David P. Miller

This case involves a status review application by the Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto seeking extended society care for three young children (B, C, and D) with no access to their parents, JM and MH.

The court reviewed extensive evidence including Statements of Agreed Facts, police and hospital records, and testimony from society workers, foster parents, and the parents themselves.

The children have special needs, including autism for B, and have been in care beyond statutory time limits.

The parents have a history of instability, mental health issues, substance abuse, domestic violence, and lack of cooperation with the society.

The court found the parents neither credible nor reliable and concluded that returning the children to their care would pose significant risks.

The court ordered extended society care with no parental access but allowed access among the siblings.

The decision carefully applies the legal framework under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, including the best interests of the child and the new access test for children in extended society care.

The children's aid society brought a summary judgment motion seeking extended society care and significantly reduced access for three children.

The mother and the Office of the Children's Lawyer opposed the motion.

The court found no genuine issue for trial regarding disposition, as the mother remained homeless and unable to provide stable care, and ordered extended society care.

However, the court found a genuine issue for trial regarding access, noting the children's strong bond with their mother.

Using its expanded fact-finding powers, the court made a final order granting more frequent access than the society proposed, tailored to each child's specific needs and views.

The Simcoe Muskoka Child, Youth and Family Services brought a motion for summary judgment seeking an order for extended society care for the child, S.C., who had been in temporary care since birth.

The respondent parents opposed, arguing for a trial to present their plans for the child's care, including family assistance in Ontario or a move to British Columbia.

The court found no genuine issue for trial, concluding that the parents' unresolved mental health issues, chronic housing instability, history of domestic violence, and inconsistent access visits demonstrated their inability to provide a stable and safe home.

The court dismissed the parents' proposed plans as unviable and granted the Society's request for extended care, ordering monthly supervised access for the parents.

This child protection trial concerned whether the two-year-old child, EL, was in need of protection and the appropriate dispositional orders.

The Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto sought extended society care due to concerns about the mother's cognitive limitations and inability to protect the child from the stepfather, who had a significant history of sexual assault and criminal convictions, including against a child.

The mother and grandmother sought the child's return to their care, subject to supervision, and access.

The court found the child to be in need of protection due to risks of physical and sexual harm.

It ordered extended society care, granted the mother and grandmother supervised access, and denied the stepfather any access, citing his high risk and the mother's inability to protect the child from him.

The Jewish Family and Child Services of Greater Toronto brought a motion for temporary care and custody of a 9-year-old child, D.S., due to concerns about the mother, Z.Y.'s, deteriorating mental health, which manifested as paranoid delusions impacting the child's safety, well-being, and academic/medical needs.

The mother denied mental health issues and sought the child's return without supervision.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the child was at risk of harm if returned to the mother's care, and that supervision terms would be inadequate.

The motion was granted, placing the child in the society's temporary care, with access to the mother at the society's discretion, considering the child's needs and the mother's mental health.

In a status review application, the Children's Aid Society of Toronto sought extended society care for a child (N.G.-L.), while the father (W.L.), supported by the mother (N.G.), sought custody with a supervision order.

The court found intervention necessary due to the mother's long-standing substance abuse issues, the parents' past dishonesty, and minimization of risks.

However, considering the child's best interests, the father's commitment, his capacity to parent with support, and the positive influence of a friend (T.G.), the court determined that a supervision order placing the child in the father's care, following a six-week interim society care transition, was the least disruptive and most appropriate alternative.

The order included strict supervision terms for the father and clear boundaries for the mother's access, which is to be supervised solely by the society.

The appellant father appealed a child protection order that placed his child in the extended care of the Children's Aid Society of Toronto.

He alleged that the trial judge made factual errors regarding his insight into the mother's drug abuse, his focus on the mother, the safety of his care plan, and his credibility.

The Superior Court of Justice, applying the standard of palpable and overriding error for factual findings, dismissed the appeal.

The court found no obvious error in the trial judge's assessment of the father's credibility and the viability of his care plan, emphasizing the high degree of deference owed to trial judges in child protection proceedings where the child's best interests are paramount.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a summary judgment motion seeking a finding that Adam T. was a child in need of protection and an order for extended Society care.

The respondent mother, A.T.T., and respondent father, T.M., sought alternative dispositions, including the child's return to their care.

The court found Adam to be in need of protection due to the mother's chronic substance abuse, unstable lifestyle, and lack of candor, and the father's disengagement.

The court granted the Society's request for extended Society care, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial for a different disposition, and dismissed the parents' plans for care and access, except for supervised access for the maternal grandmother.

This is a second appeal concerning a child protection order, specifically the "no access" portion of the order.

The mother (appellant) sought a rehearing or virtual access to her child, D.R., who was found in need of protection due to serious injuries inflicted by a parent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the appeal judge's decision to deny access, finding no palpable and overriding error in the best interests analysis under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The court emphasized the significant risk that led to the protection finding and the lack of a beneficial and meaningful relationship between the mother and child, noting the child's thriving in foster care.

Motion by the Children's Aid Society of Toronto to vary a temporary care and custody order placing an 18-month-old child (F.I.) with the father.

The society sought to return F.I. to the mother's care, subject to society supervision.

The mother supported the motion and provided evidence of material changes in her circumstances since the initial placement order.

The father opposed, arguing the mother had not sufficiently addressed her underlying issues.

The court found a material change in circumstances and ordered F.I. returned to the mother's care with society supervision, while maintaining the father's access rights.

