Gregory James Black

The Crown appealed an acquittal on charges of careless driving causing death and bodily harm.

The appeal focused on errors in the trial judge's application of the principled approach to hearsay admissibility, specifically regarding threshold reliability and the consideration of corroborative evidence.

The Crown also argued the trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons for not applying a relaxed standard of admissibility for exculpatory evidence and improperly used *voir dire* evidence to assess witness credibility.

The court found multiple legal errors, including the misapplication of hearsay rules and the failure to provide sufficient reasons, warranting a new trial.

Tyler Westlin pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm.

The victim, a hotel employee, sustained serious facial injuries requiring two surgeries.

The Crown sought a 6-month jail sentence followed by 2 years probation, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence.

The defence sought a 12-month conditional sentence, highlighting the accused's remorse, rehabilitation efforts (anger management, reduced alcohol consumption, mental health support), and a 12-year gap in his criminal record.

The court, balancing sentencing principles including proportionality and restraint, imposed a 12-month conditional sentence with restrictive conditions, finding it could adequately address denunciation and deterrence while supporting the offender's rehabilitation and financial obligations to his children.

The defendant, John Bertrim, was found guilty of careless driving causing the death of a cyclist under the Highway Traffic Act.

This decision outlines the reasons for sentencing, considering aggravating factors such as the victim being a vulnerable cyclist and the defendant's inattention at an intersection, balanced against mitigating factors like the defendant's age, lack of criminal record, and good character.

The court emphasized general deterrence and proportionality, imposing a sentence of 14 days intermittent custody, a $5,000 fine, and a 2-year probation order with a driving prohibition, including exceptions for farm equipment and medical emergencies.

The accused, Coady Grant, was charged with impaired operation and "80 plus" care or control of a motor vehicle.

The defence conceded impairment, leaving the sole issue as whether Mr. Grant was in care or control of the vehicle.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence, including Mr. Grant's ownership of the truck, possession of keys, bizarre interactions with the vehicle at a gas station, immediate departure from the truck upon police arrival, and video evidence of him paying for gas.

Applying the R. v. Villaroman test for circumstantial evidence, the court found that the only reasonable and inescapable inference was that Mr. Grant drove the truck to the gas station and was in care or control of it.

Mr. Grant was found guilty of both offences, with the "80 plus" charge stayed under the Kienapple principle.

Nathan Forsellino was convicted by a jury of sexual assault.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of three and a half years, while the defence sought a conditional sentence of two years less a day or, alternatively, nine months.

The court, exercising its fact-finding role under s. 724(2) of the Criminal Code due to jury ambiguity, found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant forced sexual intercourse upon the victim, A.G., despite her objections and physical resistance, including placing a hand on her throat.

The court considered aggravating factors, such as the forced sexual intercourse and severe victim impact, and mitigating factors, including the defendant's lack of criminal record, strong community support, and low risk of re-offending.

The court determined that a conditional sentence was inappropriate due to the need for denunciation and deterrence in sexual assault cases.

The constitutional challenge to s. 742.1(f)(iii) was not addressed.

The Crown brought an application to admit similar fact evidence (the "Toronto Allegations") and to permit a witness (Ms. H.M.) to testify remotely via Zoom in a criminal trial for sexual assault and related charges.

The defence opposed the admission of similar fact evidence, arguing it was prejudicial and lacked probative value, and also opposed remote testimony for the trial proper.

The court partially granted the Crown's application, allowing Ms. H.M. to testify remotely due to childcare responsibilities and the COVID-19 pandemic, and permitting her to testify regarding the accused's observation/perception of a firearm and his utterances about its contents.

However, the court excluded other aspects of the Toronto Allegations, such as the proposition for sex and credit card purchases, finding them irrelevant and overly prejudicial.

The offender, C.B., was found guilty after trial of sexually assaulting his biological daughter, including sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching, when she was between 13 and 16 years old.

This decision outlines the reasons for sentencing, considering aggravating factors such as abuse of trust, the frequency and duration of the abuse, the victim's young age, and the degree of physical interference.

Mitigating factors included the offender's lack of a prior criminal record, community support, employment history, and mental health issues.

The court applied the principles from R. v. Friesen and R. v. D.D., emphasizing denunciation and deterrence as primary objectives for offences against children.

A global sentence of five years imprisonment was imposed, along with various ancillary orders including a non-communication order, a 10-year s. 161 prohibition order, a SOIRA order for life, a DNA order, and a 10-year weapons prohibition.

The accused was charged with careless storage of a firearm contrary to s.86(1) of the Criminal Code and contravening storage regulations under s.86(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proceeded by summary conviction.

The accused raised multiple Charter arguments alleging violations of ss. 7, 8, and 9, including claims of unlawful search and seizure, arbitrary detention, and abuse of process.

