Bruce Best

The applicant, who retired early due to a workplace injury, alleged that General Motors discriminated against him on the basis of disability by deducting his WSIB loss of earnings benefits from his early retirement pension benefits.

The applicant argued this was discriminatory because other early retirees who worked post-retirement were permitted to keep significant earned income without deduction.

The Tribunal dismissed the application, finding that the appropriate comparator group was other early retirees who do not work post-retirement.

Since both groups received the same bridging income amount, there was no adverse treatment and therefore no discrimination.

The applicants sought judicial review of interim decisions by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, which declined to dismiss human rights applications under s. 45.1 of the Human Rights Code.

The applicants argued that prior proceedings under the Police Services Act and the Regulated Health Professions Act should bar the human rights complaints based on issue estoppel and finality principles.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, finding the Tribunal reasonably applied the Supreme Court's fairness principles from Penner to conclude that it would be unfair to dismiss the human rights applications, given the different purposes, lack of financial stakes, and statutory contexts of the prior proceedings.

The applicant, a retail store manager, developed a work-related wrist injury that restricted her physical abilities.

She alleged the respondent failed to accommodate her disability.

As a preliminary issue, the Tribunal considered whether the duty to accommodate required the respondent to schedule the applicant to work alone and permit her to ask customers to return later if their requests exceeded her physical restrictions.

The Tribunal found that assisting customers was an essential duty of the position.

Since the proposed accommodation would exempt the applicant from performing an essential duty rather than enabling her to perform it, the Tribunal held that the duty to accommodate did not require the respondent to implement this measure.

The applicant, a financial analyst, alleged that his employment was terminated because of his disability (depression and anxiety) and age.

The respondent claimed the termination was solely due to performance issues and compensation, and that the decision-maker was unaware of the applicant's disability.

The Tribunal found that the applicant's disability caused or contributed to the performance concerns (lack of initiative, failure to work collaboratively) relied upon for his termination.

The Tribunal also found it was more probable than not that the respondent knew about the disability prior to termination, as the applicant had placed a memo detailing his condition in his personnel file.

The Tribunal concluded the termination was discriminatory based on disability, but dismissed the age discrimination claim.

The hearing was bifurcated, with remedy to be determined separately.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) decision that awarded her $5,000 for discrimination.

The applicant argued the award was unreasonable because it did not compensate her for lost wages akin to a wrongful dismissal claim.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the HRTO's award was based on a procedural failing in the duty to accommodate and was distinct from common law wrongful dismissal damages.

Applying the reasonableness standard of review, the court found the HRTO's decision fell within the range of possible, acceptable, and defensible outcomes.

The applicant filed a Request for Order During Proceedings seeking leave to amend her human rights application to include a request for reinstatement.

The applicant, now represented by counsel, had originally drafted the application herself and omitted the claim.

The respondent did not object to the request.

Applying the factors from Aubin, the Tribunal found no prejudice to the respondent given the hearing was months away, and granted the amendment.

The applicant requested to add Shahrokh Nourmansouri as a personal respondent to the human rights application.

The applicant argued that the proposed respondent was the directing mind of the corporate respondents and that the fluidity of the corporate arrangements created a real risk that the corporate entities might be dissolved before any remedy could be enforced.

The respondents did not oppose the request.

The Tribunal granted the request, finding a real risk that the applicant would not be able to enforce a remedy without adding the personal respondent.

The respondents requested that the Tribunal defer consideration of the human rights application pending the outcome of a judicial review in another case concerning the interaction between s. 45.1 of the Human Rights Code and the Police Services Act.

The applicant opposed the deferral and sought to amend his application to add the ground of 'sex'.

The Tribunal denied the deferral request, finding that the potential for the law to change did not outweigh the prejudice of further delay, especially since the incidents occurred over four years prior.

The Tribunal granted the applicant's request to amend the application, finding it to be a simple amendment with no undue prejudice to the respondents.

The respondents requested that the Tribunal defer or stay the human rights application pending the resolution of an application for judicial review in a related case, or alternatively, dismiss the application pursuant to section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code.

The applicant had previously filed complaints under the Police Services Act regarding the same underlying incidents of alleged racial profiling.

The Tribunal declined to defer or stay the proceedings, finding that a delay would prejudice the applicant and the balance of convenience did not favour a stay.

Applying its previous decision in Claybourn, the Tribunal also dismissed the request to dismiss under section 45.1, finding that the Police Services Act complaints process did not appropriately deal with the substance of the human rights application.

The applicant filed a Request for an Order During Proceedings seeking an order for her cell phone provider, Public Mobile, to produce telephone and text message records.

The respondents agreed that the records were arguably relevant and should be produced.

