Michael H. Gordner

This is a preliminary hearing ruling on the committal of Hai Qin Liang, who is charged with failing to stop after a collision resulting in bodily harm, contrary to section 320.16(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown conceded the accused did not know she hit a person but argued for wilful blindness.

The court reviewed the evidence, including video and witness statements, focusing on the accused's actions post-collision, such as making U-turns to observe the scene, and her subsequent surrender to police.

The judge found insufficient evidence to establish that the accused either knew she struck a person or was wilfully blind to that fact, concluding that her actions were antithetical to a deliberate failure to inquire.

Consequently, the accused was discharged.

The defendant, Timothy Attwater, brought an application under section 11(b) of the Charter for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the information being sworn to the anticipated end of trial was 1265 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court cases set by R. v. Jordan.

The court analyzed periods of delay attributable to defence unavailability (56 days), the COVID-19 pandemic (532 days), and the death of the defendant's former counsel (373 days).

After deducting these exceptional and defence-attributable delays, the net delay was calculated at 304 days, which is well below the Jordan ceiling.

Consequently, the application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

Dr. Rajkumar was charged with impaired driving.

The defence alleged multiple Charter breaches (s. 8, 9, 10(b)) related to the breath demand immediacy, the right to counsel, and unreasonable detention ("overholding").

The court found that the breath screening demand was not immediate, breaching s. 8 and s. 10(b), and that the right to counsel was not properly facilitated, breaching s. 10(b).

The Crown conceded a s. 9 breach for overholding.

Applying the R. v. Grant test, the court found the cumulative breaches serious and their impact significant, outweighing society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The breath testing results were excluded from evidence, leading to an acquittal.

The offender, C.B., was found guilty after trial of sexually assaulting his biological daughter, including sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching, when she was between 13 and 16 years old.

This decision outlines the reasons for sentencing, considering aggravating factors such as abuse of trust, the frequency and duration of the abuse, the victim's young age, and the degree of physical interference.

Mitigating factors included the offender's lack of a prior criminal record, community support, employment history, and mental health issues.

The court applied the principles from R. v. Friesen and R. v. D.D., emphasizing denunciation and deterrence as primary objectives for offences against children.

A global sentence of five years imprisonment was imposed, along with various ancillary orders including a non-communication order, a 10-year s. 161 prohibition order, a SOIRA order for life, a DNA order, and a 10-year weapons prohibition.

The appellant, Patrick Flynn, appealed his conviction for an offence under s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code ("blowing over").

At trial, the judge found two Charter breaches (s. 8, 9, and 10(b)) but admitted the breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appeal advanced three grounds: error regarding the "as soon as practicable" requirement for breath samples, failure to prove the first sample was within two hours, and error in the s. 24(2) Charter analysis.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error or error in principle in the trial judge's findings of fact or application of the s. 24(2) balancing test, which concluded that the minimal nature of the Charter breaches did not warrant exclusion of the breath samples.

At a focus hearing for a preliminary inquiry involving charges of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching, the court determined whether the defence could call five proposed witnesses, including family members and disclosure witnesses.

The Crown argued that such witnesses were only relevant to trial, not to the preliminary inquiry's purpose of determining whether there was sufficient evidence for committal.

The defence argued that the discovery function of preliminary inquiries remained valid and that witnesses relevant to that function could be called under section 541(5) of the Criminal Code.

The court held that the discovery function of preliminary inquiries continues to exist and that the defence may call witnesses to further that function within reasonable bounds.

In a murder trial where self-defence was the central issue, the Crown removed four witnesses from its list shortly before trial because they possessed reliable exculpatory evidence.

The defence brought a motion to compel the Crown to call these witnesses.

The court held that while the Crown generally has discretion over which witnesses to call, the decision to exclude witnesses solely to withhold exculpatory evidence is a trial tactic reviewable under the court's trial management authority.

Finding that the Crown's strategy would adversely affect trial fairness, the court ordered the Crown to call the witnesses during its case.

The accused was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with having a blood alcohol content exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, following a single-vehicle collision.

The Crown relied on breath test results showing 149 milligrams per 100 millilitres.

The court found that the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds for arrest, having relied in part on an inadmissible compelled statement.

The breath samples were obtained in violation of section 8 of the Charter.

Additionally, the court found the samples were not obtained as soon as practicable, depriving the Crown of the presumption of identity.

The court also found insufficient evidence of impairment based on the observations of the officers.

Both counts were dismissed.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash committals following a preliminary inquiry on charges of importing cocaine and methamphetamine into Canada and possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The applicant argued that the committal was unsupported by evidence because he was not present in the truck when it crossed the border and the case was entirely circumstantial.

The court reviewed the narrow scope of certiorari review of committals and held that jurisdictional error arises only where there is no evidence on an essential element of the offence.

The court concluded that the circumstantial evidence linking the applicant to the truck, the co‑accused, and the transport of contraband was capable of supporting inferences of knowledge, control, and participation in importation.

Although an extension of time to bring the application was granted, the application to quash the committals was dismissed.