Lily Sok Yan Ng

The applicant filed a complaint against the Children's Aid Society of Toronto, alleging it failed to hear his concerns, conduct an investigation, or interview him and his child after he reported that his child was being bullied at a private school.

The Society had concluded that the concerns involved peer-to-peer interactions without an identified caregiver at fault, falling below the intervention threshold.

The Child and Family Services Review Board dismissed the complaint, finding that the Society had provided the applicant with an opportunity to be heard and had given satisfactory reasons for its decision not to investigate.

This decision addresses the issue of access to a child, J.M., after a finding of need for protection and the mother's consent to an extended care order for the child.

The mother, M.M., sought frequent in-person access with a view to eventual return, while the Children's Aid Society of Toronto intended to place J.M. for adoption and proposed very limited or no face-to-face contact.

The court applied the "best interests" test under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, considering the mother's untreated schizophrenia, inconsistent access history, and the child's need for permanency.

The court granted the mother non-face-to-face access via cards, letters, emails, and school reports, and denied access to the father, M.O.

A temporary care and custody motion under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 concerning a two-month-old infant.

The Children's Aid Society sought to maintain the child in its care, citing concerns about the parents' mental health, substance misuse, and medication non-compliance.

The parents proposed a plan for the child to be placed in the joint care and custody of the mother and maternal grandmother in Toronto, with various terms and conditions.

The court found the parents' plan adequate to mitigate identified risks and ordered the child's return to the parents' care with supervision, rejecting the Society's reliance on unreliable drug testing evidence and emphasizing the importance of family reunification principles under the legislation.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a summary judgment motion within a status review application seeking custody of two children (M.B. and K.B.) to be granted to their maternal aunt and uncle (J.C. and Je.C.), with specified access terms for the mother and father of K.B. The mother opposed the motion, arguing genuine issues required a trial.

The court granted the custody order on a summary basis, finding the mother had failed to address serious protection concerns over 22 months, including her ongoing conflictual relationship with K.B.'s father, inconsistent attendance at supervised visits, and lack of engagement with support services.

However, the court found that access issues required a focused hearing due to insufficient evidence regarding the children's current wishes and disagreement among parties regarding appropriate access terms.

This is a costs decision in a child protection case concerning a motion by the mother for expanded access to two children.

The mother was substantially successful in obtaining a court-ordered schedule for expanded and unsupervised access, though the order included provisos allowing the Children's Aid Society to suspend access if safety concerns arose.

The mother sought costs on a full recovery basis against both the Society and the father.

The court declined to award costs against either party, applying the established principles that child protection cases are exceptions to the presumptive entitlement to costs, and that neither the Society nor parents should be penalized for acting in good faith within the statutory framework.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion to vary the mother's access to her seven-year-old daughter, seeking an order that access be at the Society's discretion.

The child had begun refusing to visit her mother in November 2017 after previously having regular, successful access.

The Society argued that forcing access would cause emotional and physical harm to the child.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while there was a sufficient change in circumstances, it was not in the child's best interests to suspend access.

The court emphasized the maximum contact principle, the lack of evidence-based reasons for the suspension, and the need for immediate counselling to address the underlying causes of the child's refusal.

This case concerns the proper interpretation of "access at the discretion of the society" orders under the Child and Family Services Act.

The Children's Aid Society moved a child from one family friend's care to another under the guise of an "extended access visit" without prior court authorization or notice to the child's counsel.

The court granted the motion to vary the interim supervision order but expressed significant concerns about the society's interpretation of discretionary access orders.

The judgment provides guidance that "extended access visits" which constitute a change in placement require prior judicial authorization and cannot be unilaterally implemented by the society, even when access is left to the society's discretion.

This is a child protection proceeding under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act involving two young boys in the care of the Children's Aid Society since birth.

The Society sought a Crown wardship order with no access to the mother.

The mother opposed the application and sought the return of the children to her care under Society supervision.

The court found that the mother has significant cognitive limitations, has failed to demonstrate meaningful change since a prior Crown wardship order involving her third child, and continues to resist working cooperatively with the Society and other professionals.

The court granted the Society's application for Crown wardship with no access, while making the siblings access holders to each other to preserve their relationship.

The court issued supplementary reasons after dismissing an application for leave to appeal a costs order.

The moving party estate filed a reply factum after the initial decision was released, pursuant to an extension agreement between counsel that was not brought to the court's attention.

The court reviewed the reply factum but found it did not address new issues raised in the responding factum, but rather repeated previous arguments regarding the Indian Act and on-reserve assets.

The denial of leave to appeal was confirmed.

The moving party estate sought leave to appeal a motion judge's order dismissing its request to use off-reserve property to satisfy a $40,000 costs award in favour of the responding party wife.

The underlying family law dispute involved claims for spousal support and equalization against the deceased husband's estate, which included both on-reserve and off-reserve property.

The court denied leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision that enforcement issues should follow, rather than precede, a determination of entitlement on the merits.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his motion to set aside an interim, interim without prejudice order requiring him to pay child and spousal support.

The appellant argued the original order was obtained by fraud and without notice, and that the motion judge failed to consider the Child Support Guidelines.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusion that the order was not obtained by fraud, and noting that the original order was designed to maintain the status quo pending a case conference.

The appellant appealed the equalization and retroactive spousal support provisions of a trial judgment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that the trial judge erred by overriding a prior consent order regarding the buy-out of the matrimonial home to recalculate equalization.

The court substituted a new equalization payment owed by the respondent to the appellant.

The court dismissed the appeal regarding retroactive spousal support, finding the trial judge properly concluded there was good reason for the respondent's delay in claiming support given her circumstances caring for a severely autistic child.

Pre-trial motion decision in a family law matter concerning a motion to change a prior order that granted the applicant custody of two children and denied the respondent access.

The respondent sought to vary the order based on completion of substance abuse treatment.

The court addressed multiple pre-trial motions including: permission for the applicant and her spouse to participate in cross-examination via Skype from Denmark; disclosure of police records concerning the respondent; extensive mutual disclosure requests; and whether to set aside or stay prior court orders.

The court permitted Skype cross-examination based on financial hardship and the balance of convenience, ordered disclosure of police records with court screening, granted mutual disclosure requests, and stayed the order requiring production of children for supervised access while declining to set aside the original custody order.

Following a successful appeal under the Hague Convention ordering the return of a child to England, the appellant father sought costs of $15,000 for the appeal and $15,000 for the application hearing.

The respondent mother argued for no costs or $5,000.

The Court of Appeal awarded the appellant costs for both proceedings, fixed in the aggregate amount of $5,000 on a partial indemnity scale, balancing the need for deterrence with the relative financial situations of the parties.

The mother brought the child from England to Canada for a vacation and subsequently refused to return.

The father applied under the Hague Convention for the child's return.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the child was habitually resident in Ontario and that returning her to England would create an intolerable situation.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the application judge erred in determining habitual residence by focusing on the mother's intentions and post-retention facts.

The Court also found the application judge set the threshold for an 'intolerable situation' too low.

The appeal was allowed and the child was ordered returned to England.