superior Court.

During a focus hearing for the preliminary inquiry, the Crown indicated it would not call the officer who made the arrest based on information from a confidential informant.

The defence sought to examine this officer regarding the lawfulness of the arrest and the grounds for arrest.

The Crown argued that a Dawson application was required and raised concerns about protecting the informer's privilege.

The court ruled on the scope and purpose of preliminary inquiries, the Crown's discretion not to call witnesses, the accused's right to call witnesses, the preliminary inquiry judge's authority to manage the hearing, and whether a Dawson application was necessary.

Six accused persons charged with offences under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and related Criminal Code firearms charges made dissimilar elections as to mode of trial.

Some accused elected trial by judge and jury, while others elected trial by provincial court judge.

Some accused subsequently re-elected without obtaining written Crown consent as required by statute.

The court addressed whether a justice presiding at a preliminary inquiry has residual jurisdiction to remedy or disregard recorded elections to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings.

The court held that elections and re-elections as recorded must stand, and that a justice has no power to strike down or disregard a recorded election after the fact.