Melanie A. Warner

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's appeal, the parties sought directions regarding costs of prior appearances and the plaintiff's request for free transcripts for a motion for leave to appeal.

The court set a timetable for the defendant to make submissions on costs for prior appearances, noting the plaintiff's limited means.

The court denied the plaintiff's request for free transcripts at public expense, finding that transcripts of oral argument are not necessary for a motion for leave to appeal under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff appealed a Master's decision dismissing her motion to amend her statement of claim to add new claims and defendants in a wrongful dismissal action.

She argued that the limitation period for the new claims was suspended due to her mental illness constituting a legal disability.

The Divisional Court upheld the Master's finding that while the plaintiff suffered from a severe mental illness, it did not render her legally disabled or unable to appreciate her cause of action.

The court also dismissed motions to adduce fresh evidence and upheld the Master's rulings on undertakings and refusals.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant in a wrongful dismissal action sought to review a single Divisional Court judge's order dismissing her motion to admit fresh evidence on her pending appeal from a Master's order.

The Master had refused to allow amendments to the statement of claim, finding the limitation period had expired and rejecting the appellant's argument that she was incapable due to mental health issues.

The Divisional Court panel held that the motion judge made a palpable and overriding error by applying the Palmer test to reject the fresh evidence before the appeal was heard on its merits.

The panel set aside the order, directing that the admissibility of the fresh evidence be determined by the judge hearing the appeal.

The respondents requested the dismissal of human rights complaints on the grounds that the Special Education Tribunal (SET) has exclusive jurisdiction over the identification, placement, and accommodation of students with special needs, and that the complaints were moot because the students were no longer enrolled with the respondent school board.

The Tribunal dismissed both requests.

It found that because the parties had agreed on the formal placement, the SET's own jurisprudence indicated it lacked jurisdiction over the remaining disputes about programs and services, meaning the SET did not have exclusive jurisdiction here.

The Tribunal also found the complaints were not moot because there remained a live controversy about whether the students were properly accommodated while enrolled, for which remedies like damages and declarations could still be awarded.

In an interim decision regarding a human rights complaint against a school board, the Tribunal requested further submissions from the parties on the issue of whether the Special Education Tribunal (SET) has exclusive jurisdiction over matters relating to the identification, placement, and accommodation of students with special needs.

The adjudicator noted a recent SET decision suggesting it lacks jurisdiction over programming details when the placement itself is not in dispute, and directed the parties to provide written submissions on the implications of this decision before ruling on the preliminary jurisdictional issue.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging the respondent school board failed to accommodate his disability between 2001 and 2003.

The application was filed in 2008, nearly five years after the last incident.

The Tribunal considered whether to accept the late application under section 34(2) of the Human Rights Code.

Finding no reasonable explanation for the delay by either the adult applicant or his mother acting as his litigation guardian, the Tribunal concluded the delay was not incurred in good faith.

The application was dismissed as out of time.