CITATION: R. v. A.R., 2026 ONSC 1180

COURT FILE NO.: CR-24-00006341-0000 (Windsor)

DATE: 2026/02/26

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

– and –

A.R.

Defendant

J. Comand, for the Crown

A. Cardella, for the Accused

HEARD: December 1, 2, 3 and 4, 2025

RESTRICTION ON PUBLICATION

By court order made under subsection 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code, information that may identify the person described in this judgment as the complainant shall not be published, broadcast, or transmitted in any manner. This judgment complies with this restriction so that it can be published.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MOSER J.

1. Introduction

1The accused, A.R., stands charged with one count of being a party to sexual assault, one count of being a party to sexual interference, and one count of being a parent or guardian who procured a person under the age of 18 for sexual activity contrary to the Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46.

2The complainant, H.F., alleges that her mother, A.R., allowed two men in ski masks to sexually assault her in exchange for cigarettes and cash.

3The Crown called two witnesses: the complainant, H.F., who was 10 years old at the time of the alleged incident and 13 years old at trial; and C.D., H.F.’s step-grandmother and current guardian.

4The accused testified on her own behalf.

5Given the conflicting evidence, the credibility and reliability of the witnesses who testified are central to determining if the Crown has proven A.R.’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

2. Analytical Framework

6Before turning to the evidence, I will review the principles that govern my analysis.

(i) Presumption of Innocence and Reasonable Doubt

7The presumption of innocence and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt are cornerstones of criminal law. They exist to protect innocent people from wrongful convictions.

8An accused person is innocent unless and until the Crown proves the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. This is a heavy burden on the Crown that never shifts.

9Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not equivalent to proof of probable or likely guilt, nor is it proof to a level of absolute certainty. The trier of fact must be sure that an accused person committed the offence to convict. If the trier of fact is not sure, then the accused cannot be guilty.

(ii) W.(D.) Analysis

10Because A.R. testified and denied the allegations, I must follow the three-step analysis in R. v. W.(D.), 1991 93 (SCC), [1991] 1 S.C.R 742, at pp. 757–58. The three steps are:

I. If I believe A.R.’s evidence, I must acquit her.

II. If I do not believe A.R.’s evidence but I am left in reasonable doubt by it, or any other evidence called, I must acquit her.

III. Even if A.R.’s evidence does not leave me in reasonable doubt, I must still ask myself whether, based on the evidence which I do accept, I am convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, of A.R.’s guilt.

11I am entitled to accept some, none, or all of a witness’ evidence: R. v. R.E.M., 2008 SCC 51, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 65. Where I am unable to decide who to believe, the accused is entitled to an acquittal: R. v. J.H.S., 2008 SCC 30, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 152, at para 12.

12This is not a credibility contest. It is not my task to determine which version of events is more believable. The burden remains on the Crown to prove A.R.’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. I must determine whether the Crown discharged that burden. The accused does not have to prove anything, and a lack of credibility on the accused’s part does not equate to meeting this high bar: J.H.S., at para. 13; R. v. Kruk, 2024 SCC 7, 489 D.L.R. (4th) 385, at paras. 59, 62; and R. v. T.A., 2020 ONCA 783, at para. 28.

13Mere disbelief of the accused alone does not amount to proof beyond a reasonable doubt; that would run afoul of the third prong set out in W.(D.). It is nonetheless possible for the trier of fact to reject the accused’s evidence because they accept the evidence of the complainant beyond a reasonable doubt. In R. v. J.J.R.D., 2006 40088 (ON CA), [2006] 215 C.C.C. (3d) 252 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 69, the Ontario Court of Appeal explained the following at para. 53:

… An outright rejection of an accused’s evidence based on a considered and reasoned acceptance beyond a reasonable doubt of the truth of conflicting credible evidence is as much an explanation for the rejection of an accused’s evidence as is a rejection based on a problem identified with the way the accused testified or the substance of the accused’s evidence.

(iii) Assessing Credibility and Reliability

14When assessing credibility and reliability, I must assess several factors to determine the weight to give a witness’ evidence. No single factor is determinative. There is no magic formula to decide how much of a witness’ evidence I should believe.

15The most effective way to assess credibility is to examine internal and external inconsistencies in a witness’ evidence. Inconsistencies may arise not only from a witness’ evidence at trial, but also from what witnesses may have said differently in other instances: R. v. M.(A.), 2014 ONCA 769, 123 O.R. (3d) 536, at paras. 12–13. Some inconsistencies may be minor, but others will be material and go to the heart of the allegations. Material inconsistencies about evidence in which an honest witness is unlikely to be mistaken should concern me.

16Credibility and reliability are distinct concepts in criminal law. Credibility speaks to a witness’ veracity, truth-telling and trustworthiness. Reliability speaks to the witness’ accuracy. A witness whose evidence is not credible on a certain issue cannot be reliable on that same issue: R. v. C.(H.), 2009 ONCA 56, 241 C.C.C. (3d) 45, at para. 41. However, the converse may be true. A credible witness can give unreliable evidence: C. (H.), at para. 41; R. v. Morrissey (1995), 1995 3498 (ON CA), 22 O.R. (3d) 514 (C.A.). An honest witness may be unreliable or have an imperfect or inaccurate recall of events.

17While I can consider how a witness testifies in assessing their credibility and reliability, I cannot overly rely on their demeanour. This is due to an increasing recognition that individual traits and backgrounds may impact demeanour without affecting credibility: R. v. D.P., 2017 ONCA 263, at para. 26, leave to appeal refused, [2017] S.C.C.A. No. 261. I must consider the totality of the evidence. This assessment must be conducted with the same degree of scrutiny for each witness.

18What I must not do is turn this trial into a credibility contest where I simply pick and adopt one version of events over another. It bears emphasizing that my task is not to determine which of two versions of an event is more believable. It “is to determine whether the Crown has met its burden of proving the elements of an offence beyond a reasonable doubt”: R. v. T.A., 2020 ONCA 783, at para. 28.

19Witnesses are not presumed to tell the truth. The only presumption that applies in this case is the presumption of innocence: R. v. Thain, 2009 ONCA 223, 243 C.C.C. (3d) 230, at para. 32.

(iv) Motive to Lie

20In this case, A.R. raised the issue of H.F.’s motive to lie. I must approach that claim and H.F.’s subsequent credibility analysis with caution. There is a significant difference between the absence of a proved motive to lie and a proved absence of a motive to lie: R. v. Bartholomew, 2019 ONCA 377, 375 C.C.C. (3d) 534, at para. 23; R. v. Gerrard, 2022 SCC 13, [2022] 1 S.C.R. 279, at para. 4.

21The Supreme Court of Canada observed in Kruk, at para. 65, that “it is not an error to consider whether the circumstances of a particular case support the existence of a motive to fabricate – indeed, where the defence adduces evidence on this point, a trial judge is obliged to consider it to give full effect to the presumption of innocence.”

(v) Assessing a Child’s Evidence

22The complainant, H.F., was 10 years old at the time of the alleged incident and 13 years old when she testified at trial.

23The “reasonable adult” standard is not necessarily apt when assessing the credibility of children. Inconsistencies that would weigh heavily against an adult’s credibility and reliability may carry less weight for a child: R. v. W. (R.), 1992 56 (SCC), [1992] 2 S.C.R. 122, citing R. v. B. (G.), 1990 7308 (SCC), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 30, at pp. 54–55.

24Children often experience and recall events differently than adults. It is hardly surprising that details important to adults, like dates and times, may be missing from a child’s recollection. Children may also be unable to recall details about sequence, frequency, and the separation of days with exactitude. This does not mean they misconceived what happened to them or who did it: W.(R.), at p. 134; B. (G.), at pp. 54–55.

25None of these considerations change the standard of proof. The Crown must still prove the accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. There is no separate “adult” or “child” standard. I must assess each witness’ credibility and reliability using criteria suited to the person’s development, understanding, and ability to communicate: W. (R.), at p. 134.

26Corroboration is not required to accept a child’s evidence, but it may assist me. Evidence can have confirmatory value even if it does not directly prove the acts or directly implicate the accused, so long as it supports aspects of credibility or reliability in light of the challenges raised by the accused: R. v. Primmer, 2021 ONCA 564, at paras. 33, 38–42, leave to appeal refused, [2022] S.C.C.A. No. 462, citing R. v. Demedeiros, 2018 ABCA 241, 364 C.C.C. (3d) 271, at para. 8, aff’d 2019 SCC 11, [2019] 1 S.C.R. 568; R. v. H.P., 2022 ONCA 419, 414 C.C.C. (3d) 395, at para. 69; and R. v. S.R., 2023 ONCA 671, at para. 7.

27I may rely on confirmatory evidence where the complainant’s evidence alone is insufficient to support a conviction. I may consider the whole of the evidence to determine whether anything confirms aspects of the complainant’s account. This forms part of the broader assessment of credibility and reliability: S.R., at paras. 7–8.

(vi) Myths and Stereotypes in Sexual Assault

28I must avoid relying on recognized myths and stereotypes about how victims of sexual assault are expected to behave. One such myth is that genuine victims report immediately or cease all contact with the alleged perpetrator. Power imbalances, fear, confusion, emotional dependence, and other contextual factors may shape how a complainant behaves after an assault. These assumptions have no role in assessing credibility: R. v. D.(D.), 2000 SCC 43, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 275, at para. 63.

