Brian Ducharme

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused challenged the admissibility of breath test results on Charter grounds, alleging violations of sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found multiple Charter breaches, including: (1) the officer's failure to properly identify the approved screening device used; (2) the officer's failure to inform the accused of the reason for detention; (3) the officer's failure to provide the right to counsel during the detention period while awaiting the arrival of the screening device; and (4) procedural deficiencies in the investigation.

The court excluded the breath test evidence and dismissed the charge.

The accused was charged with an "over 80" driving offence.

The Crown relied on breath sample analysis to prove the accused's blood alcohol concentration exceeded the legal limit.

The central issue was whether the breath samples were taken "as soon as practicable" as required by section 258(1)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code to invoke the presumption of identity.

The court found multiple unexplained delays in the booking and testing procedures totalling approximately 37 minutes, including delays in completing administrative forms and notes, and a 28-minute gap between the two breath tests.

The court concluded that the totality of delays was unreasonable and that the Crown failed to establish the samples were taken as soon as practicable.

Without the presumption of identity, the Crown's case collapsed and an acquittal was entered.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and exceeding the legal limit of alcohol in her blood while operating a motor vehicle on November 1, 2013.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence of identity, observations of impairment by lay and police witnesses, and breath test results.

The defence challenged whether the Crown had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the driver of the vehicle and argued procedural defects regarding the timing of breath tests.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts, determining that the only rational inference from the evidence was that the accused was the driver and that the police acted reasonably in obtaining breath samples as soon as practicable.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and exceeding the legal blood alcohol limit contrary to sections 253(1)(a) and 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

This was the second trial on the matter, the first having resulted in a mistrial.

The Crown invited dismissal of the impaired driving charge.

The court examined two key issues: whether breath samples were taken "as soon as practicable" (ASAP) as required by section 258(1)(c)(ii), and whether the Crown could rely on the presumption of accuracy under section 258(1)(g).

The court found the ASAP requirement was met but could not rely on the presumption of accuracy due to a discrepancy between the alcohol standard lot number on the certificate and the lot number testified to by the breath technician.

Both counts were dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking to exclude breath test results.

The court found that the border services officer had formed a reasonable suspicion that the accused had consumed alcohol based on observations including the odour of alcohol on the accused's breath, red cheeks, and discovery of an empty bottle of Jägermeister.

The court determined that an approved screening device was used and that reasonable and probable grounds existed for the demand under section 254(3) of the Criminal Code.

The court also found no breach of section 10(b) rights, as the change in investigation from immigration/customs to impaired driving did not trigger a requirement to re-advise the accused of his right to counsel.

The breath test results were admitted into evidence.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and exceeding the legal limit contrary to the Criminal Code.

The defence brought a section 24(2) Charter application seeking exclusion of breath test evidence based on an alleged violation of section 10(b) rights (right to counsel).

The accused gave an equivocal response ("at this point no") when initially asked if he wished to call a lawyer.

The court found that although the initial response was equivocal, the breath technician subsequently clarified the accused's wishes and the accused unequivocally declined counsel.

The court rejected the accused's credibility regarding his understanding of the situation and his claim that he wanted to speak to a lawyer.

The Charter application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while blood alcohol exceeded 80 mg/100 ml of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defence brought a section 24(2) Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence based on an alleged violation of section 10(b) rights.

The accused claimed police failed to inform him of his right to refuse to contact another lawyer and wait a reasonable time for his counsel of choice to become available.

The court found no Charter breach, holding that the accused was not denied counsel of choice, exercised reasonable diligence, and failed to communicate dissatisfaction with the legal advice received.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and exceeding the legal limit contrary to the Criminal Code.

The defence brought a section 10(b) Charter application seeking exclusion of breath sample evidence, alleging violations of the right to counsel.

The court found a breach of the implementation component of section 10(b) because police failed to provide the accused with a list of lawyers or phonebook when he indicated he did not know any lawyers.

However, the court declined to exclude the evidence under section 24(2), finding the breach was minor and inadvertent, the accused received legal advice from duty counsel, and the reliable breath evidence was essential to addressing the societal problem of impaired driving.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

Following a traffic stop, the officer detained the accused for approximately ten minutes while waiting for an approved screening device (ASD) to arrive, without informing the accused of the reason for detention or his right to counsel.

The court found that the officer breached the accused's Charter rights under sections 8, 10(a), and 10(b) by failing to make the ASD demand forthwith as required by section 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The officer's apparent belief that he could detain the accused indefinitely without explanation, combined with his lack of understanding regarding when detention obligations arise, led the court to exclude the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.