Ronald A. Marion

The Crown sought to admit utterances from a 911 call made by the deceased complainant, Pierre Lefebvre, under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule in a criminal trial for unlawfully being in a dwelling with intent to commit an indictable offence.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine admissibility.

The application was dismissed because the utterances did not meet the criteria for the res gestae exception nor the threshold reliability under the principled approach.

The court found that the declarant did not personally observe the events and his high anxiety and confusion raised concerns about the possibility of concoction or distortion, making the evidence an inadequate substitute for sworn testimony.

The accused brought a supplementary application under s. 24(2) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to exclude expert opinion evidence, arguing it was tainted by physical evidence previously found to be obtained in violation of his Charter rights.

The court dismissed the application, holding that expert opinion evidence does not constitute 'evidence obtained in a manner that infringed' Charter rights for the purpose of s. 24(2) exclusion.

The court clarified that s. 24(2) applies to physical, bodily, or derivative evidence, and that the admission of the expert opinion would not adversely affect the accused's ability to make full answer and defence.

The Crown applied under s. 714.1 of the Criminal Code for the complainant to testify remotely via video link due to pandemic concerns and travel difficulties.

The defence opposed, citing concerns about trial fairness, the solemnity of the location (complainant's home), and technological reliability, especially given credibility was the central issue.

The court dismissed the application, finding insufficient information regarding the specific location and technology, and emphasizing that while remote testimony is encouraged, it must not compromise trial fairness, particularly when controversial evidence is involved and the application is opposed.

Two young persons were jointly charged with aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and possession of a stolen motor vehicle.

A third count of mischief was charged against one accused alone.

The incident occurred in Windsor on March 14, 2019, when the accused parked a stolen vehicle in a parking lot.

The property manager confronted the accused, sprayed brake fluid in his face, and a physical altercation ensued.

During the fight, the complainant was stabbed by an unknown assailant.

The court acquitted one accused of all charges due to insufficient evidence.

The other accused was acquitted of aggravated assault and assault with a weapon on grounds of lawful self-defence, but convicted of possession of the stolen vehicle and mischief.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) and section 255(1) of the Criminal Code.

The accused brought a motion alleging violations of sections 8 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that while there was no violation of section 8 rights regarding the breath samples, there was a serious violation of section 10(b) rights regarding access to counsel.

The officer failed to facilitate access to counsel for over one hour and forty-three minutes following detention.

Despite the Charter violation, the court admitted the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that exclusion would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was convicted.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with having a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown established through witness testimony that the accused operated his vehicle erratically, crossing lane markings multiple times and nearly causing collisions.

Police observed similar erratic driving and detected the odour of alcohol upon approach.

Breathalyzer tests confirmed blood alcohol levels of 188 and 186 milligrams per 100 millilitres.

The accused raised multiple Charter violations including claims of degrading treatment, arbitrary detention, racial discrimination, improper search, failure to inform of arrest reasons, trial delay, procedural abuse, denial of counsel of choice, and denial of French language services.

The court rejected all Charter claims and found the accused guilty on both counts.

The applicant sought an order for the return of a 2015 Ford pick-up truck seized as offence-related property following his arrest on charges of trafficking a controlled substance, possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of a controlled substance contrary to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The applicant argued the vehicle was not required for any proceeding.

The court found that the vehicle constituted offence-related property and that a forfeiture hearing following conviction would be a "proceeding" within the meaning of section 490 of the Criminal Code.

The court held it had no jurisdiction to order release of the seized property where the detention period had not expired and continued detention was required for the forfeiture proceeding.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired driving, refusing to provide a breath sample, and resisting a peace officer.

The defence admitted the actus reus of all three offences but contested mens rea.

The accused consumed three glasses of wine while taking Champix (varenicline), a smoking cessation medication, resulting in pathological intoxication characterized by extreme impairment, aggression, and memory loss.

Expert evidence established that the combination of Champix and alcohol can produce exaggerated intoxication effects at low alcohol levels.

The accused was unaware of this drug-alcohol interaction and could not reasonably have known of it.

The court found the presumption of voluntary intoxication was rebutted and acquitted the accused on all charges.

Six accused persons charged with offences under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and related Criminal Code firearms charges made dissimilar elections as to mode of trial.

Some accused elected trial by judge and jury, while others elected trial by provincial court judge.

Some accused subsequently re-elected without obtaining written Crown consent as required by statute.

The court addressed whether a justice presiding at a preliminary inquiry has residual jurisdiction to remedy or disregard recorded elections to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings.

The court held that elections and re-elections as recorded must stand, and that a justice has no power to strike down or disregard a recorded election after the fact.

The accused was charged with assault using a liquid or powder spray on the complainant on May 29, 2013.

The Crown's case rested entirely on the identification evidence of the complainant, who identified the accused as one of his attackers in poorly lit conditions at 2:00 a.m.

The defence called two alibi witnesses who testified the accused was at their residence at the time of the alleged assault.

The court found significant frailties in the identification evidence, including inconsistencies regarding the light source, the momentary nature of the observation, and the complainant's failure to mention seeing the accused holding a canister in his initial police statement despite later testifying to this fact.

The court also noted the animosity between the complainant and accused, which compromised the complainant's credibility.

Despite concerns with the alibi evidence, the court found reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused.

The accused was charged with assault and uttering threats arising from an altercation with his former common-law spouse on his property.

The complainant attended the accused's residence without permission and became upset.

The accused applied force to prevent her from re-entering the house after she allegedly threatened to burn it down.

The trial judge found the accused not guilty of both charges, determining that the complainant was a trespasser and that the accused's use of force was justified under the defence of property provisions of the Criminal Code.