29As the Supreme Court stated in D.(D.), there is no inviolable rule governing how a victim of sexual assault will behave. Some victims may report immediately, some may delay, and some may never disclose at all.

(vii) The Accused’s Statement

30A.R.’s prior statement was used in part during cross-examination.

31The Crown may use an accused’s statement for the truth of its contents either as part of the case-in-chief or as a prior inconsistent statement in cross-examination when the accused testifies. These statements often contain both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence: R. v. Rojas, 2008 SCC 56, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 111, at para. 37.

32A prior inconsistent statement can be used to cross-examine a witness. It can be used only on the issue of credibility for a non-party witness, unless the witness adopts the statement: R. v. G.H., 2020 ONCA 1, at para. 32. However, as a party litigant, the accused’s prior inconsistent statements can be admitted for the truth of their contents: R. v. Mannion, 1986 31 (SCC), [1986] 2 S.C.R. 272, at p. 549.

3. Review of the Evidence

33I will now review and summarize the evidence I heard at trial.

H.F.’s Evidence

34I will start with H.F.’s evidence, as this was the order of evidence heard at trial. Later, in my analysis, I will begin with the accused’s evidence as I am instructed to do in W.D. H.F. testified using two testimonial aids: she testified remotely and had a support person present from the Victim/Witness Assistance Program. Defence counsel consented to the use of both aids.

35Section 16.1(1) of the Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5, presumes that a person under 14 has the capacity to testify. The only requirement is that the child be able to understand and respond to questions. No issues arose regarding H.F.’s capacity or her ability to testify under a promise to tell the truth. Both counsel agreed this was not an issue at this trial.

36H.F. currently lives with her step-grandmother, C.D., and her aunt, K. She is in grade eight and has lived in C.D.’s home for several years. For my decision, I will refer to C.D. as H.F.’s grandmother, and H.F. as C.D.’s granddaughter, as this is how they both refer to their relationship.

i) Examination-in-Chief

37H.F. believes the incident occurred while she was living with A.R. in grade five. During that period, her younger brothers, B. and D., and her older brother, L., visited A.R.’s home on occasion.

38Two adult males, M. and E., friends of A.R., also visited frequently, coming to the home together. H.F. understood that A.R. dated E., though she was unsure whether they were still dating at the time of the incident. She described M. as A.R.’s friend.

39H.F. gave an initial police statement in December 2022. During this police interview, H.F. drew a sketch of the layout of A.R.’s home. Counsel filed the sketch as Exhibit 1. It depicts H.F.’s bedroom and her younger brothers’, B and D’s, bedroom on the second floor of the residence. On the main floor, it shows A.R.’s bedroom adjacent to the living room, with a bathroom and kitchen also on the main floor. As I noted to the parties at trial, I only considered the diagram, the room labels, and the drawing of the cellphone/camera. I did not consider the written comments on the document.

40On the day of the incident, H.F. was home alone with A.R. She was watching television in her upstairs bedroom. Although she and A.R. did not always get along, they were getting along that day.

41A.R. called H.F. downstairs, and H.F. met her in the kitchen/living room area. A.R. handed her clothing and instructed her to “put it on.” H.F. could not recall what time of day this interaction occurred.

42H.F. described the clothing. First, she listed “booty shorts”, which were like shorts, but shorter. They covered her bum, but they ended really short. H.F. had never seen these shorts before and did not know where they came from. She also described being handed a top that she called a “crop top.” She said this was a short top that did not cover her belly button, that was both loose and tight in fit. H.F. indicated with her hand that the shirt ended just under her chest and that the top was tighter in that location (under her chest). She described that the top had straps, not sleeves, and that the straps were not quite as thick as two fingers in width. She had also never seen this article of clothing before and did not know where it came from. H.F. could not recall the colour of either piece of clothing.

43She had never been presented with clothing by her mother in this manner before. Nonetheless, she obeyed her mother, took the clothes upstairs, and changed into them in her bedroom.

44When she came back downstairs, A.R. stood in the hallway between the living room and the kitchen. H.F. saw two men just inside the front door. A.R. told H.F. to “listen to the guys.” H.F. described both men as wearing all black: black pants and long-sleeved tops. They wore ski masks that exposed only their eyes and mouths. The masks covered their hair. One was tall, and the other was short. From what she could see from the skin on their hands, she associated their skin tones with M. and E., and she described the taller man as white while the shorter man had darker light skin.

45When asked what happened next, H.F. testified, “then I got raped.”

46The men directed H.F. to go to A.R.’s bedroom, which only had a curtain separating it from the living room. She could not recall the exact language of this instruction or which of the men issued it. The bedroom contained a mattress, a dresser, and a television. Her mother remained in the living room.

47H.F. testified that she complied with the instruction to lie down on her back on the mattress. She could not remember which man instructed her to lie down.

48H.F. stated that one man recorded the incident while the other was “raping” her. She could not recall which man recorded the assault and which performed it. She recalled that the man recording stood closer to the television and faced the mattress. He held a device “like a camera off the phone”, with a red case. She described a blue light that went on when it was recording on the back of the “camera piece.” She testified that she had previously seen that device on A.R.’s dresser, but it was not her mother’s main cellphone. The person recording did not speak and held the device with both hands.

49H.F. drew the device during her police interview in December 2022. She drew it on the same paper that was entered as Exhibit 1.

50H.F. explained the assault in detail. While she laid on the mattress, the man who assaulted her had his knees on the mattress and his feet on the floor. It is important to note here that A.R. later agreed the bed was simply a mattress that lay directly on the floor. H.F. said he touched her with his hand and fingers, but he did not use more than three fingers.

51H.F. described the area of her body that the man touched as her “bladder part” or the “crotch.” She did not know the correct name for the name of the body part. However, she described that the man “stuck his finger up it” and that it hurt her. She recalled his hand and fingers directly touching the skin of her “crotch.” She did not say anything during the incident. After he removed his finger or fingers, both men left the bedroom together.

52H.F. got off the bed after the sexual assault and was going to go outside. When she walked into the living room, she saw the men with her mom. This is when she saw one of the men hand her mother a pack of cigarettes, a pack of e-cigarettes, and bills. She did not remember which man did this.

53H.F. did not know how many bills she saw. At this point in her evidence, H.F.’s voice dropped off and she was very quiet. She saw her mother take the items offered and did not recall whether her mother said anything to the men. H.F. said that it would “not really” help refresh her memory to see her earlier statement or testimony on this point.

54H.F. went out the front door and saw M. and E.’s electric scooters outside by the bushes. She says that she knew it was M and E’s e-scooters because of the stickers that they had on them. She had seen those e-scooters before, that M and E brought them every time they came to her house.

55H.F. then returned into the home and the two men were still there talking to her mom, still wearing ski masks. She did not recall the conversation and did not want to refresh her memory on that point.

56Then H.F. went up to her bedroom to change her clothes. When she came back downstairs her mother was alone in the living room. A short while later, M. and E came into the front door of the home. The two men started talking to her mother and H.F. went upstairs to her bedroom “because I was bored and didn’t want to be a part of anything.”

57H.F. was not asked what the men were wearing when they arrived through the front door.

58H.F. could not remember whether she slept at A.R.’s home that night. At the time, she was staying with C.D. and K. on weekends while otherwise living with A.R during the week. She could not recall whether she saw C.D. later that day, nor whether she continued living with A.R. after the incident.

59H.F. did not confront her mother about the incident, though she testified that she “side-eyed” her afterwards.

60It took her months to disclose the assault. She explained that she kept the incident to herself because her mother threatened to kill her if she told anyone. She said the threat occurred “maybe a week if not less” after the incident at her mother’s house. H.F. testified that the threat made her angry but did not surprise her. She attributed A.R.’s behaviour to not being in the “right mindset” due to frequent smoking and vaping.

61H.F. testified that she eventually told C.D. and K. about the incident. She could not recall how much time had passed or when she had last seen A.R. before disclosing.

62The incident left H.F. with lasting effects. She said that her “crotch” hurt and described a painful burning sensation. She did not tell anybody at the time and did not see a doctor.

ii) Cross-Examination

63H.F. confirmed that she believed she was living with her mother at the time of the incident. She agreed that she lived with A.R. for approximately four to five months in total. During that time, she stayed with C.D. and K. on weekends. They picked her up on Fridays after school and returned her to A.R.’s home on Sundays.

64H.F. confirmed that she started attending a new school near A.R.’s home when she moved in with A.R. and began the new school year there. She agreed that she sometimes did not attend school while living with her mother.

65She recalled that B. and D., her younger brothers, visited her mother’s home occasionally. She knew that they lived with their grandfather, who resided nearby in an apartment building. Her older brother, L., lived with another couple, with whom H.F. herself had lived with for a period. L. also visited A.R.’s home, but not as often as B. and D.

66H.F. recalled that E., her mother’s boyfriend, came over a lot, though she believed he did not often sleep overnight.

67H.F. agreed that B. and D.’s bedroom had been on the main floor at some earlier point, but by the date of the incident, her mother had moved their bedroom upstairs and her own bedroom downstairs.

68She testified that B. and D. were not in A.R.’s home the day of the incident because they were unwell. She remembered them telling her a couple of days before the incident that they were coughing, their stomachs hurt, and they would not come over if they were still feeling unwell. That conversation led her to believe they were still sick on the day of the incident.

69H.F. testified that she woke up at her mother’s house on the day of the incident and watched television in her bedroom. She could not recall if she ate breakfast. She assumed that she watched “probably some animal thing” and “like a vet or that.”

