Kenneth Wolfe Golish

The offender was convicted by a jury of one count of sexual assault.

The assault involved forceful vaginal penetration and attempted anal penetration despite the complainant's clear lack of consent.

The court rejected the Crown's submission that a knife was used, finding reasonable doubt on that fact.

The court found the offender's lack of remorse, prior criminal record, and the significant psychological impact on the complainant to be aggravating factors.

The offender was sentenced to four years in custody, less pre-sentence credit, along with ancillary orders including a 20-year SOIRA registration and a lifetime weapons prohibition.

The defendant, Marta Bueno Troncoso, was charged with impaired operation of a conveyance and operating a conveyance with over the legal limit of alcohol.

The court found a breach of her s. 10(b) Charter rights due to an unexplained delay in providing rights to counsel and a failure to facilitate her right to counsel of choice, leading to the exclusion of breath test results under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The court dismissed claims of s. 8 and s. 10(a) breaches, and found no arbitrary detention under s. 9.

Consequently, the defendant was found not guilty of the over-limit charge.

However, based on civilian and police observations of impairment, the defendant was found guilty of impaired operation, as alcohol was a contributing factor to her impairment, notwithstanding her claim of fatigue.

The appellant, William James Epp, appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion of penetration was reasonable given the overwhelming evidence and the appellant's failure to testify.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding no error in the seven-year imprisonment sentence, considering aggravating factors such as the victim's age, the appellant's age and prior record, and the harm caused.

The appellant was convicted of historical sexual offences involving his daughter.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's credibility findings, arguing different levels of scrutiny, misapplication of *R. v. W.(D.)*, and misapprehensions of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's entitlement to accept the complainant's evidence and reject the appellant's, and finding no significant errors in the application of legal principles or assessment of evidence.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle while exceeding 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood.

The trial judge found Charter breaches (ss. 8, 9, 10(a)) but admitted breath sample evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, leading to a conviction.

The Summary Conviction Appeal (SCA) judge upheld the conviction.

The applicant argued errors in admitting uncorroborated police evidence, relying on a defective breath certificate, and admitting evidence despite Charter breaches.

The Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal, finding no legal error by the SCA judge and no issue of broader legal significance, affirming that corroboration of police testimony by an Approved Screening Device is not required and that the breath certificate met statutory requirements.

The appellant, Sarah Sefton, appealed her conviction for driving over 80, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing her Charter application to exclude breath test results.

The trial judge had found multiple s. 10(b) Charter breaches (delay in facilitating counsel, failure to advise right to wait for counsel of choice) but dismissed the s. 24(2) Charter application, deeming the breath test minimally intrusive.

The appeal court found the trial judge erred in her s. 24(2) analysis by focusing solely on the physical intrusiveness of the breath test rather than the broader impact of the denial of the right to counsel without delay on the accused's protected interests.

Re-evaluating the Grant factors, the appeal court concluded that the serious and multiple breaches of the right to counsel, including prolonged detention without access to a "lifeline" of advice, warranted the exclusion of the breath test samples.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg.

He argued the trial judge erred in her s. 24(2) Charter analysis by admitting breath sample evidence despite finding breaches of his ss. 8, 9, and 10(a) rights, and that the breath technician's certificate was defective.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's Grant analysis was adequate and entitled to deference, as the breaches were not serious and the admission of evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The court also held that the certificate's deficiencies could not be raised for the first time on appeal and were cured by other evidence at trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of child pornography, arguing the jury's verdict was unreasonable and that expert evidence was required to prove his knowledge and control of the files.

The police found a computer in the appellant's bedroom containing over 3,800 images of child pornography.

The Court of Appeal held that the jury was entitled to rely on circumstantial evidence, including the appellant's computer expertise and the testimony of his housemate, to conclude that the only rational inference was that the appellant knew the images were on his computer.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding no breach of his right to counsel of choice under s. 10(b) of the Charter, and in finding the breath test readings proved his blood alcohol exceeded the legal limit.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the Charter ground, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings.

However, the court allowed the appeal on the second ground, holding that the trial judge erred in law by relying on inadmissible roadside screening device results to prove the offence, and that the breath technician's evidence of readings with a preceding decimal point (e.g., .170) did not prove the blood alcohol concentration exceeded 80mg in 100ml.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's $2,000,000 action for negligent investigation and malicious prosecution on a motion for summary judgment, the court determined the issue of costs.

The court considered the factors under Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, noting the litigation was ill-advised and had no chance of success.

The court awarded costs to the defendant on a partial indemnity basis, reducing the amount sought to recognize the effect on the plaintiff, fixing costs at an all-inclusive sum of $15,000.

The defendant, the Attorney General of Canada, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for negligent investigation and malicious prosecution.

The plaintiff, a legal assistant, had been previously acquitted of immigration fraud charges following an undercover RCMP investigation, while her employer was convicted.

The court found that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and prosecute the plaintiff based on intercepted communications and her involvement in fabricating a refugee claim.

As reasonable and probable grounds existed, both the negligent investigation and malicious prosecution claims failed.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the action was dismissed.

The appellant appealed her conviction for failing or refusing to provide a breath sample by means of an approved screening device.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge erred in concluding there was an outright refusal, given the appellant's retraction and subsequent attempts to comply.

Furthermore, the trial judge erred by shifting the burden of proof regarding mens rea and the proper functioning of the approved screening device.

The Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the device was in good working order, which was necessary to infer intentional failure.

The appeal was allowed, and the conviction was set aside, resulting in an acquittal.

The offender pleaded guilty to second degree murder and arson after breaking into the apartment of a pregnant woman to steal her underwear.

When discovered, he brutally murdered the victim and subsequently set the apartment on fire to destroy evidence.

The court weighed the extreme brutality of the unprovoked attack, the vulnerability of the pregnant victim, and the severe post-offence conduct against the offender's guilty plea and lack of prior record.

The court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment with a 22-year period of parole ineligibility for the murder, and a concurrent 5-year sentence for arson.

The Attorney General of Ontario brought applications under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001 for the civil forfeiture of four properties used as marijuana grow operations.

The application judge ordered the forfeiture of three properties but declined to forfeit the fourth, finding it would clearly not be in the interests of justice because the owner was innocent and only a small portion of the mortgage was paid with illicit funds.

The property owners appealed the forfeiture orders, arguing the standard of proof should be beyond a reasonable doubt and that the Crown was estopped from seeking civil forfeiture.

The Attorney General appealed the refusal to forfeit the fourth property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals, affirming that civil forfeiture operates on a balance of probabilities, is independent of criminal proceedings, and that the 'interests of justice' exception functions similarly to equitable relief from forfeiture.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding they failed to establish that the respondent life insurance company waived the dependency requirement in the insurance policy.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs of $10,000 to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a finding that he breached his conditional sentence, arguing the sentence had already expired.

The dispute centered on the interpretation of s. 742.6 of the Criminal Code and whether the appellant should be credited for time spent in custody before bail determinations on previous breaches.

The Court of Appeal held that a conditional sentence starts running again immediately upon the offender being detained in custody, regardless of whether a formal show cause hearing has occurred.

The appeal was allowed and the breach finding was set aside.