Steven Doron Benmor

This is an appeal in a protracted family law matter.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's orders regarding supervised parenting time, beneficial ownership of Universal Wealth Assets Ltd. (UWA), support payable, and a broad restraining order.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal the trial judge's costs award of $950,000.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on all grounds, finding no error in the trial judge's findings regarding parenting time, support, or the restraining order.

While the declaration of UWA ownership was found to be made without jurisdiction as it was not sought as relief, this did not impact the case's outcome.

Leave to appeal costs was denied, as the high award was justified by the appellant's misconduct, fraudulent activity, and bad faith throughout the litigation.

The applicant sought over $1 million in costs on a full-indemnity basis following a 12-day trial where she was largely successful.

The respondent conceded costs but argued for a lower amount of $350,000.

The court found the respondent engaged in bad faith and unreasonable conduct, including fraudulent transfer of shares and failure to provide financial disclosure.

The court adjusted the applicant's requested costs for duplicative and excessive billing by some firms but ultimately awarded $950,000, finding it proportionate and reasonable given the respondent's conduct and the complexity of the litigation.

This appeal concerned a dispute between former spouses over an Ontario condominium property.

The appellant argued the respondent's claim was a statute-barred equalization claim under the Family Law Act, and that Ontario lacked jurisdiction or the matter was res judicata due to prior Saudi Arabian annulment proceedings.

The respondent asserted a resulting or constructive trust claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that Ontario had jurisdiction as Saudi Arabian courts declined jurisdiction over foreign property and their annulment proceedings did not resolve property issues.

The court further held that the claim was a distinct equitable trust claim, not an equalization claim, and therefore the ten-year limitation period under the Real Property Limitations Act applied, not the two-year period under the Family Law Act.

The appeal and a motion for leave to appeal costs were dismissed.

The Applicant brought a motion for temporary spousal and child support, including arrears and security for future obligations.

The Respondent opposed the motion and sought an adjournment, arguing insufficient financial disclosure and the need for questioning.

The court dismissed the Respondent's adjournment request and struck his sur-reply affidavit.

The court imputed the Respondent's income by including a portion of his corporations' pre-tax income, finding no sufficient business reason to retain all earnings.

Temporary child support of $4,741 per month and spousal support of $5,770 per month were ordered, both retroactive to January 1, 2021, with arrears payable within 30 days.

The Respondent was also ordered to secure his support obligations by designating the Applicant as an irrevocable beneficiary of a $500,000 life insurance policy.

The applicant, Melissa Hart, a self-represented litigant who had previously been declared a vexatious litigant, sought an order extending the time to file a notice of appeal from the dismissal of her spousal support application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, affirming that under s. 140(3) of the Courts of Justice Act, leave from a Superior Court judge was required to appeal the spousal support claim, and that no appeal lies from a refusal to grant such leave.

The court also clarified that a vexatious litigant order under s. 140(1)(c) of the CJA includes proceedings in the Court of Appeal.

The respondent father brought an urgent motion to reduce child and spousal support, claiming a 42% income reduction due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The applicant mother opposed.

The court, after reviewing additional evidence, determined the motion was not urgent.

The judge noted the respondent's controlling share in his company, lack of detailed evidence for alleged rental income loss, and existing savings, emphasizing that he was not in arrears.

The court dismissed the motion, stating that limited judicial resources during the pandemic must be reserved for truly urgent cases and that the motion sought to determine ultimate trial issues.

Costs were awarded to the applicant.

This family law proceeding under the Divorce Act addressed decision-making authority, parenting time, child support, and equalization of net family property.

The court found both parents capable but noted significant conflict, particularly regarding children's non-school activities.

Joint decision-making was ordered, with a mechanism for resolving disputes over extracurriculars.

Equal parenting time was granted, conditional on the Father relocating to the children's school district by a specified date.

Child support was ordered on a set-off basis.

The court made specific rulings on equalization claims, including rejecting the Mother's claim for household contents, accepting her loans from siblings, valuing Fern Property appliances at zero, and rejecting the Father's alleged loans to relatives and vehicle gifts.

