Anna Harris

The Children and Family Services for York Region brought a Status Review Application concerning two young children, E. and J., who were removed from their parents' care due to the mother's severe alcohol misuse and the father's schizophrenia and lack of parenting skills.

The Society sought final custody orders for the maternal grandmother (for E.) and the paternal aunt (for J.), which were granted.

The court found the children continued to be in need of protection and that permanent placements with the caregivers were in their best interests, emphasizing stability and continuity of care.

While the parents' plans for return were deemed unviable, the court made temporary access orders and adjourned the access portion of the trial to allow parties to develop a more workable plan, with conditions imposed on parents to address their issues and improve their support networks.

The Children and Family Services for York Region (the "Society") brought an urgent motion and child protection application concerning a child.

The court raised questions about its territorial jurisdiction, as the child and parents did not reside in or were present in York Region.

The Society sought to transfer the matter to Durham Region based on preponderance of convenience under section 91(3) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The court found that the Society lacked territorial jurisdiction to initiate the application because the child was not present within its jurisdiction.

Despite this, and with the consent of the parties, the court ordered the transfer of the proceeding to Durham Region, not under section 91(3), but by exercising its authority under Rule 2 of the Family Law Rules, prioritizing the child's best interests and judicial efficiency.

The Children and Family Services for York Region (Society) sought a temporary order for the respondent father, J.M., to have supervised access to the child, J., twice weekly.

The respondent mother, C.F., opposed this, requesting access be deferred until Society offices reopened and then be supervised by two CAS workers, specifically excluding family members or friends.

The father consented to the Society's motion but requested an additional term regarding future access discretion.

The court found that the COVID-19 closure of CAS facilities constituted a material change in circumstances.

Applying a contextual analysis, the court determined that the Society's proposal for supervision by approved paternal aunts, remotely monitored by a FIT worker, sufficiently mitigated the risk of harm to the child and promoted the child's best interests, protection, and well-being.

The Society's motion was granted, and the mother's motion was dismissed.

A case conference in a child protection matter under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto sought to place a newborn child (born March 14, 2018) who had been apprehended on March 16, 2018 due to the mother's serious mental health concerns.

The father attended court and expressed willingness to plan for the child.

The court directed the society to assess the father's strengths, develop a service plan, provide expectations, and facilitate the father's input.

At the June 14, 2018 case conference, the society reported comprehensive compliance with the court's directions and demonstrated significant progress in working with the father, including overnight visits and parenting instruction.

The case was adjourned to July 18, 2018 for motions to place the child in the father's temporary care and to appoint the Public Guardian and Trustee for the mother.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion to dismiss the mother's appeal of a trial decision that dismissed her Status Review Application and maintained a Crown wardship order.

The mother had failed to order trial transcripts or perfect her appeal due to financial constraints.

The court applied the test for dismissing an appeal for delay, emphasizing the overwhelming prejudice to the children, who had been in foster care for nearly seven years and required permanency.

Finding no merit to the appeal and no prospect of it being perfected, the court granted the motion and dismissed the appeal.

The mother brought a motion under section 54 of the Child and Family Services Act seeking a court-ordered psychiatric assessment to be conducted by a private psychiatrist, with costs to be borne by the society.

The child had been apprehended at birth due to concerns about the mother's mental health and capacity to parent.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the assessment was not necessary.

The court held that the mother's treating psychiatrist of eight years had already provided a diagnosis and treatment plan, and the court had access to extensive police records, medical records, and direct observations of the mother's behaviour during access visits.

The court found that the mother's request was essentially for a second opinion, which did not meet the statutory threshold of necessity required under the legislation.