70She agreed the incident happened on a school day and that she did not attend school because she did not feel like going. She also agreed she had a cellphone and tablet with Wi-Fi access while living with A.R.

71When asked how she identified the e-scooters she saw near the bushes as belonging to M. and E., she explained that their e-scooters had distinctive stickers, including stickers with their names. She described M.’s scooter as having black and white stickers with only a few containing colour. She recalled that E.’s scooter featured sports-themed stickers, specifically basketball and football stickers.

72She described M. as shorter than E., with a “light but dark” skin tone. He had brown hair, which he had dyed in the past.

73H.F. denied that E. lived at A.R.’s home or slept there regularly. She agreed she did not know whether he returned to the home at night after she went to sleep.

74She disagreed with the suggestion that she continued visiting A.R. after she stopped living there. Her memory was that the last time she lived with A.R. was the last time she saw her. She returned to living full-time with C.D. and K. afterwards.

75H.F. agreed that she had previously testified in court regarding this incident.

76Defence counsel confronted H.F. with a discrepancy between her police statement and her testimony in-chief. In her police statement, she reportedly described the recording device as “a camera, one that goes around your neck” and she drew such a camera in Exhibit 1. However, in cross-examination, she insisted that she told police it was like a case on a cellphone. She explained that she speaks quietly, so it may not have been captured in the police recording. This portion of the police statement was neither proven nor played in court.

77Defence counsel then took her to her preliminary hearing testimony where she stated that the device was not like a phone camera. This refreshed her memory, and she acknowledged that she had made a mistake. She could no longer say whether the device was a camera or a cellphone. At this point, she requested a break.

78H.F. agreed that her evidence-in-chief was that her mother remained in the living room during the incident and did not enter the bedroom. Defence counsel confronted H.F. with her preliminary hearing testimony stating that her legs were positioned as they were on the mattress because her mother instructed her to do so. Thus, her mother was inside the bedroom at that time. H.F. agreed she gave that evidence at the preliminary hearing and that she was telling the truth at the preliminary hearing.

79H.F. explained that her mother was in the bedroom for a little bit at first, but then left. She could not recall how many times A.R. entered or exited the room and did not remember whether her mother was present at the beginning or at the end of the assault. Once her memory had been refreshed, she only then remembered that her mother was in the bedroom at some point. She agreed that most directions came from the masked men, with some from her mother, but she could not recall who told her what.

80H.F. maintained that one of the masked men told her to lie down on the mattress, consistent with her evidence-in-chief.

81Defence counsel then addressed her preliminary hearing evidence where she testified that her mother told her to lie down on her back. H.F. agreed she was telling the truth at the preliminary hearing but currently no longer knows which version is accurate. She agreed it was possible that neither her mother nor the men told her to lie down. She responded, “maybe” and “I don’t know.” She was clearly exhausted at this point in her testimony.

82She agreed it was also possible that she had been watching television downstairs with her mother before the incident rather than upstairs, but she could no longer remember.

83When questioned about the relative heights of E. and M., she testified that E. is definitely taller than M. However, in her preliminary hearing, she stated the opposite: “M. is tall, E. is short.” This inconsistency surprised her in cross-examination. She readily acknowledged she had mixed them up at the preliminary hearing and maintained that her current recollection was accurate. She expressed this with certainty and confidence.

84H.F. was adamant that no one else was in the home during the assault.

85She acknowledged it was possible she was not recorded by one of the masked men, and that she only thought she was. She remained unsure whether the device was a cellphone or a camera.

86H.F. maintained that it was unusual for her mother to ask her to change into any clothes. She agreed she normally would not have listened to her mother, but she did so that day. She fairly stated that she could not say whether or not the clothes were new, as she had never seen them before and did not know where they came from.

87She agreed she had the opportunity to tell C.D. and K. about the incident before her mother’s threat but did not. She estimated about a week passed between the incident and the threat from her mother. When asked why she did not tell anyone before the threat, she repeatedly said, “I don’t know.”

88H.F. recalled getting in trouble with C.D. and K. for stealing figurines from school. C.D. punished her by making her write lines. She disclosed the incident during this punishment. She confirmed these were the circumstances surrounding her first disclosure.

89Defence counsel suggested she invented the story to avoid punishment for stealing. H.F. responded emphatically, “No.” When defence counsel suggested she made up the story to gain sympathy from her grandmother who was scolding her for stealing, she again responded with a clear “No.”

90When defence counsel suggested that she fabricated the entire incident involving the masked men, she stated, “it did happen” and then, “it did happen, but whatever.” Again, she was obviously exhausted by this point in her testimony.

91In reply, H.F. said she did not like being in court and wanted to go home.

92She explained that she disclosed the incident when she did because she had “bottled up” her feelings and was upset, and “it just came up.” She denied that she told C.D. and K. about the incident to get out of trouble.

C.D.’s Evidence

i) Examination-in-Chief

93C.D. is H.F.’s step-grandmother. H.F. refers to C.D. as “Meemaw.” C.D. was married to H.F.’s late paternal grandfather. She and her daughter, K. (whom H.F. calls “Mommy”), are H.F.’s current guardians. C.D. first became H.F.’s guardian when H.F. was one year old and remained her guardian until she turned three. She resumed the role when H.F. was in sixth grade.

94Shortly before H.F. entered grade five, H.F. lived with C.D. for a brief period. The decision was made for H.F. to move in with A.R. Although cautious, C.D. agreed to the arrangement on the condition that H.F. return to her home every weekend. A.R. accepted those terms.

95C.D. testified that H.F. appeared “very happy” on the day she returned to live with her mother. H.F. moved in with A.R. in August 2021, before the start of fifth grade.

96H.F. had a cellphone and an iPad. She frequently called C.D. during the school week. She consistently returned to C.D.’s home every weekend.

97C.D. was forthright in acknowledging her difficulty with dates. This uncertainty was evident in her testimony.

98All parties agree that H.F. moved in with A.R. in August 2021. In her evidence, C.D. stated that H.F. moved out of A.R.’s home in April 2022. According to C.D., A.R. called her in April 2022 to say she could no longer care for H.F. H.F. then returned to live with C.D. in April 2022. From April until June 2022, A.R. had parenting time with H.F. on Sundays.

99After Halloween 2022, in either November or December, C.D. recalled an incident in which H.F. admitted to taking baby animal figurines from a kindergarten classroom. H.F. asked whether C.D. was going to “scream and hit” her. C.D. reassured her that she would not but told her that there must be a consequence. She instructed H.F. to sit at her desk and write “I will not steal” one hundred times.

100H.F. grew very upset while writing the lines. She began disclosing the sexual assault. C.D. called K. into the room to hear what H.F. was saying. H.F. became dysregulated. She screamed, threw objects, and destroyed her bedroom. C.D. said that she had never seen H.F. display this type of behaviour before. This was H.F.’s first disclosure of the sexual assault.

101C.D. contacted the police and brought H.F to the station for a statement. It is an agreed fact that H.F. gave her statement in December 2022.

102Counsel asked C.D. whether anything else had occurred to her once she learned of the allegations.

103She recalled an incident “in June” 2022, during summer vacation, when she picked H.F. up from A.R.’s home. C.D. initially placed this event after H.F.’s April 2022 move out. She testified that H.F had an “awful” smell on her hair and clothing. She said H.F. smelled “like smoke,” but not cigarette smoke. On that occasion, H.F. told her: “Meemaw, go get the car” and “go, go, go, don’t stop.”

104On this occasion “in June”, C.D. said that to get rid of the smell, she prepared a bath for H.F. She had purchased her several pretty bath bombs and put one in the bath water. H.F. liked the colour of the water and got in the bath. C.D. left the bathroom and shortly after she left, H.F. was screaming. C.D. rushed back in. H.F. was saying, “It burns, it burns, help me.” C.D. looked at H.F.’s vaginal area and saw that it was raw and looked like she had scratched or rubbed herself raw. C.D. tried to cool her vaginal area down with cool water and she assumed that H.F. was having an allergic reaction to the bath bomb, however she did not see any other area that was affected. H.F. was saying “It burns inside me.” C.D. retrieved a cream to soothe her granddaughter. She gave H.F. the cream and told her she was a big girl and that she could put it on herself. C.D. observed H.F. placing her hands into her vagina trying to put the cream up into her vagina. H.F. also asked for an icepack. C.D. gave her an icepack and H.F. went to her bedroom.

105When asked again when the bath bomb incident occurred, C.D. said it was in June and that H.F. was not living with her at the time. This conflicted with her earlier testimony that, by April, H.F. was already back in her care.

106C.D. testified that H.F.’s behaviour changed dramatically after the bath bomb incident. Although previously a good sleeper when she slept at her house, H.F. began crawling into C.D.’s bed, clinging to her, and crying herself to sleep. She would not explain why she was upset.

107H.F. also became demanding and rude after the bath bomb incident. Before the incident, C.D. described her as a typical child. She was playful. Sometimes she would get upset with her cousin, but she was generally well-behaved. Her demeanour changed significantly after that incident.

108C.D. recalled occasions when she had to return H.F. early from weekend visits. On those occasions, H.F. had to be lifted out of the car and handed to A.R. C.D. recalls H.F. calling A.R. and her boyfriend, E., derogatory names.