The court found a technical s.8 Charter violation regarding the failure to file a timely Report to a Justice for detention of the seized firearm, but determined the evidence should not be excluded under s.24(2).

The court found the accused guilty of the regulatory offence under s.86(2) but acquitted on the criminal careless storage charge under s.86(1), finding the Crown had not proven a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonably prudent person.

This is a detention review application under s. 520 of the Criminal Code.

The applicant, previously detained on tertiary grounds, sought release arguing errors of law by the Justice of the Peace and material changes in circumstances, including a new electronic monitoring plan and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found no error of law but agreed that the new monitoring system and the pandemic constituted material changes.

Applying s. 515(10) criteria, the court found detention was not required on secondary grounds due to the applicant's lack of criminal record and stable employment, and that the proposed restrictive conditions and electronic monitoring would manage public safety risks.

While the tertiary grounds initially weighed heavily for detention given the serious charges and strong Crown case, the court balanced these with the improved release plan, the general vulnerability of inmates to COVID-19, and trial delays.

Ultimately, the court concluded that detention was not necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice and ordered the applicant's release on a substantial recognizance with strict conditions.

The defendant, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion (voir dire) to exclude a statement given to police, arguing a violation of his s.10(b) Charter right to counsel.

The police denied his request to contact his stepmother to arrange counsel of choice, instead directing him to duty counsel.

The court found that the police officer's denial was a clear violation of the well-established duty to facilitate access to counsel, even through a third party, and that the defendant was not reasonably diligent in renewing his request because the officer's initial response was a clear "no." Applying the R. v. Grant factors under s.24(2) of the Charter, the court found the breach serious, the impact on the defendant's Charter-protected interests significant (as it affected his ability to make an informed choice with trusted counsel), and the societal interest in adjudication on the merits did not outweigh the breach given the statement's questionable necessity.

Consequently, the January 25, 2018 statement was excluded.

The accused was charged with three counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking after surrendering drugs during a police parade following her arrest for a firearms offence.

The trial proceeded by way of a blended voir dire.

The court found that while the arrest was lawful, the police flagrantly violated the accused's Charter rights by failing to implement her right to counsel without delay for approximately four hours and by conducting an unjustified strip search without reasonable grounds specific to the accused's circumstances.

The court excluded all evidence obtained as a result of these violations and entered acquittals on all counts.

At a focus hearing for a preliminary inquiry involving charges of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching, the court determined whether the defence could call five proposed witnesses, including family members and disclosure witnesses.

The Crown argued that such witnesses were only relevant to trial, not to the preliminary inquiry's purpose of determining whether there was sufficient evidence for committal.

The defence argued that the discovery function of preliminary inquiries remained valid and that witnesses relevant to that function could be called under section 541(5) of the Criminal Code.

The court held that the discovery function of preliminary inquiries continues to exist and that the defence may call witnesses to further that function within reasonable bounds.

The defendant was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking following a police response to a stabbing report at an apartment building.

Police detained the defendant in an elevator with the suspect and conducted a search, seizing cocaine and cash.

The defendant challenged the search on Charter grounds, alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10.

While the court found the Crown proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based on the quantity of cocaine, the large amount of cash, and expert evidence regarding trafficking indicators, the court excluded the evidence due to an unreasonable search in violation of section 8 rights.

The charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with three sexual offences against his daughter: Sexual Assault (s. 271), Sexual Interference (s. 151), and Exposure (s. 173(2)).

The allegations involved taking photographs of the complainant's vaginal area, touching her vaginal and buttocks area with his penis, and masturbating in her presence while she was bathing.

The complainant, a 14-year-old with the mental capacity of an 8 or 9-year-old, testified that these incidents occurred when she was between 12 and 13 years old.

The accused denied all allegations.

The trial judge found the complainant to be a credible and compelling witness but determined that there were sufficient concerns about the reliability and weight of her evidence to prevent a considered and reasoned acceptance beyond a reasonable doubt of the allegations.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with having care or control of a motor vehicle while blood alcohol concentration exceeded the legal limit.

The Crown sought to rely on breath sample analysis results.

The defence raised Charter violations: (1) a section 8 unreasonable search and seizure claim regarding the Approved Screening Device demand; (2) section 10(b) right to counsel violations, including failure to reinform of rights upon a second arrest and failure to facilitate contact with counsel of choice.

The Crown conceded one 10(b) breach.

The court found the section 8 claim failed but upheld the section 10(b) breach regarding counsel of choice.

Under section 24(2), the court excluded the breath sample evidence due to the serious and wilful disregard by multiple officers for the accused's right to counsel, despite minimal actual impact on the accused's interests and the reliability of the evidence.