Post-separation adjustments for the Fern Property were to be recalculated by the parties.

The applicant sought to vary an interim consent order for child access to establish equal parenting time and suspend child support, arguing it was in the children's best interests and consistent with an OCL report.

The respondent opposed, asserting the stringent test to vary an interim order had not been met.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion, finding no urgent problem or new development to justify changing the existing access schedule, and emphasized that an OCL report should be tested at trial before being relied upon to change a status quo.

The respondent, Stephen Levine, brought a motion seeking an advance on equalization to be used as a credit towards his purchase of the applicant's cottage and office condominium properties.

The applicant, Annette Levine, opposed this, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction for partial summary judgment on equalization due to significant disputes regarding asset valuations, outstanding disclosure, and uncommenced business valuations.

The court, citing Zagdanski and Haroun, declined to order an advance on equalization due to the contested facts and incomplete financial information.

However, it adopted an alternative proposal, ordering Stephen Levine to pay 50% of the cottage's net sale price (less a $50,000 valuator retainer) to reduce a line of credit on the matrimonial home, and to pay the full $400,000 sale price of the office condominium directly to Annette Levine (less commissions), ensuring she received a corresponding benefit for his acquisition of the properties.

This decision addresses a costs motion following a prior ruling where the Respondent was largely successful in obtaining interim child support, spousal support, and financial disclosure, while the Applicant's cross-motion to lift a preservation order was dismissed.

The Respondent sought full indemnity costs of $14,142.25, which the Applicant opposed, proposing $3,534.38 due to alleged partial success and excessive billing, and citing limited ability to pay.

The court found the Respondent's offer to settle was more favourable than the final order, entitling her to full indemnity costs from the date of the offer.

The Applicant's conduct, including non-payment of support and inadequate financial disclosure, was deemed unreasonable.

The court awarded the Respondent $13,000 in costs, inclusive of disbursements and taxes, payable within 30 days, and lifted a preservation order on the Applicant's RRSP assets to facilitate payment.

The appellant appealed a costs award made by an arbitrator, arguing that the arbitrator erred in law by limiting the assessment of costs to only the mediation/arbitration period, thereby excluding general steps taken in the proceedings prior to that phase.

The court granted leave to appeal, finding that the issue raised a question of law.

The court determined that the arbitrator misapplied Rule 24(10) of the Family Law Rules, which, as interpreted by case law, does not prevent a decision-maker from considering costs related to general litigation steps not requiring specific judicial intervention.

The appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted back to the arbitrator for further consideration of costs, specifically those related to general steps and a misapprehended reserved costs order.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a costs order made by Bielby J., which directed her to pay $10,221.40 to the respondent following a motion addressing access issues.

The applicant argued that the motions judge erred in assessing her offer to settle, misapplied legal principles, and made a disproportionate costs award.

Applying the two-part test for leave to appeal under Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure (applicable via Family Law Rules), the court found no conflicting decisions on matters of principle and no reason to doubt the correctness of the costs order.

It noted that costs awards are discretionary and should only be set aside for errors in principle or if plainly wrong.

Leave to appeal was denied.

The parties reached a comprehensive settlement agreement following a case conference and submitted a consent order to the court.

The draft order included provisions requiring the parties to appoint a parenting coordinator with authority to resolve disputes through mediation and arbitration (secondary arbitration) under section 59.7 of the Family Law Act.

The court questioned its jurisdiction to include such mandatory arbitration provisions in a court order and sought clarification from counsel.

The court ultimately determined that while the parties may voluntarily enter into an arbitration agreement, the court lacks statutory authority to order parties to submit to arbitration, even by consent order.

The court approved the draft order with the parenting coordinator provisions deleted.

The trial addressed three issues: whether an interim sole custody order for the applicant should be made final, whether the respondent's access should be extended to include Thursday nights, and whether child support obligations should be varied if access was increased.

