Lily Sok Yan Ng

This decision addresses the issue of access to a child, J.M., after a finding of need for protection and the mother's consent to an extended care order for the child.

The mother, M.M., sought frequent in-person access with a view to eventual return, while the Children's Aid Society of Toronto intended to place J.M. for adoption and proposed very limited or no face-to-face contact.

The court applied the "best interests" test under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, considering the mother's untreated schizophrenia, inconsistent access history, and the child's need for permanency.

The court granted the mother non-face-to-face access via cards, letters, emails, and school reports, and denied access to the father, M.O.

A temporary care and custody motion under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 concerning a two-month-old infant.

The Children's Aid Society sought to maintain the child in its care, citing concerns about the parents' mental health, substance misuse, and medication non-compliance.

The parents proposed a plan for the child to be placed in the joint care and custody of the mother and maternal grandmother in Toronto, with various terms and conditions.

The court found the parents' plan adequate to mitigate identified risks and ordered the child's return to the parents' care with supervision, rejecting the Society's reliance on unreliable drug testing evidence and emphasizing the importance of family reunification principles under the legislation.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a summary judgment motion within a status review application seeking custody of two children (M.B. and K.B.) to be granted to their maternal aunt and uncle (J.C. and Je.C.), with specified access terms for the mother and father of K.B. The mother opposed the motion, arguing genuine issues required a trial.

The court granted the custody order on a summary basis, finding the mother had failed to address serious protection concerns over 22 months, including her ongoing conflictual relationship with K.B.'s father, inconsistent attendance at supervised visits, and lack of engagement with support services.

However, the court found that access issues required a focused hearing due to insufficient evidence regarding the children's current wishes and disagreement among parties regarding appropriate access terms.

This is a costs decision in a child protection case concerning a motion by the mother for expanded access to two children.

The mother was substantially successful in obtaining a court-ordered schedule for expanded and unsupervised access, though the order included provisos allowing the Children's Aid Society to suspend access if safety concerns arose.

The mother sought costs on a full recovery basis against both the Society and the father.

The court declined to award costs against either party, applying the established principles that child protection cases are exceptions to the presumptive entitlement to costs, and that neither the Society nor parents should be penalized for acting in good faith within the statutory framework.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion to vary the mother's access to her seven-year-old daughter, seeking an order that access be at the Society's discretion.

The child had begun refusing to visit her mother in November 2017 after previously having regular, successful access.

The Society argued that forcing access would cause emotional and physical harm to the child.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while there was a sufficient change in circumstances, it was not in the child's best interests to suspend access.

The court emphasized the maximum contact principle, the lack of evidence-based reasons for the suspension, and the need for immediate counselling to address the underlying causes of the child's refusal.

This case concerns the proper interpretation of "access at the discretion of the society" orders under the Child and Family Services Act.

The Children's Aid Society moved a child from one family friend's care to another under the guise of an "extended access visit" without prior court authorization or notice to the child's counsel.

The court granted the motion to vary the interim supervision order but expressed significant concerns about the society's interpretation of discretionary access orders.

The judgment provides guidance that "extended access visits" which constitute a change in placement require prior judicial authorization and cannot be unilaterally implemented by the society, even when access is left to the society's discretion.

This is a child protection proceeding under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act involving two young boys in the care of the Children's Aid Society since birth.

The Society sought a Crown wardship order with no access to the mother.

The mother opposed the application and sought the return of the children to her care under Society supervision.

The court found that the mother has significant cognitive limitations, has failed to demonstrate meaningful change since a prior Crown wardship order involving her third child, and continues to resist working cooperatively with the Society and other professionals.

The court granted the Society's application for Crown wardship with no access, while making the siblings access holders to each other to preserve their relationship.

Pre-trial motion decision in a family law matter concerning a motion to change a prior order that granted the applicant custody of two children and denied the respondent access.

The respondent sought to vary the order based on completion of substance abuse treatment.

The court addressed multiple pre-trial motions including: permission for the applicant and her spouse to participate in cross-examination via Skype from Denmark; disclosure of police records concerning the respondent; extensive mutual disclosure requests; and whether to set aside or stay prior court orders.

The court permitted Skype cross-examination based on financial hardship and the balance of convenience, ordered disclosure of police records with court screening, granted mutual disclosure requests, and stayed the order requiring production of children for supervised access while declining to set aside the original custody order.