Caroline V. Jones

The applicant brought an application for judicial review of an arbitrator's interpretation of schedules to two expired collective agreements.

Prior to the hearing, the parties ratified new collective agreements.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the matter moot as there was no longer a live controversy between the parties.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot case, emphasizing that it does not provide advisory opinions and that the applicant had an obligation to bargain scheduling issues rather than await a court decision on expired agreements.

During an arbitration hearing regarding a grievance for discharge without just cause, the Union requested disclosure of a document seen in the possession of an employer witness.

The Employer argued the document was protected by litigation privilege.

The Grievance Settlement Board found that while the document was originally protected by litigation privilege, the privilege was waived when the document was deliberately reproduced and found in the possession of an independent fact witness.

The Employer was ordered to disclose the document to the Union.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging sex discrimination and reprisal against her employer and an individual respondent.

The application was deferred pending grievance proceedings.

After settling with the employer, the applicant requested to reactivate the application against the individual respondent.

The respondent opposed the reactivation, arguing it was filed outside the 60-day time limit.

The Tribunal granted the reactivation request, finding a reasonable explanation for the delay and no prejudice to the respondent.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging gender-based discrimination and harassment by the respondent principal during the 2010-2011 school year.

The respondent requested the application be dismissed for delay, as it was filed more than one year after the last alleged incident.

The Tribunal found that the last incident occurred in June 2011, and the application was filed in August 2012, outside the one-year limitation period under section 34 of the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal rejected the applicant's argument that internal investigation documents extended the timeline and found no good faith explanation for the delay.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging sex discrimination and reprisal by her former vice-principal and principal.

The application was filed approximately 15 months after the last alleged incident of discrimination, beyond the one-year limitation period under section 34 of the Human Rights Code.

The applicant argued the delay was in good faith because she was awaiting the outcome of an internal investigation and was travelling abroad.

The Tribunal found that waiting for an internal process to conclude and travelling did not constitute a good faith reason for delay, particularly as the applicant had actively pursued other complaints during that time.

The application was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The applicant, a former police officer, alleged discrimination in employment on the grounds of perceived ancestry and creed.

The respondents brought a request to remove several personal respondents from the proceeding, and the applicant's union requested intervenor status.

The Tribunal applied the test for removing personal respondents, retaining three individuals whose alleged conduct was central to the application and could support personal liability, while removing four others whose actions were in the normal course of employment and for whom the corporate respondent would be vicariously liable.

The union's request to intervene was granted.

The complainant filed a human rights complaint against her union and its president, alleging interference with her accommodation process.

The respondents brought a request to dismiss the complaint under section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code, arguing that the substance of the complaint had been appropriately dealt with by a settlement agreement reached in a Grievance Settlement Board proceeding.

The Tribunal dismissed the request, finding that the settlement agreement explicitly covered only the complainant's claims against her employer and did not extend to the outstanding human rights complaint against the union and its president.

The union brought a motion for non-suit at the close of the employer's case regarding disciplinary issues.

The employer had presented evidence over 47 days concerning allegations that the grievor undermined a shift leader, behaved inappropriately with the public, and demonstrated a discriminatory attitude.

Applying the established principles for non-suit motions, the Vice-Chair found that the employer had presented some evidence that, left unchallenged, might arguably support discipline.

The motion for non-suit was dismissed.

The union sought production of documents in a grievance arbitration.

The employer claimed solicitor-client privilege, litigation privilege, and Wigmore privilege over numerous internal communications.

The Vice-Chair reviewed the documents, upholding solicitor-client and litigation privilege for communications involving legal advice or prepared for the dominant purpose of litigation.

However, the Vice-Chair dismissed the employer's claims of Wigmore privilege over internal labour relations and human resources communications, finding that the benefit of resolving disputes based on a fair and open process outweighed any injury to internal communications.

In a grievance concerning a return to work following a divestment, the employer sought to adduce extrinsic evidence to disclose a latent ambiguity or establish an estoppel regarding a Memorandum of Understanding.

The union objected.

The Grievance Settlement Board held that it would hear the proposed extrinsic evidence before determining whether it discloses a latent ambiguity or establishes an estoppel, noting that the evidence was expected to be relatively brief.

The union filed three grievances on behalf of the grievor alleging improper displacement, violation of seniority provisions, and discrimination.

At the hearing, the grievor, supported by her father, refused to testify.

As the union was unable to put forward any evidence to substantiate the allegations without the grievor's testimony, the employer brought a motion to dismiss.

The Vice-Chair granted the motion and dismissed the grievances due to a lack of evidence.

In a grievance arbitration under the Crown Employees Collective Bargaining Act, a question arose regarding the production of two specific documents from a competition file.

The Grievance Settlement Board issued an order reflecting the employer's agreement to investigate the documents, advise the union of the results, and produce any further arguably relevant documents identified by the selection panel.