The court found the respondent's evidence unreliable due to past dishonesty regarding alcohol addiction and anger management issues, which significantly impacted his ability to communicate and cooperate.

The court determined that the parties could not effectively communicate without a third party and that joint custody was not in the children's best interests.

The respondent's request for increased access was denied, partly because it was tied to a desire to reduce child support without a clear plan for the children's well-being.

Consequently, the interim sole custody order for the applicant was made final, and the respondent was ordered to pay child support according to the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

Chappell Partners LLP (CP), counsel for the respondent Miranda Leigh Smith, sought full recovery costs of $5,518.50 against the applicant Peter Brian Cozzi.

Cozzi was the unsuccessful party on a motion heard December 16, 2015, which sought to remove a collateral mortgage secured by CP for fees.

The court found Cozzi's conduct unreasonable, noting he brought a motion for relief already pleaded in another file and made unproven, false allegations of fraud and dishonesty against CP, particularly regarding independent legal advice.

Applying Rule 24(11)(b) of the Family Law Rules and common law principles, the court awarded full recovery costs to CP against Cozzi.

A costs decision following the dismissal of the father's motion to require the mother's child support claim to be dealt with solely under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act rather than the Family Law Act.

The mother, as the successful party, sought costs of $15,480.65.

The father argued for no costs or nominal costs, contending the motion raised a novel legal issue.

The court awarded costs to the mother in the amount of $12,480.65, finding the father acted unreasonably by bringing an ill-advised jurisdictional challenge that delayed the substantive child support proceedings, and by failing to accept the mother's offer to settle.

The respondent father, a resident of New York, brought a motion to dismiss an application for custody and child support brought by the applicant mother, a resident of Ontario.

The father argued that the Ontario Court of Justice lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter and that the mother should instead proceed under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act (ISOA).

The father also raised forum non conveniens arguments based on fairness and practicality concerns.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that Ontario had jurisdiction based on the real and substantial connection test, as the child was born in and resided in Ontario with the mother.

The court further held that the father failed to discharge the burden of proving that ISOA was clearly more appropriate than proceeding under the Family Law Act.

A motion to change custody and parenting arrangements concerning a six-year-old child, Zara Karima Demirdache.

The father sought to transfer the child from a French-language public school (École élémentaire Pierre-Elliott-Trudeau) to either a French Immersion program or an English-language public school, citing his inability to communicate in French and concerns about exclusion from the child's education.

The mother opposed the transfer, seeking to maintain the child's enrollment at the French school.

The court dismissed the father's motion, finding that the child was thriving at the French school, had developed strong friendships, was making excellent academic progress, and that the father had successfully maintained meaningful involvement in the child's education despite the language barrier.

The court ordered the child to remain at the French school for the 2013-2014 academic year and imposed conditions requiring the mother to provide translations of report cards and advance notice of school events.

The father brought a motion to strike ten paragraphs from the mother's Amended Response to Motion to Change, arguing that paragraphs describing his difficulties working with professionals involved with the family were irrelevant, inflammatory, and would prejudice a fair trial.

The mother agreed to strike three paragraphs but opposed striking the remainder.

The court found that evidence regarding the father's ability to communicate and cooperate with professionals was highly relevant to the issues of joint custody and shared parenting, as these abilities directly relate to the father's capacity to co-parent effectively.

The court struck only the three paragraphs to which the mother consented and dismissed the balance of the father's motion.

The respondent father brought a motion to set aside an order made after an undefended trial that granted the mother sole custody, adjusted parenting time, imputed income to the father, and ordered child support.

The moving party sought leave to file an answer and financial statement, arguing the order resulted in injustice and that he had not participated in the proceeding.

The court held that the Family Law Rules did not authorize setting aside the order and that the Rules of Civil Procedure provisions respecting default judgments could not be applied by analogy.

Even if applicable, the moving party failed to provide any explanation for his default and did not satisfy the criteria required to set aside a default judgment.

The court further found no manifest injustice warranting use of inherent jurisdiction.