109C.D. recalled receiving late-night video calls from H.F. asking to be picked up from A.R.’s home when she was living with her mother. These calls came at unpredictable hours, from 10:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m. C.D. struggled to place these events chronologically.

110C.D. testified that A.R. had no contact with H.F. from June 2022 onwards. C.D. said A.R. offered “one excuse after another” for not taking H.F. for visits.

ii) Cross-Examination

111During cross-examination, defence counsel reviewed the timeline. C.D. agreed that H.F. lived with A.R. from Monday to Friday between August 2021 and April 2022. She also testified that H.F. stayed with her for much of the Christmas break, though she returned H.F. to A.R. on Christmas Eve because she believed A.R should have her daughter for Christmas. A.R. called and asked her to pick H.F. up at noon on Christmas Day.

112C.D. agreed that in April 2022, A.R. called her in tears. A.R. said she had broken up with E. and could no longer care for H.F.

113C.D. confirmed that A.R. often asked her for help and that she always assisted. She stated, “she knew I would take care of my granddaughter” and explained that she was proud of A.R. for asking for help in April 2022.

114C.D. testified that, after April, H.F. visited A.R. on Sundays. Initially, the visits ran from 1:00 p.m. until 3:00 p.m. Later she extended the visits from 1:00 p.m. until 5:00 p.m. She recalled H.F. being happy when the visits were lengthened and skipping out of her mother’s house afterwards. Believing A.R. could be trusted, C.D. agreed to longer visits.

115C.D. repeated that the bath bomb incident occurred after a visit while H.F. still lived with A.R. She then realized her error and corrected herself. She admitted confusion with dates and became emotional in the witness box.

116She recalled that the bath bomb incident occurred after A.R. had written a note giving temporary custody to C.D. At that point, H.F. visited A.R.’s home every other Sunday. C.D. testified that she believed the incident occurred in June or July when the weather was warm.

117She agreed she did not check whether any other parts of H.F.’s body were affected during the bath bomb incident.

118C.D. stated that H.F. became “nasty” toward her after the bath bomb incident.

119She testified that there were further visits with A.R. after the bath bomb incident, though H.F. did not go willingly. C.D. now regrets having told H.F. to, “Please listen to mommy” on subsequent visits.

120C.D. added detail about the day H.F. disclosed the sexual assault. She recalled H.F. saying, “I’m going to just slice my throat like my mom showed me how to do.”

121C.D. clarified that H.F.’s behaviour deteriorated gradually after the bath bomb incident.

122She maintained that all of H.F.’s negative behaviours, such as name calling, disrupted sleep, and emotional volatility, emerged after the bath bomb incident.

123Confronted with inconsistencies in her timeline, C.D. acknowledged making mistakes. She agreed that there had been an earlier incident, before April 2022, when H.F. behaved rudely and swore at her, leading to C.D. returning her early from a weekend visit. She also accepted that this behaviour, along with H.F.’s late night calls that she attributed to fear, occurred before the bath bomb incident.

124C.D. acknowledged that H.F. had bedtime difficulties at A.R.’s home before moving out in April, but she steadfastly maintained that H.F. did not have such issues at C.D.’s home until after the bath bomb incident. Following that event, H.F. clung to C.D. at night and begged not to go to A.R.’s for visits.

125C.D. could not recall precisely when the Sunday visits stopped.

126She testified that she believed visits continued after the bath bomb incident and into the summer but ended by the start of the new school year in September 2022. After this point, A.R. gave repeated excuses for not taking H.F.

127C.D. agreed it was possible that the final visit occurred on June 12, 2022.

128C.D. displayed no animosity towards A.R. As she exited the courtroom, she said to her: “I still love you. Please get help, please.”

A.R.’s Evidence

i) Examination-in-Chief

129A.R. is 30 years old. She continues to reside in the same home where she lived with H.F. in 2021–2022. The home belongs to her mother, and A.R. testified that she has lived there consistently for approximately six years. She now lives there alone. She has four children, including H.F.

130A.R. stated that H.F moved in with her at the end of August 2021 and remained until April 2022. During that period, H.F. stayed with her from Monday to Friday. C.D. picked H.F. up after school on Fridays and returned her on Sundays.

131A.R. explained that C.D. was married to H.F.’s paternal grandfather.

132A.R. testified that H.F. had not lived with her since infancy, but she visited on some Sundays when her older brother, L., also visited.

133A.R. stated that while H.F. lived with her, E. also lived in the home, as did her two sons, B. and D.

134A.R. described the layout of the home. Two bedrooms were located on the upper floor, and a den had been converted into a bedroom on the main floor. When H.F. first moved in, she took an upstairs bedroom. B. and D. then slept in bunk beds in the den on the main floor. A.R. testified that she and E. used the upstairs master bedroom.

135A.R. said that E. moved in with her at the end of 2020 or the beginning of 2021. He moved out in April 2022.

136She confirmed that E. owned an e-scooter, which she described as a stand-on model that could be folded.

137A.R. stated that she and E. broke up in April 2022. After the breakup, they remained friends for about a week but did not spend much time together, except when she stopped by during work breaks.

138According to A.R., once E. moved out, B. and D. no longer stayed with her for the same periods of time. Around that time, her brother, a male friend, and M. moved in. She testified that all three men lived in the home full-time after E. left. She said she was sorting E.’s belongings, helping her mother pack to move to Stayner, and that H.F. moved back in with C.D. and K. in April 2022.

139A.R. testified that behavioural issues developed between H.F. and her younger brothers a few weeks after H.F. moved in, in August 2021. She attributed those difficulties and her breakup with E. as reasons why H.F. moved out in April 2022.

140A.R. volunteered that she believed H.F. had similar behavioural issues at a previous guardian’s home. This statement is hearsay. I do not accept it for the truth of its contents. However, the fact that A.R. raised this point without being prompted is notable.

141A.R. stated that she believed H.F. might suffer from insomnia, as she does. She said H.F. was afraid to be upstairs alone and would repeatedly come downstairs while A.R. washed dishes for hours in the evenings. A.R. testified that H.F. would scream and keep her brothers awake.

142After H.F. moved out in April, C.D. and K. kept H.F. on a permanent basis. A.R. said she then had visits with H.F. every other Sunday.

143A.R. testified that she left her home in Windsor for a couple of months at the beginning of June 2022. When she returned, she did not resume visits with H.F. right away. She recalled telling her children, including H.F., during a visit on either the first or second Sunday in June, that she would be leaving on vacation.

144A.R. said she left with her brother and her new boyfriend, M., to travel to Stayner to meet her mother and her mother’s partner, and then to go north to visit her younger sister. M. had moved in with her in May 2022. She described the trip as “kinda last minute.” She testified that her brother and M. had been living with her just before they departed. She left on Friday, June 17, 2022, and returned in September.

145A.R. insisted that M. and E. were not friends, did not spend time together, and actively disliked one another. She testified: “they didn’t like each other. If they hung out, I had to separate them.”

146A.R. denied that there was ever a time when men wearing ski masks were in her home.

147She stated that she moved her bedroom to the main floor only after H.F. and E. had moved out and that she gave her two young sons her former upstairs master bedroom. She said this rearrangement happened after her return from the June–September trip to Stayner and Sault Ste. Marie.

148A.R. testified that between August 2021 and June 2022, the entire time that H.F. lived in the home and last had visits with her mother, A.R.’s bedroom was located upstairs.

149She denied ever owning a camera or having a physical camera in her home as an adult.

150A.R. said she only had one cellphone and none of the phones she described had a red case or were red in colour.

151She testified that the only person with an e-scooter was E., and that M. did not have any type of vehicle.

152A.R. denied ever telling H.F. to put on a crop top or “booty shorts.”

153When asked whether she was ever alone with H.F. in the home during the period they lived together, A.R. testified as follows:

Q: During the time that H was living with you from August 2021 to April 2022, how often were you and H the only people in the house?

A: Never.

Q: You can say that with confidence?

A: Yes, because if me and H were home alone, we would go to hang out with A and O next door.

Q: So, if there was an occasion where it was just the two of you, you would head over next door to visit the neighbours?

A: Ya.

Q: And, how often was it that you were in a situation where it was just the two of you heading over to the neighbours?

A: Maybe once per month.

Q: So, not frequent?

A: No, there was always someone over.

Q: And, when she was, during the period of time where she was just visiting on Sundays, how often were you and H the only people in the house or the only people around?

A: Never.

Q: And you can say that with confidence?

A: Ya.

Q: And is that kind of similar situation where you would be going next door or there actually were …

A: There was always her siblings around, H didn’t do well with being bored. So, if she didn’t have somebody to play with, um ya, if there was someone to play with, I would probably come up with a reason to just call and let them know that her siblings weren’t going to be there that week.

Q: Sorry, so, what was that?

A: I would have called and cancelled with C and K to let them know that her siblings won’t be there that week.

Q: So, if it was a situation where, it wasn’t, so. What would prompt you to call C and K?

A: Is if it was, if the boys weren’t coming, if her siblings weren’t coming.

Q: Oh, ok.

A; Ya, ya.

Q: So if she would be visiting but the boys weren’t going to be, you would postpone that visit?