The father appealed a summary judgment decision that limited his access to his daughter, N.B., to written contact, subject to the child's wishes for further contact.

The father argued that the summary judgment judge improperly considered hearsay evidence and failed to apply principles of justice and fairness.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law or palpable and overriding error.

The court emphasized that the summary judgment judge's decision was child-focused, based on N.B.'s expressed fears and wishes, and that the father had not sought to cross-examine deponents or introduce fresh evidence at the appropriate time.

The appellant mother, M.H., brought a motion for state-funded counsel for her appeal of a child protection order that placed her child in extended care.

The court applied the five-part test for funding, finding that the mother's s. 7 Charter rights were engaged, she could not have a fair hearing without counsel due to the complexity of the proceedings and her limited capacity, she had exhausted all legal aid avenues, and she was unable to afford a lawyer.

Crucially, the court determined that her appeal had the requisite minimum threshold of merit, particularly concerning arguments of ineffective assistance of counsel and the significant imbalance of evidence at the original summary judgment motion.

The motion was granted, and the Attorney General of Ontario was ordered to provide state-funded counsel and reasonable disbursements for both the appeal and the present motion.

The appellant, J.H., appealed final child protection orders placing his children in extended society care with no access, alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge.

The appellant claimed the trial judge rejected his plan for the children's return before final submissions.

The appellate court reviewed the trial judge's statements in context, applying the high threshold for apprehension of bias.

It found that the trial judge's comments, including hypothetical scenarios and expressions of preliminary thoughts, did not indicate a closed mind but rather an open one amenable to persuasion by submissions.

The appeal was dismissed, with no costs awarded.

This is a ten-day trial involving a status review application for three children and a protection application for a fourth child.

The court determined that all four children should be placed in the custody of the mother under section 102 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The father's access was ordered to be supervised, occurring every other week for two hours at a Supervised Access Centre.

The court found that the children were at risk of harm while in the father's care, that the father had engaged in a campaign to undermine the mother's relationship with the children, that the children had thrived in the mother's care since March 2018, and that the father lacked insight into his shortcomings and was ungovernable by court orders or the child protection agency.

A summary judgment motion brought by the Children's Aid Society seeking a finding that a child was in need of protection and placement in the care of the maternal grandmother.

The mother opposed the motion and sought dismissal or alternatively placement in her own care.

The court found credibility issues regarding the history predating the protection application and the circumstances of the child's placement with the maternal grandmother.

The court determined that the maternal grandmother's evidence, which formed the foundation of the society's case, could not be properly scrutinized on a summary judgment motion.

The court declined to grant summary judgment and instead ordered a focused trial to hear evidence from the maternal grandmother and the mother on the issue of whether the child is in need of protection, with disposition to be determined if a finding of need is made.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a summary judgment motion within a status review application seeking custody of two children (M.B. and K.B.) to be granted to their maternal aunt and uncle (J.C. and Je.C.), with specified access terms for the mother and father of K.B. The mother opposed the motion, arguing genuine issues required a trial.

The court granted the custody order on a summary basis, finding the mother had failed to address serious protection concerns over 22 months, including her ongoing conflictual relationship with K.B.'s father, inconsistent attendance at supervised visits, and lack of engagement with support services.

However, the court found that access issues required a focused hearing due to insufficient evidence regarding the children's current wishes and disagreement among parties regarding appropriate access terms.

This is a child protection proceeding under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act involving two young boys in the care of the Children's Aid Society since birth.

The Society sought a Crown wardship order with no access to the mother.

The mother opposed the application and sought the return of the children to her care under Society supervision.

The court found that the mother has significant cognitive limitations, has failed to demonstrate meaningful change since a prior Crown wardship order involving her third child, and continues to resist working cooperatively with the Society and other professionals.

The court granted the Society's application for Crown wardship with no access, while making the siblings access holders to each other to preserve their relationship.

The father appealed a disposition order from Justice R. Spence, which made his two children crown wards with no access, after a finding that the children were in need of protection.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's factual findings in five areas: the history of domestic violence, the mother's inability to separate from the father, the characterization of missed medical appointments, the health of one child prior to apprehension, and the mother's capacity to engage with healthcare providers and the Children's Aid Society.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's assessment of the facts, emphasizing the high degree of deference owed to trial judges in child protection cases.

A child protection trial under the Child and Family Services Act involving two young children (K.P., born 2013, and A.P., born 2014) where the applicant society sought findings of need of protection and Crown wardship without access.

The respondent parents, both with significant cognitive disabilities (father with FASD and frontal lobe damage; mother with intellectual disability), opposed the application and sought various supervision orders.

The court found the children in need of protection based on actual physical harm, risk of physical harm from pattern of neglect, and failure to address developmental delays.

The court rejected all proposed supervision orders due to the parents' lack of insight, poor judgment, inability to self-regulate, and demonstrated unwillingness to cooperate with the society.

Crown wardship without access was ordered as being in the best interests of the children.

A focused trial concerning access arrangements for a child born in 2009.

The applicant (biological father) sought to terminate or reduce the respondent's (mother) supervised access.

The respondent sought unsupervised access to be gradually increased to alternate weekends and holiday access.

The child was apprehended by the Children's Aid Society in May 2014 and placed in the father's care in October 2014.

The mother had been exercising supervised access at APCO since May 2015.

The court found that while there was a positive attachment between the child and mother, the mother's behaviour during supervised visits remained problematic and not child-focused.

The court ordered continuation of supervised access with conditions requiring the mother to undergo psychiatric assessment and counselling before any future variation of the order.