Adam N. Black

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision declaring it a successor employer bound by a collective agreement after taking over a hospital shuttle bus contract.

The applicant argued the Board unreasonably expanded the definition of 'building service provider' and 'servicing the premises' under the Labour Relations Act, 1995.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Board's interpretation of its home statute was reasonable, supported by the evidence, and consistent with its prior jurisprudence.

This is an appeal in a protracted family law matter.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's orders regarding supervised parenting time, beneficial ownership of Universal Wealth Assets Ltd. (UWA), support payable, and a broad restraining order.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal the trial judge's costs award of $950,000.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on all grounds, finding no error in the trial judge's findings regarding parenting time, support, or the restraining order.

While the declaration of UWA ownership was found to be made without jurisdiction as it was not sought as relief, this did not impact the case's outcome.

Leave to appeal costs was denied, as the high award was justified by the appellant's misconduct, fraudulent activity, and bad faith throughout the litigation.

Following the dismissal of the mother's appeal from two family law arbitration awards, the father sought full recovery of costs totaling $99,284.63 based on offers to settle.

The mother argued for no costs or costs fixed at $20,000.

The court found the father was presumptively entitled to full recovery of costs from the date of his first offer to settle, which was as favourable as the outcome of the appeal.

After considering the principles of proportionality and reasonableness, and noting discrepancies in the hours docketed by both sides, the court fixed the father's costs at $70,000 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST.

The mother appealed two arbitration awards that granted the father equal parenting time and ordered her to pay $25,000 in costs.

She argued the arbitrator erred in applying the best interests of the child test, changing the parenting schedule without expert evidence, and assuming equal time would reduce conflict.

The mother also sought to introduce fresh evidence, including an affidavit from a former therapist.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the arbitrator's decisions.

The court also rejected most of the fresh evidence, noting the therapist did not qualify as a participant expert and the evidence did not meet the Palmer test.

The appellant appealed a spousal support order of $125,000 per month following a 24-year marriage.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing the respondent's needs and means, misapplied the Halliwell principle for high-income earners, and erred in awarding indefinite support.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the respondent's compensatory entitlement, needs, and means, and confirming that the trial judge properly conducted an individualized fact-specific analysis.

The parties in a family law application resolved disclosure motions by consent, agreeing that orders would issue and either party could seek costs on written submissions.

The court declined to make a costs award, citing that the motion was not heard on the merits, making it difficult to determine success or inappropriate behaviour.

The court also emphasized the disproportionate allocation of judicial resources required to review extensive cost submissions for a matter settled by consent, and the principle that parties are best positioned to determine costs at settlement.

The applicant brought a motion to list two jointly owned properties for sale.

The respondent opposed, seeking a right of first refusal or a hold-back from proceeds.

The parties settled the substantive issues by consent order, which included a $60,000 hold-back but no right of first refusal.

The court was asked to determine costs based on written submissions.

The court found that success was divided, as neither party's offers were clearly more favorable than the consent order, and the evidence was insufficient to determine fault in pre-motion negotiations.

Consequently, no costs were awarded to either party.

This is a costs endorsement arising from an unsuccessful motion by Mr. Regisford to terminate spousal support.

Ms. Regisford opposed the motion, arguing it was premature, which the court agreed with, dismissing the motion.

Ms. Regisford, as the successful party, sought costs on a full recovery basis.

The court assessed costs considering the reasonableness of Mr. Regisford's conduct, the complexity of the issues, counsel's hourly rates, and time reasonably spent.

While Ms. Regisford's offer to settle was met, the court found Mr. Regisford's conduct, though not fully compliant with disclosure rules, did not amount to bad faith.

The court awarded Ms. Regisford costs on a substantial indemnity scale for the hearing and partial indemnity for preparation, totaling $5,791.25 inclusive of HST and disbursements, plus pre-judgment and post-judgment interest.

The applicant husband brought a motion to terminate a temporary, without-prejudice spousal support order of $5,000 per month after he was laid off from his employment.

He also argued that the respondent wife was intentionally unemployed.

The court dismissed the motion as premature, finding that the applicant was still receiving severance pay equivalent to his previous income, and the respondent was awaiting arbitration for her dismissal grievance.

The court declined to impute income to the respondent and held that the existing support amount remained appropriate based on the parties' current actual incomes.

The applicant and respondent brought cross-motions in a family law proceeding.

The respondent sought a stay of support enforcement, a refraining order against the suspension of his driver's licence, and exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.

The applicant sought to strike the respondent's pleadings and a finding of contempt for his ongoing failure to comply with financial disclosure orders.

The court dismissed the respondent's motions for a stay and exclusive possession, finding he lacked clean hands and failed to establish a prima facie case for variation.

A refraining order was granted on the condition that the respondent pay current support and $1,000 monthly towards arrears.