A: Well ya, because from 1-5 is just too long for me to come up with something for her to, she gets bored easy.

ii) Cross-Examination

154A.R. confirmed in cross-examination that she did not move her own bedroom to the main floor until after she returned from her trip to Stayner and Sault Ste Marie in September of 2022. She remained steadfast that when H.F. lived with her and when she was having Sunday visits, A.R.’s bedroom was always on the upper, second floor. A.R. was then confronted with an inconsistency on this point in her statement to the police given on December 22, 2022. In her police statement, A.R. explained to the officer that having H.F. live with her “wasn’t working” that she would be “screaming and keeping the boys up to one, two in the morning”. She went on to explain to the police that H.F. would slam her door and was screaming and “her room was next to the boys.”

155A.R. testified that she was mistaken when she spoke to the police. She insisted that she had not lied but had been tired, anxious, and without her anxiety medication. She agreed she did not appear outwardly anxious “at the naked eye” in her video-recorded statement. She explained that, when she is anxious, “my frontal cortex shuts down” and she goes into “survival mode.” It may cause her to forget information. Counsel put to her that this was not a matter of forgetting: she clearly told police that H.F.’s bedroom was beside the boys’ room. A.R. agreed she had provided the wrong information to the police.

156Despite the inconsistency, A.R. maintained that her bedroom was not on the main floor when H.F. lived with her or during the Sunday visits up until and including June 2022.

157A.R. agreed that she “occasionally” struggled to make ends meet when H.F. lived with her, but she denied having difficulty providing food. She stated she had strong support from family and friends.

158A.R. noted that she lived rent-free in her mother’s home, received Ontario Works benefits, worked at times, and could count on financial assistance from the people close to her. She candidly acknowledged her previous methamphetamine addiction in her early twenties and said she had been clean for “some time.”

159When asked why she would sometimes cancel H.F.’s visits if B. and D. were not coming, A.R. replied: “sometimes I just didn’t want to go next door. Sometimes it was really overwhelming to deal with someone who needed constant entertainment. It was a lot.” She agreed that she told police no men came to the house when the children were present, but claimed she misunderstood the question. She said that she meant that no random men came over. E. lived there, and M. did not come over when E. lived there.

160A.R. agreed there were occasions when she and H.F. were alone in the home, but she maintained these periods were brief, approximately five minutes at a time.

161A.R. repeatedly emphasized how difficult H.F. was to parent, and how overwhelming it was to constantly entertain her. She agreed there were multiple televisions, a gaming system, and many toys in the home. However, she said these did not entertain H.F.

162A.R. testified that she continued to see E. after their breakup in April when she visited him at work on his breaks to have a cigarette together. She was unsure when these interactions stopped but disagreed that they continued for “a couple of months.”

163A.R. agreed that her breakup with E. caused her to “take a break” from H.F. and her sons because she was overwrought and needed time alone. She then acknowledged that she began dating M. almost immediately after breaking up with E. At this point, she said she needed a break from her children. However, during that same period, she had her brother, a friend, and M. move into the home.

164Regarding her June trip, A.R. agreed she had one week to prepare. She testified it “didn’t cross my mind” to tell C.D. or K. she would be gone for two to three months. She said she spent that week trying to get a gift for her sister and arranging for a cat sitter while she was gone. She explained, “I knew my child was safe” and “I was just getting ready for a trip.” She repeated several times that “there was a lot going on at the time.”

165When asked why she made no effort to contact C.D., K. or H.F. during the two-to-three-month trip, A.R. said: “my phone doesn’t work out there” and “it slipped my mind.” She testified that cell service worked only when someone went into town, and that it was usually her mother who went to town for supplies. When it was suggested to her that she must have had moments of cell service during this lengthy trip, she would again revert to saying it just slipped her mind, and she had a lot going on.

166A.R. agreed that C.D. sent many messages about H.F., but she did not respond to any of them. One of the reasons she provided for not replying to or reaching out to C.D. once she returned to Windsor, was that there had been a basement flood and power outage at the house while she was gone. She relied on this as justification for failing to contact her daughter or her daughter’s caregivers for more than three months after her return in September 2022.

167A.R. testified that she travelled to the Sault Ste. Marie region to visit family she had not seen in five to six years. Her sister had two children she wanted to visit.

168In cross-examination, A.R. agreed she never mentioned her three-month trip during her police interview. She acknowledged she told police only that she “hadn’t had the chance” to communicate with H.F. since the summer. She explained that it was late, she was tired, and it did not occur to her to mention the trip to police.

169A.R. agreed that when she returned from the trip, she resumed visits with her younger sons after dealing with the “chaos” at home. She also agreed she did not reach out to resume visits with H.F. or her older son, L.

170A.R. denied the suggestion that she avoided H.F. because of the incident she had orchestrated with H.F. and two men in June, hoping the matter would be forgotten.

171In clarifying questions, A.R. added that she lacked cell service in Stayner as well. Although her mother had Wi-Fi, it was unstable. She testified she spent a couple of weeks in Stayner, then travelled to Sault Ste. Marie, and then returned to Stayner.

4. Positions of the Parties

i) The Crown

172The Crown relies principally on H.F.’s trial evidence describing the incident, together with the evidence of C.D., who saw H.F. immediately after the alleged events at A.R.’s home.

173The Crown submits that the accused occupied a position of trust or authority with respect to H.F. A.R. is H.F.’s biological mother. While she did not consistently maintain custody throughout H.F.’s childhood, she was unquestionably in a position of trust and authority when H.F. was ten years old. The defence did not dispute this point.

174The Crown alleges that A.R. arranged for and, indeed, procured, two men to sexually assault her daughter in her home in exchange for cigarettes, e-cigarettes, and cash.

175The Crown asserts that A.R. acted as an aider to the two charged sexual offences and as a principal to the offence of procuring sexual activity as a parent.

ii) The Defence

176The defence submits that the incident, as described by H.F., did not occur.

177In the alternative, if the court finds that the incident did occur, the defence argues that A.R.’s involvement was minimal. Defence counsel points to H.F.’s evidence in-chief that A.R. did not go into the bedroom and did not speak to her while she was in the bedroom. There is no evidence that A.R. communicated with the two men or had any knowledge of what was going to occur.

178A.R. denies all allegations, and the defence maintains that she was unshaken in cross-examination. The defence emphasizes the inconsistencies in H.F.’s evidence and advances the theory that H.F. fabricated the story when she was in trouble with C.D. for stealing figurines from a kindergarten classroom. According to the defence, H.F. invented the allegations to avoid punishment and to elicit sympathy from her grandmother.

5. Credibility and Reliability Assessments

179As I mentioned earlier, credibility and reliability findings are central to this case. I will review my impressions and conclusions regarding each witness’ credibility and reliability in this section.

i) A.R.

180A.R. denied the allegations throughout. She testified that she never had masked men in her home, never handed her daughter a crop top or “booty shorts”, and never told her daughter to listen to the masked men.

181Much of A.R.’s testimony focused on how difficult it was to parent H.F. She described H.F. as a child who grew bored easily, never felt entertained by screens or toys, and was overwhelming to care for when no other children were around. A.R. insisted she avoided being alone with H.F., claiming that whenever it happened, she would immediately bring H.F. to the neighbour’s home to play with another child. According to A.R., she was never alone with her ten-year-old daughter for more than five minutes. Not during the months that H.F. lived with her, and not during the Sunday visits between April and June 2022.

182A.R. portrayed herself as an overwhelmed mother who “needed a break” when E. left in April 2022. She said this led to her decision to take a trip in June to reconnect with her family. She did not tell C.D. or K. that she would be gone for almost three months. She said she did not inform them because she was too busy preparing for her trip.

183She further testified that upon her return to southwestern Ontario in September, her home had flooded, and the power was out. These inconveniences were the reason why it did not occur to her to contact her ten-year-old daughter or H.F.’s guardians to inform them of her return. Even after restoring her home and resuming visits with her younger sons, A.R. still did not reach out to H.F. for three months until her arrest in December 2022. These explanations, viewed cumulatively, seem incredulous. To be clear, I am not using this evidence for after the fact considerations going to whether the offence occurred, but for a reflection on A.R.’s lack of care for the safety and wellbeing of her daughter.

184At no point in her testimony did A.R. say anything positive about her daughter. Instead, she deliberately painted a negative picture of her. She described H.F. as a whiny, inconsolable child who refused to sleep or go to school. She claimed that her young daughter refused to be entertained by anything and was exhausting to parent. Nothing, not screens, toys, nor games, could keep her satisfied. I treat these descriptions as A.R.’s characterizations, not as findings of fact about H.F.’s temperament.

185The tone and manner of A.R.’s testimony made one thing clear: A.R. did not care for H.F. and had effectively cut her young daughter out of her life by June 2022. I draw this inference from her prolonged lack of contact, not from parental shortcomings alone. Her pattern of conduct is inconsistent with a parent engaged in their child’s well-being.

186The defence properly argued that being a poor parent is not a crime. I agree. However, A.R.’s deliberate portrayal of H.F. as an unbearable burden is relevant to A.R.’s credibility. It speaks to how she wanted the court to view her daughter and why.

187I contrast this with C.D.’s description of H.F. C.D. described her as a normal child who was sometimes mischievous and required discipline, but generally quite happy. She was excited to move in with her mother. Under C.D.’s care, at C.D.’s home, H.F. went to school and slept without difficulty until the bath bomb incident. This contrast is telling; the two descriptions before me cannot be reconciled. If I did not know better, I would not think they were descriptions about the same child.

188I do not accept A.R.’s version of H.F. I find she deliberately misrepresented her daughter to the court. I do, however, accept that A.R. did not feel close to her daughter and largely viewed her as a burden.

