David P. Miller

The insurer terminated the applicant's income replacement benefits and subsequently requested that she attend a neuropsychological assessment under s. 42 of the Schedule.

The applicant refused, arguing the request was not reasonably required.

The arbitrator found that the insurer's request was not timely, as it was made 13 months after receiving the applicant's neuropsychological report and appeared to be for the purpose of bolstering its position at arbitration rather than adjusting the claim.

The proposed examination was deemed not reasonably required.

The appellant, the aunt of two orphaned children, sought an extension of time to file materials to be added as a party to a custody proceeding after missing a peremptory deadline.

The motion judge denied the extension, prioritizing the scheduled trial date and the children's need for stability.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the motion judge's discretionary decision, noting the appellant had previously been involved but failed to take the necessary steps in time.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent parents sought costs on a full indemnity basis against the children's aid society following an appeal.

The court applied the Family Law Rules, noting that the presumption of costs to the successful party does not apply in child protection cases involving a government agency.

The court found that the society did not act unfairly or unreasonably in pursuing the appeal, as it acted out of concern for the child's best interests and was supported by the Office of the Children's Lawyer.

Consequently, no costs were awarded.

The Society appealed a trial judge's order returning a seven-year-old child to her mother's care under supervision.

The Society argued the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors in fact-finding and failed to properly weigh the child's best interests.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal regarding the child's placement, finding no palpable and overriding errors and noting that fresh evidence of the mother's recent alcohol use was insufficient to alter the result.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to quash a term requiring the Society to assign an American Sign Language-familiar worker, as counsel had not been given an opportunity to make submissions on that issue.

The appellant children's aid society appealed an order of the lower court in a child protection proceeding.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal in part, quashing the paragraph of the order that required the society to assign a family worker familiar with American sign language.

The remainder of the lower court's order was confirmed, and the parties were encouraged to prepare a re-integration plan for the child prior to the resumption of school.

The appellant father appealed a finding that his child was in need of protection.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the finding was supported by the record and not tainted by materials solely admissible at the disposition stage.

The Court clarified that the judge hearing the disposition stage would not be bound by certain statements in the lower court's reasons concerning the necessity for court intervention.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and claimed weekly income benefits under the No-Fault Benefits Schedule.

The insurer disputed his employment status at the time of the accident, his medical eligibility, and the quantum of benefits, noting the applicant had failed to report significant income on his tax returns.

The arbitrator found the applicant was employed as a real estate salesperson and was substantially disabled from performing his essential tasks until November 14, 1991.

However, because the applicant failed to provide reliable proof of his pre-accident income, his benefits were calculated based on the statutory minimum gross weekly income.

The arbitrator rejected the insurer's argument that the applicant's claim should be barred on public policy grounds due to his false tax returns.

The union applied under section 40a of the Labour Relations Act for a direction to settle a first collective agreement by arbitration.

The employer, bound by a pre-existing multi-party agreement providing employment guarantees for native workers, refused to negotiate terms for native employees that might conflict with that agreement.

The Board found that the employer's rigid adherence to the third-party agreement and refusal to recognize the union's comprehensive bargaining authority over all employees in the unit constituted a refusal to recognize the union.

Given the complex third-party interests impeding bilateral negotiations, the Board directed the settlement of the first collective agreement by arbitration.

The appellant supplied food products to a supermarket and billed a real estate company with a similar name to the supermarket's former operator.

The supermarket was actually operated by a different, related company that eventually went into receivership.

The appellant sued the real estate company for unpaid invoices, arguing it was the purchaser or was estopped from denying liability because it had paid previous invoices without objection.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, upholding the Court of Appeal's finding that there was no contract between the appellant and the real estate company, and that the elements of estoppel were not established.

The appellant owned a shopping centre where the respondents' employer was a tenant.

A fire caused by the respondents' negligence destroyed part of the centre.

The lease between the appellant and the employer contained insurance provisions that protected the employer from subrogated claims.

The appellant sued the respondents for negligence.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the respondents, as employees, were not parties to the lease and could not rely on its insurance provisions to shield themselves from liability, applying the doctrine of privity of contract.