David P. Miller

The respondent parents sought costs on a full indemnity basis against the children's aid society following an appeal.

The court applied the Family Law Rules, noting that the presumption of costs to the successful party does not apply in child protection cases involving a government agency.

The court found that the society did not act unfairly or unreasonably in pursuing the appeal, as it acted out of concern for the child's best interests and was supported by the Office of the Children's Lawyer.

Consequently, no costs were awarded.

The Society appealed a trial judge's order returning a seven-year-old child to her mother's care under supervision.

The Society argued the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors in fact-finding and failed to properly weigh the child's best interests.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal regarding the child's placement, finding no palpable and overriding errors and noting that fresh evidence of the mother's recent alcohol use was insufficient to alter the result.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to quash a term requiring the Society to assign an American Sign Language-familiar worker, as counsel had not been given an opportunity to make submissions on that issue.

The appellant children's aid society appealed an order of the lower court in a child protection proceeding.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal in part, quashing the paragraph of the order that required the society to assign a family worker familiar with American sign language.

The remainder of the lower court's order was confirmed, and the parties were encouraged to prepare a re-integration plan for the child prior to the resumption of school.

The appellant father appealed a finding that his child was in need of protection.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the finding was supported by the record and not tainted by materials solely admissible at the disposition stage.

The Court clarified that the judge hearing the disposition stage would not be bound by certain statements in the lower court's reasons concerning the necessity for court intervention.

The appellant supplied food products to a supermarket and billed a real estate company with a similar name to the supermarket's former operator.

The supermarket was actually operated by a different, related company that eventually went into receivership.

The appellant sued the real estate company for unpaid invoices, arguing it was the purchaser or was estopped from denying liability because it had paid previous invoices without objection.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, upholding the Court of Appeal's finding that there was no contract between the appellant and the real estate company, and that the elements of estoppel were not established.

The appellant owned a shopping centre where the respondents' employer was a tenant.

A fire caused by the respondents' negligence destroyed part of the centre.

The lease between the appellant and the employer contained insurance provisions that protected the employer from subrogated claims.

The appellant sued the respondents for negligence.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the respondents, as employees, were not parties to the lease and could not rely on its insurance provisions to shield themselves from liability, applying the doctrine of privity of contract.