Ilana Mizel

This criminal trial concerned charges against the defendant, Warren Walls, for inviting sexual touching, transmitting sexually explicit material to a person believed to be under 16, and sexual assault.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of the complainant's testimony, noting significant inconsistencies and fabrications regarding the sexual assault and invitation to sexual touching allegations, which raised reasonable doubt.

While the transmission of sexually explicit material was proven, the Crown failed to establish the requisite purpose of facilitating a sexual offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Consequently, the defendant was acquitted on all counts.

During a murder trial, the defence sought to call a forensic psychiatrist to testify that the accused may have been in a cocaine-induced psychosis at the time of the offence, and that the alleged conduct was out of character.

The court ruled that the expert could testify about the potential impact of cocaine consumption and the possibility of psychosis, as this was relevant to the defence of intoxication and the ability to form specific intent.

However, the court excluded the expert's opinion that the offence was out of character for the accused, finding it to be impermissible character evidence and oath-helping.

During a murder trial, the deceased's family brought an urn containing the deceased's ashes into the overflow courtroom.

The trial judge ruled that the urn must be removed from the courthouse.

The court found that leaving the urn overnight posed practical and security concerns, and carrying it in and out risked the jury seeing it, which could prejudice the accused's right to a fair trial.

The court also noted that the presence of the remains could adversely impact the appearance of neutrality.

In a first-degree murder trial involving an East Indian accused and a white victim, the court ruled on jury selection procedures following the Supreme Court's decision in Chouhan.

The court established specific anti-bias instructions and challenge for cause questions addressing conscious and unconscious bias regarding race, drug use, and the Indigenous status of Crown witnesses.

The court determined that the trial judge, rather than counsel, would ask the challenge for cause questions, and that prospective jurors would be given advance notice of the questions.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder and sexual assault, brought a motion to introduce evidence suggesting an alternate perpetrator.

The proposed evidence included trace DNA found on the deceased, social media posts by the deceased expressing fear of her neighbours, and evidence of criminal activity at the neighbouring rooming house.

The Crown opposed the admission, arguing it was speculative and prejudicial.

The court ruled the evidence admissible, finding it relevant as circumstantial context that could raise a reasonable doubt, and held that its probative value was not substantially outweighed by any prejudicial effect.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought a pre-trial application to exclude DNA evidence obtained under a warrant.

The defence argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) relied on unlawfully obtained information, specifically banking records from a US bank and a cast-off DNA sample seized by US Homeland Security Investigations.

The court found the banking information was obtained unlawfully and the extraction of the DNA profile from the cast-off sample potentially violated s. 8 of the Charter.

While bound to excise this information from the ITO, rendering the warrant invalid, the court ultimately admitted the DNA evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The offender pleaded guilty to manslaughter for his role in the execution-style shooting of a 16-year-old victim.

The court determined the appropriate sentence range was 8 to 12 years, fixing the sentence at 8 years due to the offender's limited participation and young age.

The court then reduced the sentence to 7 years to account for the collateral consequences of harsh pre-sentence custody conditions, including lockdowns and the COVID-19 pandemic, before applying a 1.5:1 credit for time served.

The final sentence to be served was 2 years and 325 days.

The offender, Cheng Sun, was convicted by a jury of manslaughter in the death of his wife, Weqiong Du-Sun, after initially being charged with second-degree murder.

The sentencing judge considered the circumstances of the offence, including the jury's implied finding of provocation by a knife threat, and the offender's personal background, lack of criminal record, and demonstrated remorse.

Aggravating factors included the domestic violence context, the brutality of the attack (multiple blunt force injuries and strangulation), the victim's social vulnerability, and the devastating impact on her daughter.

The Crown sought 11-12 years, while the defence sought no more than 7 years.

The court imposed a total sentence of nine years' incarceration, with credit for pre-sentence custody.

In a pre-trial voir dire for a second-degree murder charge, the Crown and defence brought applications regarding the admissibility of evidence.

The court found the accused's statements to police were voluntary and that his s. 10(b) Charter rights were not violated, as police took reasonable steps to ensure he understood his rights despite a language barrier.

However, the court dismissed the Crown's application to admit the deceased's text messages to her daughter under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, finding the statements lacked threshold reliability.

The offender, a 26-year-old first-time offender, was convicted of unauthorized possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and carrying a concealed weapon after fleeing from police.