189In her police statement, A.R. complained that H.F.’s bedroom was beside the boys’ room, and that she kept them up at night by screaming and slamming her bedroom door. I accept this statement as to where B. and D.’s bedroom was located as true. It aligns with H.F.’s evidence that A.R.’s bedroom was on the main level. This contradiction with A.R.’s trial position undermines her credibility. Unlike statements by other witnesses, I may consider the accused’s earlier statement to police as evidence of what happened, whether or not A.R. testified that what she said earlier was true.

190A.R. also testified that she did in fact move her bedroom to the location H.F. described, but only after she returned from her trip in September 2022. All witnesses agreed H.F. did not see A.R. or enter her home after June 2022. H.F. could not have predicted a future bedroom move. That inconsistency speaks volumes.

191I find that A.R. deliberately misled the court about where her bedroom was during the relevant period. The significance of this is evident. A.R. tried to raise a reasonable doubt that the assault could have occurred in the room described by H.F. According to A.R., there was no mattress on the floor. There were only her son’s bunk beds. Thus, the trier of fact should have a reasonable doubt about the assault. This undermines her credibility in a meaningful way.

192I also do not accept A.R.’s insistence that she was never alone with her daughter. This claim is nonsensical. By her own admission, H.F. missed significant amounts of school. A.R. was not working at the time. It is simply impossible that she ensured another person was always present during school hours, weekday afternoons, and weekends. I also reject her similar claim that she was never alone with H.F. during the Sunday visits after April. Her claim borders on impossible given the daily realities of childcare.

193H.F. testified that her brothers were not present on the day of the allegations because they were unwell. I find that there were times when A.R. and H.F. were alone, including on the date in question.

194C.D.’s evidence about the Sunday visits reinforces this conclusion. She recalled that the visits lasted from 1:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m., then extended until 5:00 p.m., and that H.F. was happy after the shorter visits. I find that those visits involved periods when H.F. was alone with her mother inside the home.

195A.R.’s insistence that she was “never” alone with H.F. aimed at suggesting there was no opportunity for the offence. I find that claim entirely false.

196I also reject A.R.’s explanation for cutting off all contact with H.F. from June 2022 until her arrest. Her reasons, such as preparing for a trip, poor cell service, a flood, and general busyness, do not explain her returning to contact with her younger sons while avoiding her daughter. I do not believe her explanation. She chose not to contact her daughter. Her conduct does not demonstrate forgetfulness; it shows deliberate disengagement.

197A.R. gave a false and negative portrayal of her own daughter and misled the court on numerous occasions. This goes to the heart of her credibility.

198I do not have similar concerns about her reliability. When A.R.’s evidence was wrong, it was not because she forgot. It was because she deliberately chose to be misleading.

199I must now consider whether her denial, assessed in the context of the whole of the evidence, raises a reasonable doubt: R. v. H.C., 2009 ONCA 56, 241 C.C.C. (3d) 45, at para. 56; R. v. Dinardo, 2008 SCC 24, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 788, at para. 23. Applying W.(D.), I first consider whether I believe A.R. If not, I must consider whether her evidence nonetheless leaves me in reasonable doubt. If I still am not in reasonable doubt, I must consider whether the remaining evidence, which I do accept, leaves me with any reasonable doubt.

200It would be wrong to scrutinize A.R.’s evidence more harshly simply because she is an adult: H.C., at para. 62; R. v. Owen (2001), 2001 3367 (ON CA), 150 O.A.C. 378 (C.A.), at para. 3; and R. v. Minuskin (2003), 2003 11604 (ON CA), 68 O.R. (3d) 577 (C.A.), at para. 33. However, the law also recognizes that the exacting standard applied to adult evidence does not always map neatly onto the evidence of a young child. A common-sense approach is required: H.C., at para. 63; B. (G.), at pp. 54–55; and W.(R.), at p. 134. Thus, I have applied these principles even-handedly to both witnesses.

201After considering A.R.’s evidence on the first branch of W.(D.), I find it does not raise a reasonable doubt. In the end, A.R.’s denials rang hollow. I reject her claim that there was no opportunity for the crime, her evidence about the location of her bedroom, and her explanation for abandoning contact with her daughter

ii) H.F.

202H.F.’s account of the allegations lacked embellishment and exaggeration. However, that only goes so far. Merely because an allegation could have been worse does not mean that it is more likely to be true: R. v. G.G. (1997), 1997 1976 (ON CA), 115 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 10; R. v. L.L., 2014 ONCA 892, at para. 2; and R. v. R.A.G., 2008 ONCA 829, 243 O.A.C. 1, at para. 20. A restrained account does not prove credibility, as both truthful and fabricated accounts may appear plain and unadorned. A lack of embellishment matters here only because the defence suggested that H.F. had a motive to lie.

203Following Kruk, at para. 65, I must evaluate that motive.

204The defence argues that H.F. fabricated the allegations to avoid punishment for stealing animal figurines from her school. C.D. confronted H.F. about the theft, and H.F. immediately confessed to taking the figurines. C.D. responded with a mild consequence: H.F. had to write “I will not steal” one hundred times.

205Both C.D. and H.F. agreed this was the first time that H.F. spoke about the assault. I accept this as the timing and context behind the first disclosure. I also accept that H.F. gave her police statement in December 2022. I cannot use the police statement for the truth of its contents, but I can consider it to assess credibility considering A.R.’s allegation of fabrication: R. v. Stirling, 2008 SCC 10, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 272, at paras. 7–8.

206I do not accept the defence theory of fabrication given the timing and circumstances of the disclosure. H.F. had already admitted to the theft before she disclosed and faced a measured consequence. There is no logical connection between avoiding that consequence and inventing an allegation of this magnitude. This allegation accuses her own mother of arranging for two masked men to sexually assault her in exchange for cigarettes and cash. I accept H.F.’s testimony that she had been holding in her emotions and that, in that moment, “it just came up.” It defies common sense that this disclosure context is consistent with a calculated fabrication to evade a minor consequence for behaviour that H.F. had already admitted to.

207On these key points, H.F. did not waver, and she was not confronted with any inconsistencies. She remained steadfast and unshaken on:

(a) Her mother told her to put on clothing she had never seen before.

(b) The clothing was a crop top and “booty shorts.”

(c) When she came downstairs after changing into the clothes her mother provided, two masked men were inside the home.

(d) One man was short, and the other was tall. They both wore ski masks.

(e) She went with the men into her mother’s main floor bedroom.

(f) Inside, one of the men appeared to be filming and the other was positioned on the mattress.

(g) The man on the mattress inserted at least one, but no more than three, fingers inside of her “crotch.”

(h) This act hurt H.F. and “burned.”

(i) After the act, both men left the bedroom.

(j) H.F. saw the men speaking with her mother.

(k) One of the men handed her mother a package of cigarettes, a package of e-cigarettes, and cash.

(l) Outside, H.F. saw e-scooters that she associated with M. and E.

(m) Back inside, her mother was still with the men who were still wearing the ski masks.

(n) H.F. changed her clothes upstairs and returned to find the men gone.

(o) Shortly afterward, M. and E. arrived to visit her mother at the house.

208H.F. was uncomfortable testifying. I found her to be an immature witness, consistent with the way most children her age would act in this situation. She used the word “crotch,” but it was evident she meant her vagina. She also explained that the man put his fingers up her “bladder area.” She said that it burned and hurt. I do not find that any imprecision in her anatomical vocabulary detracts from the core allegations.

209I accept that H.F. described this event to the best of her ability. She disclosed the event as a ten-year-old child with no knowledge of digital penetration or child pornography reasonably would. I do not find that she conjured up this story without experiencing it herself. These details of sexual activity are not consistent with what most ten-year-olds would know. The defence did not suggest that H.F. had knowledge of sexual activity or any reason to know about these sexual acts.

210I found H.F. credible. She had no motive to lie and did not exaggerate. I believe her.

211I now turn to reliability. I must assess H.F.’s evidence considering her age, mental development, and ability to communicate. If there are flaws or weaknesses in her evidence that are caused by these factors, I do not consider them as proof of dishonesty or inaccuracy on key issues. A contradiction in a child’s testimony should not be given the same effect as a similar flaw in an adult’s testimony. As stated by the Supreme Court in B. (G.), at p. 55, “while children may not be able to recount precise details and communicate the when and where of an event with exactitude, this does not mean that they have misconceived what happened to them or who did it.”

212I must address the two material inconsistencies in H.F.’s evidence, which both relate to her mother’s involvement in the sexual assault:

(i) H.F. provided inconsistent evidence on A.R.’s location during the assault; and,

(ii) H.F. provided inconsistent evidence on what, if any, instructions A.R. gave her in relation to the assault.

213In her police statement and at the preliminary hearing, H.F. described A.R. as directing her to the bedroom and on how to position herself on the bed. She described A.R. as being in the bedroom. At trial, in examination-in-chief she said A.R. remained in the living room but told her to listen to the masked men. In cross-examination, H.F. added that A.R. was in the room at some point but did not stay, and she was unsure whether it was her mother or the men who told her to lie down. I find that this inconsistency affects only H.F.’s memory of her mother’s role, not whether the incident occurred. This is an example of fragmented recall around a traumatic event, not inconsistency about the event itself.

214Although confused about her mother’s actions, H.F. was firm that the incident with the two men took place. She remained steady on that crucial point.