The court declined to strike the respondent's pleadings to allow him to participate at trial, but found him in civil contempt for wilful non-disclosure, granting him a final opportunity to purge the contempt before sentencing.

The applicant father brought an application under the Hague Convention seeking the return of the parties' one-year-old son from Ontario to California.

The respondent mother argued that the child was habitually resident in Ontario and that returning him would expose him to a grave risk of harm due to alleged abuse.

The court found that the child's habitual residence was California, as it was the only place where both parents lived together with the child, and the father had not consented to a change in residence.

The court also dismissed the mother's Article 13(b) defence, finding insufficient evidence that a return would create an intolerable situation.

The application was granted, and the child was ordered returned to California, where custody and access issues would be determined.

The court issued a costs endorsement following the dismissal of the applicant's motion to change a prior judgment.

The court found the applicant to be the primary instigator of ongoing litigation and unreasonable conduct, though the respondent's conduct was also noted as unreasonable at times.

The respondent was awarded partial indemnity costs, fixed at $37,240.45, with the court rejecting the applicant's claims of undue hardship and impact on children's best interests as grounds to deny costs.

The court issued supplementary reasons following the dismissal of Elena Albergaria's motion to change a prior judgment, addressing outstanding issues of child and spousal support, including overpayments/underpayments, and Section 7 expenses.

The court affirmed its jurisdiction to issue these reasons before a formal order was perfected, correcting an oversight.

It determined Elena was entitled to spousal support for an additional two years, calculated future support amounts based on the parties' incomes and prior agreements, and adjusted for Daniel's significant overpayments in both spousal and child support.

Future Section 7 expenses were also allocated.

The applicant brought a motion to change the spousal and child support provisions of a 2012 consent order that incorporated a separation agreement.

She argued that the respondent's receipt of a retroactive lump sum payment following a firefighter arbitration constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no legal basis to set aside the agreement and holding that the possibility of a retroactive wage increase was known or ought to have been known when the agreement was signed, thus failing to meet the threshold for a material change.

The father brought a motion to change a final consent order for joint custody, seeking sole custody of the two children.

He argued that the mother had resiled from the dispute resolution mechanism in their agreement and failed to cooperate with counselling for their child.

The court applied the Gordon v. Goertz test and found no material change in circumstances, as the high-conflict nature of the relationship was foreseen when the consent order was made.

The motion was dismissed, but the court provided strict directions on interpreting the dispute resolution mechanism and ordered the parties to proceed with counselling.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's ruling that the mandatory victim surcharge under section 737 of the Criminal Code violated section 7 of the Charter.

The respondents were individuals of limited financial means who had pleaded guilty to various offences.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, holding that the victim surcharge is a consequence of conviction rather than a fine or punishment.

The court further held that the surcharge is not grossly disproportionate, as offenders can be granted significant time to pay.

The victim surcharges were imposed on all respondents with two years to pay.

The applicants challenged the constitutionality of amendments to section 737 of the Criminal Code that removed judicial discretion and made the victim surcharge mandatory.

The court found that the mandatory imposition of the surcharge, where no fine is imposed, violates section 7 of the Charter by negatively impacting security of the person.

The removal of judicial discretion was found to be arbitrary, overreaching, and grossly disproportionate to the legislative goal of increasing offenders' accountability to victims.

The violation could not be justified under section 1 of the Charter.

The court declared the mandatory surcharge provisions to be of no force and effect.

The parties separated after a 19-year marriage.

The wife brought a motion to strike the husband's pleadings, alleging he wilfully breached multiple court orders requiring financial disclosure.

The motion judge granted the motion, struck the husband's pleadings, and ordered an uncontested trial.

The husband appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge made palpable and overriding errors by characterizing the husband's disclosure as merely 'token' and ignoring evidence of substantial compliance.

The Court reaffirmed that striking pleadings is a drastic remedy of last resort in family law cases.

Following the dismissal of both the appeal and cross-appeal, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The respondent sought $15,000, arguing the appeal was more complex and time-consuming than the cross-appeal.

The appellant argued for no costs on the basis of divided success.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant and ordered no costs.

Following a 27-year marriage, the parties separated and engaged in a collaborative family law process to resolve issues including the valuation of their jointly owned businesses.

The process broke down, but the parties reached an informal agreement regarding the buyout of the wife's shares, which was partially performed.

The husband later initiated proceedings for divorce, equalization, and a compelled transfer of shares.

The trial judge found a binding agreement existed regarding the share valuation, ordered the husband to pay $800 per month in spousal support, and awarded the husband substantial indemnity costs due to the wife's unreasonable settlement demands.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the husband's appeal and the wife's cross-appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on the binding nature of the agreement, the spousal support award, and the costs order.