The court considered the offender's positive pre-sentence report, lack of criminal record, and motive of self-protection against the aggravating factor of possessing a loaded firearm while fleeing.

Finding the offender's conduct fell between a mere licensing infraction and truly criminal conduct, the court imposed a sentence of 29 months' imprisonment.

The accused was charged with multiple firearm and drug offences.

The police conducted warrantless searches of the accused's rental property based on the consent of the landlord (the accused's mother).

The court found that the landlord did not have the authority to consent to the search of the tenant's residence, resulting in a breach of the accused's s. 8 Charter rights.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the firearm, marijuana, and a portion of the cocaine from evidence, finding that their admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute due to the seriousness of the police conduct.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a young person, S.B., on a charge of sexual assault.

The Crown argued the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error of fact regarding the complainant's certainty that the accused heard her express non-consent, and erred in law or mixed fact and law by failing to establish the accused's knowledge of absence of consent.

The appeal court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons functionally adequate.

The court clarified that the trial judge did not make the factual findings attributed by the Crown, but rather expressed reasonable doubt regarding the complainant's credibility and the reliability of her evidence, particularly concerning inconsistencies in timing and the purpose of being at the location of the alleged assault.

The appellant appealed her conviction for failing or refusing to provide a breath sample by means of an approved screening device.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge erred in concluding there was an outright refusal, given the appellant's retraction and subsequent attempts to comply.

Furthermore, the trial judge erred by shifting the burden of proof regarding mens rea and the proper functioning of the approved screening device.

The Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the device was in good working order, which was necessary to infer intentional failure.

The appeal was allowed, and the conviction was set aside, resulting in an acquittal.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and exceeding the legal limit of alcohol in her blood while operating a motor vehicle on November 1, 2013.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence of identity, observations of impairment by lay and police witnesses, and breath test results.

The defence challenged whether the Crown had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the driver of the vehicle and argued procedural defects regarding the timing of breath tests.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts, determining that the only rational inference from the evidence was that the accused was the driver and that the police acted reasonably in obtaining breath samples as soon as practicable.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit following a motor vehicle collision on February 8, 2009.

The Crown relied on breath test results showing readings of 174 and 175 mg/100 mL of blood, along with observations of impairment by police officers and a civilian witness.

The defence challenged the reliability of the breath testing instrument, arguing that inadequate maintenance and an unknown number of calibration checks prior to testing raised reasonable doubt.

The defence also presented expert evidence suggesting the accused's alcohol consumption was inconsistent with the breath test results.

The court found the breath testing instrument was functioning and operated properly at the time of testing and rejected the defence arguments regarding maintenance and calibration checks.

The court also found the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol based on the totality of evidence, including the failure to stop at a stop sign, observations of impairment, and the reliable breath test results.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The Crown relied on breath test results showing readings of 147 mg and 139 mg per 100 mL of blood.

The defence challenged the reliability of the breath testing instrument based on lack of annual maintenance since August 2010 and an unexplained fifth calibration check.

The defence also argued that symptoms of impairment observed at the scene could be attributed to the accused being awakened from sleep and the effects of bright police lights.

The court found that the Crown had satisfied its burden on both counts, rejecting the defence arguments regarding instrument reliability and finding sufficient evidence of impairment.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

The defence challenged the admissibility of breath samples on the grounds that they were not obtained as soon as practicable, contrary to s. 254(3) of the Criminal Code and breaching the accused's s. 8 Charter rights.

The court found a breach occurred due to unexplained delays totalling approximately one hour between the demand and the first breath sample.

However, the evidence was admitted under s. 24(2) of the Charter as the breach was not serious state conduct, the intrusion was minimal, and the public interest in prosecuting impaired driving was significant.

On the merits, the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's blood alcohol content exceeded the legal limit at the time of driving.

The appellant appealed a probation condition imposed following guilty pleas to several offences, including communication for the purpose of prostitution, breaches of court orders, failure to attend court, and uttering threats.

The appellant sought removal of a curfew condition on the basis that it was punitive and lacked a nexus to rehabilitation or public protection.

The Crown argued the sentencing judge considered the offender’s rehabilitation and community protection when imposing the curfew.

Applying appellate deference principles, the court held that the sentencing judge committed no error in principle and that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The probation condition, including the curfew, was upheld.