Anthony G. Debly

The defendants were charged with selling improperly packaged vapour products contrary to the Smoke Free Ontario Act after an undercover enforcement officer purchased a vape containing 5% nicotine.

The court found the products were improperly packaged as they exceeded the 2% nicotine limit, lacked federal and provincial duty-paid stamps, and lacked Health Canada warnings.

The court rejected the defendants' explanation of how the products were acquired and held that the defence of entrapment is not available for bona fide regulatory test shopping.

Both defendants were found guilty.

The appellant appealed the Registrar of Motor Vehicles' decision to recall and cancel her personalized licence plate under s. 12(2) of the Highway Traffic Act for containing or implying political opinions.

The Registrar brought a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal found that the Act does not assign it authority to hear appeals of decisions made under s. 12(2), as its jurisdiction is limited to specific sections that do not include s. 12.

The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The appellants, a motor vehicle dealer and its business manager, appealed a Notice of Proposal to Revoke Registration and an Immediate Temporary Suspension Order (ITSO) issued by the Registrar under the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002.

The Tribunal held a hearing to determine whether the ITSO should be extended pending the conclusion of the appeal.

The Registrar presented evidence of the appellants' failure to pay out a lien, failure to honour a consignment agreement, failure to comply with requests for information, and multiple significant violations found during inspections.

The Tribunal found that the Registrar established a reasonable basis for the allegations and that it was in the public interest to extend the ITSO until the conclusion of the hearing.

The applicant sought a stay of the municipality's decision to revoke its taxi licences and refuse additional licences pending an application for judicial review.

The municipality had revoked the licences based on by-law violations and non-compliance with COVID-19 orders.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the applicant failed to establish irreparable harm, as the alleged financial losses were quantifiable.

The court also found the balance of convenience favoured the municipality's public interest in enforcing its regulatory scheme.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the Registrar's refusal to issue him a commercial driver's licence due to his failure to meet minimum vision standards.

The Tribunal considered whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal under section 50(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The Tribunal found that the appellant was an 'applicant' under section 32(5)(a) rather than a 'holder' under section 32(5)(b), and that the regulations only prescribe a right of appeal for decisions made under section 32(5)(b)(i).

Consequently, the Tribunal concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

Crown appeal of an acquittal on a charge of stunt driving contrary to section 172(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial Justice of the Peace erred in law by imposing a requirement that an officer must "lock in" the speed reading on a radar device as an essential element of the offence.

Both Crown and Defence agreed this was an error.

The appellate court found that the trial Justice properly found the officer was qualified, the radar device was in proper working order, and the accused was driving at 171 km/h in a 100 km/h zone.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittal, and entered a finding of guilt.

The defendant was charged with stunt driving under Section 172(1) of the Highway Traffic Act for driving 50 kilometres per hour or more over the speed limit on EC Row Expressway in Windsor.

The Crown's case relied on radar evidence showing a speed reading of 150 km/h in a 100 km/h zone.

The court found the defendant not guilty because the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was travelling at 150 km/h.

While the court was satisfied the defendant was travelling at 140 km/h (40 km/h over the limit), the stunt driving charge requires proof of at least 50 km/h over the limit.

The appellant appealed an order of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles cancelling its Commercial Vehicle Operator's Registration (CVOR) certificate and seizing its plates due to a poor safety record.

The appellant's operations manager had a history of managing other companies with cancelled or refused CVORs and outstanding fines.

Despite the appellant's recent hiring of a safety consultant, the Tribunal found the appellant had a pattern of poor safety and little demonstrated action to improve.

The Tribunal concluded there was reason to believe the appellant would not operate safely and ordered the Registrar to carry out the cancellation and seizure.

A commercial trucking company was charged with transporting dangerous goods (wet-filled acid batteries) without displaying required safety placards and labels in violation of the Dangerous Goods Transportation Act.

The defendant argued that an exemption under 49 CFR 173.159(e) applied because the shipment originated from the United States.

The court rejected this argument, finding that 173.159(e) pertains only to packaging and bracing requirements, not placarding and safety marking requirements.

The court held that the exemption under section 9.1 of the Canadian Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act, 1992 only applies when United States placarding and marking requirements are met, which they were not.

The defendant was convicted.

The appellant, operator of a seasonal bar on Pelee Island, appealed a Notice of Proposal refusing to remove conditions on its liquor licence that restricted patio service and music.

The appellant argued that a shift in its business model to cater to an older boating clientele and minor expansions to local commercial facilities constituted a change in circumstances under section 14 of the Liquor Licence Act.

The Tribunal found that the neighbourhood remained largely residential and that a mere change in business model was insufficient to justify removing conditions originally imposed to protect the public interest.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant appealed the impoundment of its trailer under section 50.3 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The trailer was impounded after an inspection revealed a critical defect with the brakes.

The applicant argued that the inspecting officer failed to follow statutory procedures and exceeded his authority by ordering repairs before towing.

The Tribunal found that the officer complied with the statutory requirements for detaining the vehicle.

The Tribunal held that its jurisdiction is limited to determining whether a critical defect existed at the time of inspection, which was undisputed, and confirmed the impoundment.

The Registrar of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario proposed to suspend the liquor licence of Club T'Zers following a severe motor vehicle accident involving two patrons.

The Registrar alleged that the licensee permitted drunkenness and served liquor to intoxicated persons.

The Board found that the two patrons were highly intoxicated when they entered the establishment and that the staff knew they were intoxicated but allowed them to remain for 20 to 30 minutes before ejecting them after an altercation.

The Board concluded that the licensee permitted drunkenness contrary to subsection 45(1) of Ontario Regulation 719/90.

However, the Board dismissed the allegation under section 29 of the Liquor Licence Act, finding insufficient evidence that the patrons were actually served or supplied with liquor while on the premises.

The appellants, an adult entertainment parlour and its manager, appealed their convictions under a municipal by-law prohibiting dancers from touching patrons.

The trial and appeal judges had interpreted the by-law as an absolute prohibition on touching, regardless of the dancer's state of dress.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the by-law must be interpreted to prohibit touching only when the dancer is nude or partially nude, otherwise the provision would be unconstitutionally vague.

Because the trial judge failed to properly resolve conflicting evidence regarding the dancer's state of dress, the convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.