215She had a clear memory of the assault and the sequence of events that followed. She painfully recalled the digital penetration and subsequent burning sensation. She did not waiver on the fifteen points that I listed above. I find her reliable on these core elements. I therefore cannot overlook the fact that the core narrative remained consistent, even though some peripheral details changed.

216I attribute the inconsistencies about A.R.’s role to the passage of time, the trauma of the event, and a young child’s tendency to minimize a parent’s involvement in something deeply distressing.

217The inconsistency about whether the device was a cellphone or a camera is immaterial. H.F. acknowledged the discrepancy. She consistently recalled a red device and blue light that suggested recording. She also candidly admitted she does not know for certain that she was recorded. I attribute this difference in recall to her age and the time that has passed. Her sensory memory of the device, such as its colour, shape and emitted light, remained consistent. This supports reliability despite the uncertainty over the label ascribed to the device.

218The other gaps highlighted by the defence, such as the weather, whether she ate breakfast, the packaging of the cigarettes, or exactly where she woke up do not undermine her reliability. These details would not have mattered to a ten-year-old. It is unsurprising that they did not anchor in her memory. Again, this is entirely consistent with the established jurisprudence on children’s recall: peripheral details often fall away while core memories remain intact.

219I am not finding that A.R. used substances during the incident. There is insufficient evidence for that finding. A.R. acknowledged past addiction issues. Beyond H.F.’s description and C.D.’s evidence about an unusual smell, there is no further evidence of substance use at that time.

220Defence also pointed to H.F.’s imperfect recall of the precise wording of the threats issued by her mother and which other members of H.F.’s family may have also been threatened. H.F. remembered that her mother threatened to kill her if she told anyone. She believed her mother might also harm C.D. and K.

221However, I reject this argument. H.F.’s account of the threat is reliable. I accept that A.R. threatened her, and that H.F. perceived her mother to be “smoking a lot of something” at the time. It is immaterial that H.F. could not recall whether her cousin was included in the threat. The defence’s suggestion that H.F. misremembered such a threat is inconsistent with the emotional weight such a statement would carry for a child.

222I place limited weight on H.F.’s demeanour but note that she appeared to be trying to tell the truth. She did not evade questions on cross-examination: R. v. D.V., 2025 ONCA 723, at para. 5. H.F. directly addressed the error about the relative heights of M. and E. When confronted with her earlier testimony, H.F. corrected herself immediately and confidently. Given her age, this mistake is understandable.

223H.F. had difficulty with dates and timing. That is not unusual for a child. The precise date is not an element of any of the offences before the court. H.F. believed that once she stopped living with her mother, she never saw her again. She did not recall the every-other-Sunday visits. I find she was honestly mistaken. C.D. and A.R. agreed that H.F. moved out of her mother’s home in April 2022. I accept that timeline. The alternating weekends with C.D. before April and the structured visits afterwards likely contributed to H.F.’s belief that she was living with her mother the entire time. That, in turn, explains why she located the sexual assault within the period when she lived with her mother.

224In conclusion, I find that H.F. is a credible and reliable witness with some confusion about her mother’s actions and dates/timing. Her confusion about her mother’s movements and the surrounding timeline does not diminish my confidence in her reliability on the essential elements of the assault.

225I find as fact: that A.R. told H.F. to put on the crop top and shorts; that she told H.F. to listen to the men; that one masked man sexually assaulted H.F. while the other appeared to record using a red device with a blue light; that the men handed A.R. cigarettes, e-cigarettes and cash immediately afterward; and that A.R. threatened to kill H.F. and her guardians if she told anyone.

iii) C.D.

226I found C.D. to be a very credible witness. She has known A.R. for many years and consistently gave her the benefit of the doubt. She understood why A.R. cancelled visits with her daughter, and she accepted A.R.’s frustration on the one occasion she returned H.F. early as a consequence of misbehaving. She also acknowledged that A.R. reached out for help when she struggled to provide food, and C.D. gave her full credit for doing so. Nothing in C.D.’s evidence suggested hostility or a desire to cast A.R. in a worse light than necessary.

227C.D. clearly still cares for A.R. despite supporting H.F. through these allegations. She had no apparent motive to lie or exaggerate. I am entitled to consider that in assessing the weight and credibility of her evidence. I do not, however, treat the absence of motive as dispositive; it is one factor among many.

228C.D. helped the court significantly with the overall timeline, but she struggled with exact dates. She admitted this readily. Even so, her evidence on important points, such as the order of events and when they happened in relation to others, was consistent, reliable, and credible. Her willingness to acknowledge uncertainty enhanced, rather than undermined, her credibility.

229First, she remembered H.F. being genuinely excited to live with her mother in August 2021. That is an anchor point. It matters because H.F.’s attitude toward being at her mother’s home changed dramatically over time.

230C.D. recounted many late night and early morning video calls between August 2021 and April 2022, when H.F. lived with A.R. During those calls, H.F. begged to be picked up and said she was scared. A.R., herself, acknowledged similar behaviour. She said that H.F would scream, refuse to sleep, and feared being alone upstairs without an adult. Their evidence reinforces each other’s on this point.

231C.D. also said that while H.F. was living with A.R., she had no trouble sleeping at C.D.’s home on the weekends or when she first moved back in with her in April 2022. That changed suddenly after the bath bomb incident. After that day, H.F. clung to C.D. at night and cried herself to sleep. I accept that evidence. It was credible and reliable. This was a dramatic change, and C.D. clearly remembered that the bath bomb incident immediately preceded it. C.D. waivered somewhat on exactly when the bath bomb incident occurred, but she was not shaken on her certainty that it did in fact occur and that H.F.’s behaviour markedly changed after that incident.

232The bath bomb incident is important. I accept that it happened and the defence did not challenge that fact. C.D. believed it occurred in June 2022. While she was uncertain about the exact date, I accept her memory that it occurred after H.F. moved back in with her in April 2022 and after the Sunday visits were extended until 5:00 p.m. Her description of H.F. being happy and skipping after the first shorter visits with her mother helps place the event. Given the alternating Sunday schedule, and the fact that visits extended after at least two shorter ones, the bath bomb incident likely occurred between April and early June 2022. I also accept A.R.’s evidence that she left for her trip on June 17, 2022. The last visit before that would have been on June 12, 2022. C.D. also recalled at least one additional visit after the bath bomb incident, which helps further narrow the timeline.

233I’ve spent considerable time reviewing this timeline because the defence labelled the bath bomb incident as a “red herring.” Having reviewed the evidence carefully, I am satisfied that the bath bomb incident occurred roughly between late April and early June 2022. It has significant probative value.

234C.D.’s observations about H.F.’s change in demeanour were credible and reliable. The shifts in H.F.’s sleep and behaviour were sudden and gradually worsened. This all occurred after the bath bomb incident. I believe C.D.’s evidence on this point.

235On the day of the bath bomb incident, H.F. got into C.D.’s car urgently and hastily instructed her grandmother to “go, go, go” away from her mother’s house. H.F. smelled strongly of smoke, but it was not cigarette smoke. I accept that evidence.

236I also accept that H.F. had vaginal injuries that day consistent with C.D.’s description that the area appeared “rubbed raw.” I accept that H.F. attempted to apply cream internally inside of her vagina to soothe the pain. C.D.’s description was detailed, consistent with her contemporaneous actions, and unshaken.

237This visit triggered an immediate and lasting change in H.F.’s behaviour at home. She began crying herself to sleep while clinging tightly to her grandmother in bed. She grew increasingly rude and irritable toward C.D. and K. That change, again, came after the bath bomb incident. The temporal proximity between the physical symptoms and behavioural shift strengthens my finding that both relate to the same precipitating event.

238This is circumstantial evidence. It consists of the vaginal injury, H.F.’s urgent desire to leave her mother’s home, her reluctance to return, and the marked behavioural shift that followed. Circumstantial evidence of this nature can be highly probative when, as here, it aligns with the complainant’s core account and is inconsistent with innocent explanations.

239I accept this evidence as both credible and reliable.

240The only reasonable inference flowing from this circumstantial evidence is that the sexual assault occurred on the day of the bath bomb incident. The injury was consistent with what H.F. described. Her frantic behaviour, her urgent desire to leave her mother’s residence, and the shift in her demeanour only makes sense if she had just been sexually assaulted. Fear of her mother would also explain her refusal to return for visits. In my view, this is the only logical conclusion. On circumstantial evidence, I must avoid speculation and adopt the inference of guilt only where no other reasonable inference is available on the whole of the evidence: R. v. Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 1000, at para. 35.

241H.F.’s evidence did not require corroboration, but it has been corroborated by C.D.’s evidence. Any remaining uncertainty that I had about the timing of the assault was resolved by C.D.’s evidence.

6. Application to the Offences Charged

242As aforementioned, on the first stage of W.(D.), the accused’s evidence does not raise a reasonable doubt.

243On the second stage of W.(D.), I do not find that the evidence as a whole raised any reasonable doubt.

244On the third stage of W.(D.), on the evidence that I do accept, namely the evidence of H.F. and C.D., I find that the Crown has proven the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

245I will now apply my factual findings to each statutory element of the alleged offences.

246I note that consent is not an issue in this case. H.F. was only ten years old at the time of the incident. Children under the age of 16 cannot validly consent to sexual activity: R. v. Barabash, 2015 SCC 29, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 522, at para. 20. Accordingly, the only live issues relate to whether the acts occurred and A.R.’s level of participation.

i) Party Offences

247A.R. is charged as a party to two offences. Section 21 of the Criminal Code provides guidance regarding the law of party offences:

Parties to offence

21 (1) Every one is a party to an offence who

(a) actually commits it;

(b) does or omits to do anything for the purpose of aiding any person to commit it; or

(c) abets any person in committing it.

