Amelia M. Daurio

This decision addresses the division of property, equalization, and post-separation adjustments following the breakdown of marriage between Oludayo Olowookere and Arthur Temitope Olowookere.

The court determined the date of separation, assessed the credibility and sufficiency of evidence regarding alleged family loans, and calculated equalization and post-separation adjustments.

The court found insufficient evidence to support the existence of the claimed loans and provided detailed reasons for the equalization and adjustment calculations, ultimately ordering specific payments and dismissing the occupation rent claim.

The court granted the applicant's motion to strike the respondent's pleadings in a protracted family law dispute, finding a persistent pattern of non-disclosure, delay, and non-compliance with court orders by the respondent.

The court also granted declaratory and enforcement relief regarding property transfers and allowed the applicant to proceed to an uncontested trial, with limited rights for the respondent to submit evidence.

The decision reviews the legal principles for striking pleadings in family law, emphasizing the exceptional nature of the remedy and the importance of disclosure and compliance.

The Applicant sought the return of the children to Singapore pursuant to the Hague Convention, arguing Singapore was their habitual residence.

The Respondent contended the children's habitual residence was Ontario, asserting the move to Singapore was temporary for family support during pregnancy.

The court applied the hybrid approach to habitual residence, considering all circumstances including parental intentions and the children's connections.

The court found that the parties' intention was always to return to Canada, supported by evidence such as storage of belongings and daycare registrations.

The Hague application was dismissed, and the Ontario court was found to have jurisdiction over custody and access, as the children were habitually resident in Canada.

The Applicant sought to strike the Respondent's pleadings due to his persistent non-compliance with financial disclosure orders and rules, and the Respondent sought the sale of the matrimonial home.

The court found the Respondent engaged in intentional delay tactics and provided unreliable financial information.

While declining to immediately strike pleadings due to the child's interests and the imminence of trial, the court imposed a $10,000 penalty on the Respondent, with daily fines for late payment, and ordered that his pleadings on financial issues would be struck if he failed to comply within 45 days.

The Respondent was also barred from using his expert's reports without consent and from bringing further motions without leave.

The Respondent's motion for the sale of the matrimonial home was dismissed due to his unreliable financial claims, the imminence of trial, and potential prejudice to the Applicant and child.

The Respondent brought a motion to strike the Applicant's Motion to Change (MTC) due to the Applicant's long-standing non-compliance with multiple court orders, including significant arrears in child and spousal support ($90,868.06) and an unpaid costs award ($159,533.73) from a previous trial.

The Applicant, who had declared bankruptcy but was undischarged, also failed to provide adequate disclosure regarding his employment changes.

The court applied the three-step test for striking pleadings and found the Applicant's conduct to be egregious and exceptional, demonstrating a blatant disregard for court orders and a "scorched earth" litigation approach.

The court granted the Respondent's motion, striking the Applicant's MTC in its entirety and imposing strict conditions for any future motions, emphasizing the need for the Applicant to demonstrate genuine compliance with existing orders and good faith.

The Children and Family Services for York Region (the "Society") brought an urgent motion and child protection application concerning a child.

The court raised questions about its territorial jurisdiction, as the child and parents did not reside in or were present in York Region.

The Society sought to transfer the matter to Durham Region based on preponderance of convenience under section 91(3) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The court found that the Society lacked territorial jurisdiction to initiate the application because the child was not present within its jurisdiction.

Despite this, and with the consent of the parties, the court ordered the transfer of the proceeding to Durham Region, not under section 91(3), but by exercising its authority under Rule 2 of the Family Law Rules, prioritizing the child's best interests and judicial efficiency.

The applicant sought a restraining order against the second respondent, who is the applicant's aunt and the first respondent's current spouse.

The second respondent moved to dismiss the claim for lack of jurisdiction.

The court found that it lacked jurisdiction under the Children's Law Reform Act to grant a restraining order where no parenting orders were in place or sought, and no child was subject to the proceeding.

The court dismissed the applicant's claim against the second respondent.