Scott Pratt

The accused, charged with second degree murder and attempted murder, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to trial delay.

The total delay from the charge to the anticipated end of trial was 47.5 months.

After deducting defence delay and delay caused by discrete exceptional circumstances, the remaining delay was 35 months and 7 days, which exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

However, because the case commenced before the release of the Jordan decision, the court applied the transitional exceptional circumstances framework.

The court found that the Crown's reliance on the previous law justified the delay, noting the Crown's efforts to push the case forward and the defence's lack of effort to expedite the proceedings prior to the trial adjournment.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

S.S.M. applied to vary his probation order to allow contact with J.R., the victim of a serious domestic assault for which he was sentenced.

The court convened an "expanded hearing" to gather information from all relevant agencies and parties due to concurrent criminal and child protection proceedings.

Despite S.S.M.'s rehabilitation efforts and J.R.'s desire for contact, the court noted a history of blatant breaches of the non-association clause and J.R.'s unreliability regarding safety.

The court varied the probation order to allow contact only if approved in writing by S.S.M.'s probation officer and consented to by J.R., aiming for a supervised transitional period before the order's expiry.

The Crown appealed a sentencing decision where victim surcharges were ordered concurrently for two theft offences.

The court examined whether victim surcharges, considered ancillary orders rather than fines or penalties, could be imposed concurrently.

It concluded that there is no legal impediment to concurrent victim surcharge orders, consistent with the totality principle and judicial discretion in sentencing, and that the jurisprudence precluding concurrent fines does not apply.

The appeal was dismissed, and the concurrent victim surcharge orders were upheld.

The accused was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with having a blood alcohol content exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, following a single-vehicle collision.

The Crown relied on breath test results showing 149 milligrams per 100 millilitres.

The court found that the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds for arrest, having relied in part on an inadmissible compelled statement.

The breath samples were obtained in violation of section 8 of the Charter.

Additionally, the court found the samples were not obtained as soon as practicable, depriving the Crown of the presumption of identity.

The court also found insufficient evidence of impairment based on the observations of the officers.

Both counts were dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by drugs following a traffic stop where officers observed excessive speeding and unusual behavior.

A certified drug recognition evaluator conducted roadside and station-based evaluations and concluded the accused was impaired by drugs.

A urinalysis confirmed the presence of multiple substances including cocaine, opioids, and psychiatric medications.

The Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to operate the vehicle was impaired by the drugs in his system.

The charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with assault and uttering threats arising from an altercation with his former common-law spouse on his property.

The complainant attended the accused's residence without permission and became upset.

The accused applied force to prevent her from re-entering the house after she allegedly threatened to burn it down.

The trial judge found the accused not guilty of both charges, determining that the complainant was a trespasser and that the accused's use of force was justified under the defence of property provisions of the Criminal Code.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and exceeding the legal limit contrary to the Criminal Code.

The defence brought a section 24(2) Charter application seeking exclusion of breath test evidence based on an alleged violation of section 10(b) rights (right to counsel).

The accused gave an equivocal response ("at this point no") when initially asked if he wished to call a lawyer.

The court found that although the initial response was equivocal, the breath technician subsequently clarified the accused's wishes and the accused unequivocally declined counsel.

The court rejected the accused's credibility regarding his understanding of the situation and his claim that he wanted to speak to a lawyer.

The Charter application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while blood alcohol exceeded 80 mg/100 ml of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defence brought a section 24(2) Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence based on an alleged violation of section 10(b) rights.

The accused claimed police failed to inform him of his right to refuse to contact another lawyer and wait a reasonable time for his counsel of choice to become available.

The court found no Charter breach, holding that the accused was not denied counsel of choice, exercised reasonable diligence, and failed to communicate dissatisfaction with the legal advice received.