Common intention

(2) Where two or more persons form an intention in common to carry out an unlawful purpose and to assist each other therein and any one of them, in carrying out the common purpose, commits an offence, each of them who knew or ought to have known that the commission of the offence would be a probable consequence of carrying out the common purpose is a party to that offence.

248Anyone who participates in a crime in one of the ways listed in s. 21(1) is a “party to an offence.” A person may become a party through s. 21(1) or s. 21(2), but the two subsections capture different forms of liability. Section 21(1) governs those who participate in the offence, whether as a principal offender or as an aider or abettor. Section 21(2) goes further. It captures those who join together for a common unlawful purpose and either knew or should have known that another participant was likely to commit the charged offence in carrying out that purpose: R. v. Srun, 2019 ONCA 453, 146 O.R. (3d) 307, at paras. 59–62.

249Mere presence is not enough. A bystander does not become a party simply by being present at the scene. There must be something more. This may take the form of encouraging the principal, assisting in a way that facilitates the offence, or preventing interference with the offence. Passive acquiescence does not attract liability under s. 21(1).

250The actus reus of aiding or abetting is doing, or deliberately not doing, something that assists or encourages the offence. The concepts are distinct. To aid is to help, but to abet is to encourage, instigate, promote, or procure the crime.

251The Crown must prove that A.R. intended to assist the principal offenders. The Crown does not have to satisfy me that A.R. wanted the offence to succeed. However, I must be satisfied that she knew the perpetrators intended to commit the offence, even if she did not know the exact manner in which it would occur: R. v. Briscoe, 2010 SCC 13, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 411, at paras. 14–15.

252Willful blindness can substitute for actual knowledge when knowledge is an element of the mens rea. It arises when an accused’s suspicions are engaged to the point that she recognizes the need to ask further questions but deliberately chooses not to. It is not recklessness; it is a decision not to know. As the Supreme Court of Canada helpfully phrased it, willful blindness is “deliberate ignorance.” It is not a mere failure to inquire: Briscoe, at para. 24.

253Where a group participates in an offence, the Crown does not need to prove the identity of the principal or specify the principal’s exact role. It is enough to show that the accused committed acts with the intention of aiding, abetting, or counselling whoever committed the offence. Party liability does not require the Crown to map out each participant’s role with precision: R. v. Cowan, 2021 SCC 45, [2021] 3 S.C.R. 323, at para. 31.

ii) Counts One and Two: Party to Sexual Assault and Party to Sexual Interference

254The accused was charged with one count of being a party to sexual assault.

255The actus reus of a sexual assault consists of three elements: (i) touching; (ii) the sexual nature of the contact; and (iii) the absence of consent; R. v. Ewanchuk, 1999 711 (SCC), 1999 SCC 711, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330, at para. 25; R. v. G.F., 2021 SCC 20, [2021] 1 S.C.R. 801, at para. 25. Touching is proven objectively. The Crown need only show that the act was voluntary: Ewanchuk, at para. 25; R. v. Daviault, 1994 61 (SCC), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63, at p. 74.

256The sexual nature of the contact is also assessed objectively. The Crown does not need to prove that the masked men subjectively intended a sexual purpose: Ewanchuk, at para. 25.

257The mens rea of sexual assault has two components: (i) an intention to touch; and (ii) knowledge of, or willful blindness to, or recklessness about the complainant’s lack of consent: Ewanchuk, at para. 42; R. v. Barton, 2019 SCC 33, [2019] 2 S.C.R. 579, at para. 87. Sexual assault is a general intent offence. The Crown must only prove that the masked men intended the touching: Ewanchuk, at para. 41.

258Section 151 of the Criminal Code provides:

Every person who, for a sexual purpose, touches, directly or indirectly, with a part of the body or with an object, any part of the body of a person under the age of 16 years

(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 14 years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of one year; or

(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than two years less a day and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of 90 days.

259The elements of this offence include an act of touching, directly or indirectly, any part of a complainant aged 14 years or younger, for a sexual purpose with an object or any part of the body of the accused.

260I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that one of the masked men intentionally touched H.F. with his hand and digitally penetrated her vagina. The defence concedes, if this occurred, the act meets the legal test of sexual assault as well as sexual interference on the part of the masked men.

261The act described and the facts, as found above, are sufficient to make out the necessary elements on both counts.

262I accept H.F.’s account of the incident. I find as fact that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the sexual touching occurred between one masked man and H.F.

263I also find that the defendant procured the incident which is relevant to her mens rea to counts one and two. A.R. instructed her daughter to put on the crop top and shorts, told her to go into the bedroom, and directed her to listen to the masked men. I also find that A.R. knew she was sending her ten-year-old daughter into a sexual situation. Any other interpretation defies logic and common sense. Once the sexual act occurred, A.R. received cigarettes, e-cigarettes and cash. That sequence, viewed cumulatively, leads me to the conclusion that A.R. was a party to the offence of sexual assault and sexual interference.

264Precision around the exact date is not required for me to reach this conclusion: R. v. G.G., 2025 ONCA 574, 177 O.R. (3d) 721, at paras. 39–43; B. (G.), at pp. 215–16; and R. v. S.M., 2017 ONCA 878, at para. 10.

265The inference that A.R. knowingly facilitated the principals’ actions is reinforced by her conduct immediately before and after the offence.

266A.R. did not act surprised when two masked men were inside her home. She had prepared for their arrival by dressing her daughter in revealing clothing. She did not question why they were there or act alarmed. She sent her daughter into the bedroom and told her to obey. Afterwards, she immediately received money and goods. Her calm demeanour and lack of inquiry into the presence and conduct of the masked men in her home are incompatible with innocence. In my view, the only reasonable inference is that A.R. arranged this exchange in advance as payment for her daughter’s sexual exploitation.

267Even if I am wrong in drawing that conclusion, I find that A.R. was, at the very least, willfully blind to the masked men’s intentions. Two masked adults do not take a ten-year-old into a bedroom for anything benign, particularly after the child was instructed to obey and wear revealing clothing that she had never worn before. Willful blindness is established where the accused turns a blind eye to the obvious. That standard is met here.

268I reject A.R.’s testimony outright. I find that she distanced herself from her daughter after June 2022 because she hoped H.F. would forget or fail to disclose the assault. A.R. understood what had happened and she feared what a conversation with her daughter might bring to light.

269The Crown does not need to prove motive. Even so, the evidence suggests that the money, and perhaps a desire to please the men around her, played a role in A.R. procuring this exchange. A.R. did not share a close bond with H.F. She repeatedly described her as a burden. That poor relationship helps explain her indifferent disposition towards her daughter’s safety and wellbeing.

270Aiding and abetting requires conduct that assists or encourages the principal offender. It bears repeating that to aid is to help; to abet is to encourage.

271I find that A.R. did both. She arranged for the men to enter her home. She dressed her daughter for them and told her daughter to obey them. She sent her daughter into the bedroom to be assaulted by them. Each of these actions materially assisted, encouraged, or facilitated the principals.

272For the mens rea of aiding, the accused need only know that the principal intends to commit the offence. A.R. did not need to know the precise details of how the sexual assault would unfold. Here, I find that A.R. knew, at a minimum, that the masked men intended to engage in sexual touching that would violate her daughter’s sexual integrity. Even if she did not want to know the details, she was willfully blind to the obvious purpose of two masked men arranging to take her young daughter into a bedroom. On either actual knowledge or willful blindness, I find that the mens rea is established.

iii) Count Three: Procuring for a Sexual Purpose as a Parent

273There is no dispute that A.R. is H.F.’s biological mother. She is her parent within the meaning of s. 170 of the Criminal Code.

274There is also no dispute that H.F. was ten years old between April 2022 and June 2022. She was well under the age of eighteen.

275As aforementioned, I find that A.R. received cigarettes, e-cigarettes, and money immediately after the masked men, who she allowed willingly into her home, subjected H.F. to sexual activity. That exchange meets the definition of procuring a person under eighteen for sexual activity by a parent or guardian under s. 170 of the Criminal Code. The transactional nature of the exchange, coupled with A.R.’s participation, satisfies both the actus reus and the mens rea of the offence.

7. Conclusion

276Returning to the W.(D.) framework, I reject A.R.’s denial that no sexual acts occurred involving H.F. and the masked men. Her evidence does not raise a reasonable doubt when considered alone or in the context of the record as a whole.

277I accept H.F.’s account of the masked men entering the home, the non-consensual sexual activity that followed, and the immediate payment to A.R. thereafter. The portions of A.R.’s evidence which I do accept, coupled with H.F.’s evidence and C.D.’s evidence, do not raise a reasonable doubt on any of the three charges.

278The evidence, as found above, satisfies me of A.R.’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on all three charges. I cannot reach any other reasonable conclusion on the evidence.

279A.R., please stand. For the reasons I have just explained, I find you guilty of counts 1, 2, and 3 on the Indictment.

“Justice Jennifer Moser”

Justice J.M. Moser

Released: February 26, 2026

CITATION: R. v. A.R., 2026 ONSC 1180

COURT FILE NO.: CR-24-00006341-0000 (Windsor)

DATE: 2026/02/26

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

– and –

A.R.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT