Lucy K. McSweeney

On an interim family law motion, the moving party sought child support, spousal support, and interim costs under r. 24(25) of the Family Law Rules while jurisdiction was disputed in parallel Yemen proceedings.

The court imputed interim income to the responding party based on available U.S. tax evidence and ordered retroactive monthly child support and interim spousal support from July 1, 2025, but declined to order interim s. 7 expenses on the existing record.

The court rejected the argument that a unilateral Yemen talaq barred interim spousal support, citing Divorce Act threshold requirements and public policy concerns.

The court granted substantial interim costs to level the litigation playing field and stayed the jurisdiction motion until support arrears and interim costs were paid.

Costs of the motion were also awarded to the moving party.

The applicant mother brought a motion to change a final order regarding parenting time.

The court considered the children's strong and consistent views, their maturity, and the father's failure to take responsibility for past family violence.

The court granted the mother's request, ordering that contact with the father be at the children's sole discretion and initiative, and dismissed the father's requests for joint decision-making, compelled psychological assessments, and police enforcement of contact.

The applicant, Glycobiosciences Inc., sought leave for its non-lawyer principal, Kevin Drizen, to represent it in a separate action against the respondents.

The court dismissed the application, finding it procedurally improper as such relief must be sought by interlocutory motion within the existing action, not a new application.

The court also deemed the application an abuse of process, particularly given a recent Court of Appeal ruling denying Mr. Drizen similar leave.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded to the respondents.

The Applicant husband sought an immediate divorce on the ground of cruelty, alleging emotional abuse, harassment, and being forced out of the matrimonial home by the Respondent wife shortly after their marriage.

The Respondent did not file an Answer.

The court reviewed the unopposed application, requiring further evidence to support the cruelty claim.

Based on the Applicant's affidavit and police occurrence reports, the court found that the Respondent's behaviour caused the Applicant significant psychological distress and rendered continued cohabitation intolerable, establishing a breakdown of the marriage due to cruelty under section 8(2)(b)(ii) of the Divorce Act.

The court granted the divorce immediately, noting that the respondent's intent was not at issue, only the subjective harm caused.

The Appellant father appealed the relocation and decision-making portions of a final order from the Ontario Court of Justice, which had granted primary residence and sole decision-making for the child to the Respondent mother and allowed her to relocate to Poland.

The father argued the trial judge erred in finding the mother could be deported, failing to consider all evidence, and not properly applying the child's best interests.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings or application of the law, including the finding that the mother's precarious immigration status and her plan for the child in Poland were relevant to the child's best interests.

This decision concerns costs following a family law trial on parenting issues.

The Applicant Mother was found to have achieved substantial success at trial, having obtained the parenting time and sole decision-making orders she sought, while the Respondent Father's claims of alienation and proposals for shared parenting were rejected.

The court considered the parties' offers to settle and conduct, finding that the Mother's offer did not meet the Rule 18(14) threshold for full indemnity costs due to an unfulfilled condition regarding reunification counseling.

Despite both parties contributing to the conflict and the necessity of trial, the Applicant Mother was awarded partial indemnity costs, adjusted downwards due to high hours claimed and other factors.

The defendant insurer brought a motion to compel the plaintiff to serve a further affidavit of documents and produce 15 categories of records taken under advisement at discovery.

The plaintiff did not dispute the records were deemed refusals or oppose production, but argued they were in third-party possession and the defendant should pay costs to obtain or copy them.

The court found the records were not in the plaintiff's possession, control, or power, and that an agreement existed between counsel for the plaintiff to bear the cost to obtain records and the defendant to pay reasonable photocopying costs.

The motion to compel a further affidavit of documents was dismissed.

The plaintiff was directed to obtain the records at her own cost, and the defendant was ordered to pay reasonable duplication costs upon receipt.

The plaintiff was awarded costs of $5,000.

This endorsement addresses the costs following a four-day summary trial where judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff for breach of lease damages and personal liability against one defendant.

The court applied Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considering factors such as the result, counsel experience, complexity, and the importance of issues.

The plaintiff was found substantially successful and awarded costs, calculated at a full indemnity rate for lease damages and a partial indemnity rate for personal liability issues, with a deduction for certain dismissed claims.

The court declined to apportion costs separately between the corporate and individual defendants, finding their interests and defence intertwined, and ordered costs payable jointly and severally.

A non-lawyer, K. Drizen, brought a motion under Rule 15.01(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking leave to represent the plaintiff corporation, Glycobiosciences Inc. The court had previously adjourned the motion to allow Mr. Drizen to file updated materials regarding corporate authority and financial status.

The defendants did not oppose the motion.

The court granted leave, finding it to be in the interests of justice, but explicitly stated that no finding was made regarding Glyco's impecuniosity.

The plaintiff, Mennie Manangan, brought an action for damages related to the purchase of a restaurant business and sought disbursal of sale proceeds from her home.

The defendants, including 2166729 Ontario Inc., brought a counterclaim for summary judgment to enforce three vendor-takeback mortgages granted by Manangan, on which she had defaulted.

The court dismissed Manangan's motion for disbursal of sale proceeds and granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, dismissing Manangan's claim and granting judgment on the counterclaim for $184,679.54 plus interest.

The court found Manangan's claims to be without merit, that she lacked standing for contract claims, and that she failed to provide evidence to establish a genuine issue for trial.

Full indemnity costs were awarded to the defendants due to the plaintiff's unmeritorious claim, delay, and unsubstantiated fraud allegations.

The defendants, a law firm and its lawyers, brought a summary judgment motion to dismiss an action brought against them by the plaintiff, a frequent litigation adversary of their client.

The plaintiff alleged professional misconduct and actionable wrongs, including conspiracy and misleading the court, stemming from the defendants' representation of their client.

While the plaintiff conceded that lawyers do not owe a duty of care to opposing parties, he argued his amended claim, which included new allegations, established a genuine issue for trial.

The court considered the amended claim but found that the plaintiff failed to provide specific facts or evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue requiring a trial.

The defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing the plaintiff's action.

This commercial tenancy dispute involved a summary judgment motion by the landlords seeking eviction and rental arrears due to the tenants' breaches, including non-payment of rent and changing locks.

The tenants sought relief from forfeiture and a mandatory injunction for repairs, claiming set-off for repair costs.

The court found the final lease agreement governed the relationship, rejecting claims of oral modification or abandonment.

It determined the tenants were in fundamental breach for non-payment of rent and locking out the landlords, and that the landlords had fulfilled their repair obligations.

The tenants' claims for set-off were denied due to lease terms and insufficient evidence, and relief from forfeiture was denied due to the wilful nature and gravity of the breaches, and the tenants' "unclean hands." The lease was declared terminated, the tenants were ordered to vacate, and judgment was granted to the landlords for outstanding rent.

This endorsement concerns a costs decision following the dismissal of motions brought by the plaintiff, MDG Newmarket Inc., for consolidation and payment out of court.

The defendant, John Ernest Bechard, was fully successful in resisting these motions and was presumptively entitled to costs.

The parties could not agree on costs, leading to written submissions.

The court considered factors such as the defendant's complete success, the technical nature of the jurisdiction issue, the defendant's need for assistance due to language challenges and lack of internet access, the absence of materials filed by the defendant on the motion, the requirement for a lawyer for costs submissions, and the lack of a detailed cost outline.

The court also noted the tactical and non-resolution-oriented nature of the plaintiff's original motions.

Costs were fixed at $750.00 inclusive, payable by the plaintiff to the defendant.

MDG Newmarket Inc. (OEG) brought a motion seeking to consolidate a 2015 Small Claims Court action initiated by John Bechard against OEG with a 2016 Superior Court of Justice action initiated by OEG against Bechard.

OEG also sought an order for payment out of court of funds garnished from OEG and held in the Small Claims Court.

The court dismissed both parts of OEG's motion.

Consolidation was denied because Rule 6.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure applies only to proceedings in the same court, and section 107 of the Courts of Justice Act requires the Small Claims Court plaintiff's consent for transfer, which Bechard did not provide.

The request for payment out of court was dismissed due to the Superior Court's lack of jurisdiction to order the release of funds held pursuant to an order from a different level and region of court.

This family law motion concerned the final disbursement of funds from the sale of the matrimonial home.

The respondent husband sought reimbursement of $22,293.39 from the applicant wife's share for 50% of carrying costs he paid post-separation.

The court found that the settlement agreement and consent order, which included a spousal support release for the respondent, implicitly resolved the carrying cost claim.

The respondent's claim for reimbursement was dismissed, and the funds were ordered to be disbursed according to the agreed-upon deductions and entitlements, with the applicant receiving the larger share.

The applicant sought full indemnity costs for an urgent motion for the return of children, which was granted due to the respondent father's deliberate and prolonged breach of a final court order.

The father overheld the children for over four weeks in an undisclosed location, 1,700 km away, without legal justification, and failed to facilitate calls.

The court found the father's actions constituted bad faith, designed to pressure the mother into changing the access terms of their final order, and awarded full indemnity costs of $6,850.06 to the applicant.

The applicant mother brought a motion to enforce a 2018 final custody order after the respondent father overheld their three children for approximately one month, taking them to Sioux Lookout without consent.

The court, having previously ordered the children's urgent return, addressed the remaining relief sought by the applicant, including make-up access and clarification on exchange protocols.

The court found the father's actions to be a flagrant breach and issued an interim order for a revised access schedule as a partial remedy, emphasizing the children's need to reconnect with their mother.

Further submissions on make-up time and temporary access variations due to the COVID-19 pandemic were adjourned.

The parties, self-represented, consented to a temporary variation of their final parenting order during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The order addresses transfer protocols, communication via Our Family Wizard, daily video calls for the children, and a revised alternating 4-day parenting schedule, with initial 5-day periods for the father to compensate for missed overnights.

The order is effective until the children resume daycare, after which the original final order of Justice Bielby will govern.

The Applicant mother overheld the parties' children due to COVID-19 safety concerns regarding the Respondent father's compliance with protocols.

A case conference was held by teleconference, resulting in an interim consent order for parenting time and exchanges.

The order specifies transfer logistics, communication protocols via Our Family Wizard, administration of medication, and social distancing measures.

The parties were encouraged to discuss adjusting the parenting schedule and making up missed time.

The proposed applicant, Mr. Malinowski, sought an urgent motion regarding the necessity of self-isolation before resuming scheduled in-person parenting time, without having formally commenced an application.

The court denied the request for an urgent hearing, noting that the practical urgency had dissipated as the proposed respondent, Ms. Malinowska, was prepared to resume the access schedule on the day of the decision.

The court also highlighted the lack of formal pleadings, which prevented a full understanding of the legal positions and potential urgency of the broader issues, including unresolved property matters.

The parties were encouraged to continue efforts to resolve their differences with the assistance of counsel, referencing the evolving jurisprudence on parenting during the COVID-19 pandemic.