The Tribunal granted the request and ordered Public Mobile to produce the records.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment based on disability (cancer).

The respondents requested dismissal on the basis that the applicant had signed a full and final release upon termination.

The applicant argued the release was signed under duress and that he believed it was merely a receipt.

The Tribunal found no duress, noting the applicant had the opportunity to seek legal advice but chose not to, and dismissed the allegations relating to his termination.

However, the Tribunal allowed the allegation regarding a subsequent refusal to rehire to proceed, as it was unclear if it fell within the scope of the release.

The Tribunal also granted the applicant's request to add three related corporate entities as respondents.

The applicant requested reconsideration of a decision dismissing his human rights application as abandoned.

The applicant had failed to file documents or attend a hearing due to illness and not receiving notice.

The Tribunal found that the applicant's delay in filing the reconsideration request was incurred in good faith due to his recovery from illness and lack of access to mail and email, and that the respondents suffered no substantial prejudice.

The reconsideration request was granted.

The applicant alleged discrimination with respect to services because of his association with a friend who has a disability (hypersensitivity to chemicals).

The friend had been barred from the respondent's bar in 2008, allegedly as a reprisal for complaining about bleach fumes.

In 2010, the friend returned to the bar and was asked to leave; the applicant intervened and was also ejected.

The Tribunal found that the friend was barred in 2008 due to her continuous rude and demanding behaviour toward staff, not because of her disability or accommodation requests.

Consequently, the decision to eject the applicant in 2010 for associating with her was not discriminatory.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant requested that his personal information, specifically his email and home addresses, be redacted from the publicly available copies of a previous interim decision.

The respondents consented to the request.

The Tribunal, applying Rule 3.11 of its Rules of Procedure, found it appropriate to protect the confidentiality of the sensitive information and ordered the redaction.

The applicant requested reconsideration of a decision dismissing his human rights application as abandoned after he failed to attend a scheduled hearing.

The applicant argued he did not receive notice of the hearing due to severe mental health issues and because notice was improperly sent to his mother, who was not his legal representative.

The Tribunal found that the applicant did not receive notice through no fault of his own.

However, because the reconsideration request was filed more than 30 days after the dismissal decision, the Tribunal directed the applicant to file an affidavit and medical evidence to establish that the delay was incurred in good faith.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination and harassment based on disability, including his termination from employment.

The respondent AIDS Network requested that the termination portion of the application be dismissed under s. 45.1 of the Human Rights Code, arguing that a union grievance settlement had already dealt with the issue.

The Tribunal found that the grievance settlement, which reinstated the applicant, constituted a proceeding that appropriately dealt with the substance of the termination allegation.

The Tribunal dismissed the termination portion of the application, allowing the harassment allegations to proceed.

The respondents requested that the human rights applications be dismissed under section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code on the basis that the applicants' prior public complaints under the Police Services Act appropriately dealt with the substance of the applications.

The Tribunal considered the Supreme Court of Canada's decisions in Figliola and Penner.

The Tribunal held that section 45.1 should not be interpreted to bar a Code application where doing so would result in an affront to basic principles of fairness.

Given the lack of personal remedies in the police disciplinary process and the broader policy implications, the Tribunal found it would be unfair to preclude the applicants from pursuing their human rights claims.

The respondents' requests to dismiss the applications were denied, and the applications were allowed to proceed.

The applicant, a former police officer, filed a human rights application alleging discrimination, harassment, and reprisal in employment on the grounds of perceived ancestry and creed.

The respondents filed a Request for Summary Hearing.

The Tribunal denied the request without reasons pursuant to Rule 19A.5 and issued directions for the exchange of documents and submissions regarding the binding nature of findings of fact from a prior Police Services Act hearing.

The applicant, who has epilepsy, was employed at a coffee shop.

After a three-day absence due to illness, the respondent manager refused to schedule her for shifts until she provided a doctor's note clearing her to return to work and confirming she had returned to her 'prior state' of health.

The Tribunal found that the manager's insistence on this medical clearance was based on his belief that her work hours had aggravated her disability, and that holding her off work was discriminatory.

The corporate respondent and the manager were found jointly and severally liable for violating section 5(1) of the Human Rights Code.

The applicant was awarded $12,500 for injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect, and $4,370 for lost wages.

The application against two other individual respondents was dismissed.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in accommodation on the basis of place of origin and citizenship, claiming the respondents required him to pay 12 months' rent in advance because he was a newcomer to Canada.

The parties reached a settlement and filed a joint request for a consent order under s. 45.9(2) of the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal granted the request and ordered the parties to issue a joint media statement acknowledging the settlement and the respondents' commitment to human rights compliance.