William Krishan Doodnauth

The court considered an application to remove the estate trustees of Lillian Mary O’Neill’s estate, appoint successors, and require the passing of accounts.

The court found that the current trustees, Dianne and Andrea, were no longer neutral and had failed in their duties, particularly in light of delays, conflicts of interest, and lack of transparency.

The court ordered their removal, the appointment of Julie O’Neill and Karen Wolfe as successor estate trustees, and required the former trustees to pass their accounts.

Costs were awarded to the applicants.

The Children and Family Services for York Region brought a Status Review Application concerning two young children, E. and J., who were removed from their parents' care due to the mother's severe alcohol misuse and the father's schizophrenia and lack of parenting skills.

The Society sought final custody orders for the maternal grandmother (for E.) and the paternal aunt (for J.), which were granted.

The court found the children continued to be in need of protection and that permanent placements with the caregivers were in their best interests, emphasizing stability and continuity of care.

While the parents' plans for return were deemed unviable, the court made temporary access orders and adjourned the access portion of the trial to allow parties to develop a more workable plan, with conditions imposed on parents to address their issues and improve their support networks.

This appeal concerned a failed agreement of purchase and sale (APS) for a residential development, where the appellant (buyer) had an express obligation to obtain severance approval but failed to communicate or take steps for almost five years.

The respondent (seller) subsequently refused access to the property, deeming the APS terminated.

The appellant sought declarations that the APS was valid and for specific performance.

The application judge dismissed the appellant's application, finding the appellant in breach due to inordinate delay and the respondent justified in treating the APS as ended.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, affirming that where an APS has no fixed deadline, performance must occur within a reasonable time, and that inordinate, unexplained delay can constitute a fundamental breach justifying termination without a prior notice of a new deadline, depending on the circumstances.

The Respondent brought an urgent motion seeking to prevent the Applicant from relocating their child, A.L.R., from Thornhill to Barrie.

The court found that the Respondent failed to comply with the notice and objection requirements under sections 16.9 and 16.91 of the Divorce Act, thereby authorizing the relocation by statute.

Despite this, the court also considered the best interests of the child under section 16.92 of the Divorce Act, noting the Applicant's reasons for the move (husband's job relocation), the modest impact on parenting time, the child primarily residing with the Applicant, and the Applicant's compliance with notice provisions.

The Respondent's motion was dismissed, and the Applicant was permitted to relocate the child.

The father brought a motion under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction seeking the return of the parties' two infant children from Ontario to Texas.

The mother conceded that the children were habitually resident in Texas but argued the Article 13(b) grave risk exception applied, alleging the father's alcohol abuse and erratic behavior created an intolerable situation.

The court found the mother's evidence, while credible regarding the father's problematic behavior, did not meet the high threshold for "grave risk" of physical or psychological harm or an intolerable situation as required by the Convention.

The court ordered the children's return to Texas, subject to certain undertakings by the father to ameliorate immediate risks and ensure the Texas justice system could address parenting issues.

The respondent father brought a motion to change a 2018 consent order, seeking to reduce his child and spousal support obligations based on a claimed reduction in his self-employment income.

The court found that the respondent had reorganized his corporation shortly after the consent order and was splitting income with his new spouse and son.

The court imputed income to the respondent by adding back the non-arm's length salaries and dividends, setting his income at $195,488 rather than his claimed $144,121.

Support was adjusted accordingly, retroactive only to January 1, 2021, as a previous motion for 2020 had already been dismissed.

The accused was charged with two counts of child luring contrary to section 172.1(2), one count of communication for the purpose of obtaining sexual services from a person under 18 years under section 286.1(2), and two counts of arranging a sexual offence with a child via telecommunication under section 172.2(2).

The Crown's case was based on an undercover investigation (Project Raphael) where an officer posed as a minor and engaged in text conversations with the accused.

The sole issue at trial was identification: whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the person who engaged in the text conversation with the officer, given that the phone used to send the messages was never recovered.

The court found that circumstantial evidence, including cellphone tower records, the timing and content of messages, and the circumstances of the accused's arrest, proved identification beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was convicted on all five counts.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing his complaint of age discrimination and reprisal against a volunteer model aviation club.

The Tribunal had found that the applicant was removed from his position due to interpersonal conflict, not age, and that he pursued the complaint in bad faith, disentitling him to protection from reprisal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no denial of procedural fairness, no reasonable apprehension of bias, and that the Tribunal's decision was reasonable and entitled to deference.

The accused was charged with sexual touching and sexual assault against two granddaughters.

The Crown's case relied on testimony from the two complainants, who alleged multiple incidents of sexual abuse occurring over several years.

The defence presented the accused and his wife, who denied all allegations.

The trial judge found significant frailties in the complainants' evidence, including recovered memories, inconsistencies between trial testimony and police statements, and concerns regarding potential collusion.

The judge applied the W.D. analysis and found that the defence evidence raised a reasonable doubt.

All charges were dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding the respondent damages for wrongful dismissal based on a continuous period of employment that included time with a previous, separate company.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in law by concluding the previous employer's obligations flowed through to the appellant.

The evidence demonstrated the two companies were separate corporate entities and the respondent had resigned from the first to join the second.

The damages award was reduced to reflect only the period of employment with the appellant.

The applicant sought custody of his daughter following the respondent's unilateral, unannounced relocation with the child to a new city, which violated a prior court order.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) also brought a motion for disclosure of the child's records due to the respondent's non-compliance.

The court found the respondent's actions to be an exceptional case warranting a change in the child's primary residence, citing the child's instability, special needs, and the respondent's secretive and unilateral decisions.

The court granted the applicant interim primary residence and amended access arrangements, while dismissing the OCL's motion as it was resolved by consent if disclosures were made.

This trial concerned whether Amanda Bowman had the implied consent of her mother, Christina Bowman, to drive her vehicle, which was involved in an accident with the plaintiff, Barbara Watts.

Liability and damages were agreed upon, with the sole issue being implied consent under the Highway Traffic Act.

The court found that Christina Bowman successfully demonstrated that Amanda Bowman did not have her implied consent, thereby absolving Christina Bowman of owner's liability.

Consequently, Western Assurance Company, the plaintiff's insurer, was ordered to pay the agreed damages and costs to the plaintiff, with statutory subrogation rights against Amanda Bowman.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment awarding the respondent contractor $10,000 following termination of a construction management contract during the pre-construction phase.

The appellant argued that he was not personally liable because he acted as an agent for the property owner and that the contractual termination payment constituted an unenforceable penalty clause.

The court held that the appellant signed the agreement as “owner” without written designation of agency and failed to prove he acted solely as an agent without personal liability.

The court further held that the termination payment was not unconscionable or extravagant and did not constitute an unenforceable penalty clause in light of modern jurisprudence favouring freedom of contract.

The appeal was dismissed.

The tenants appealed an order of the Landlord and Tenant Board terminating their tenancy and ordering payment of rent arrears.

The tenants argued that the landlord used an alias on the written tenancy agreement, which they claimed breached section 12 of the Residential Tenancies Act and suspended their obligation to pay rent.

The landlord brought a motion to quash the appeal.

The Divisional Court found that the tenants were aware of the landlord's true identity, making the use of an alias a mere technicality that did not affect their ultimate liability for rent.

The court concluded the appeal was frivolous, vexatious, and manifestly devoid of merit.

The appeal was quashed and the automatic stay of eviction was lifted.