Jason Beeho

The plaintiff brought a motion to compel the defendant and third party to answer undertakings and refusals from an examination for discovery in a wrongful dismissal action.

The questions related to alleged whistleblower issues, a threatening text message sent by the third party, and unpaid commissions.

The court applied the tests for relevance and proportionality, ordering the respondents to answer most of the questions as they were logically connected to the matters in issue defined by the pleadings, particularly the allegations of bad faith conduct.

Questions that sought legal conclusions or information readily available from another party were not ordered to be answered.

The plaintiff brought a motion to compel the examination for discovery of David Eckert, the president and CEO, as the corporate representative for the defendants Juice DMS Advertising Limited and Yellow Pages Limited.

The corporate defendants argued that Adrian Fitz-Gerald, an executive advisor with direct involvement in the relevant events, was a more appropriate representative.

The court applied the test for substituting a corporate representative, which places the onus on the corporation to show the plaintiff's chosen representative is inappropriate.

The court found that Eckert lacked sufficient direct knowledge of the matters in dispute and that requiring his attendance would be unfairly onerous given his extensive managerial responsibilities.

Fitz-Gerald, conversely, was found to be personally involved and knowledgeable.

The motion to examine Eckert was dismissed, and Fitz-Gerald was ordered as the appropriate representative.

Costs were awarded to the corporate defendants.

In a wrongful dismissal action, the plaintiff brought a motion to strike the defendant's statement of defence, alleging a pattern of delay and evasion in fulfilling discovery obligations and answering undertakings.

The defendant argued it had made best efforts but was hindered by the sale of its assets and records to a third party, which had restricted access due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court declined to strike the defence, finding the defendant's efforts were genuine and its conduct did not rise to the level of deliberate or unequivocal default.

However, the court ordered a limited two-hour re-examination of the defendant's representative and appointed itself for light-touch case management to ensure the action progressed.

The plaintiff brought a motion to compel answers to questions refused at the defendant's examination for discovery in a constructive dismissal action.

The court applied the Supreme Court's decision in Potter to hold that the plaintiff could not compel answers regarding information that was not within her knowledge at the time she alleged constructive dismissal.

The court also determined that litigation privilege arose no earlier than the date the defendant understood the plaintiff considered herself constructively dismissed.

The court issued mixed rulings on the specific refused questions, ordering some to be answered and upholding the refusal of others.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking answers to undertakings and questions refused during the examination for discovery of the defendant Juice DMS Advertising Inc., and an order compelling a representative of Juice DMS to re-attend discovery.

The court granted most of the plaintiff's requests for answers to undertakings and refusals, including compelling Juice DMS to make inquiries of a former employee now adverse in interest.

A re-attendance on discovery was ordered by consent.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging sex discrimination regarding unequal pay, discovered after she was terminated.

The respondent requested the application be dismissed as an abuse of process because the applicant had signed a full and final release in exchange for severance.

The Tribunal found that the release was unambiguous, the applicant had independent legal advice, and the broad language of the release covered all claims, known or unknown, arising from her employment.

The application was dismissed as an abuse of process.

The applicant, a pediatric surgeon, sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent his employer, the Hospital for Sick Children, from suspending him with pay during an investigation into allegations of workplace misconduct.

The court applied the three-part test for interlocutory injunctions.

It found no serious question to be tried, concluding that an employer has an implied power to suspend an employee with pay for administrative reasons related to misconduct allegations, provided the suspension is necessary, in good faith, temporary, and with pay, as per Cabiakman.

The court also found no irreparable harm that could not be compensated by damages and determined that the balance of convenience favored the Hospital, as the suspension was crucial for a fair investigation and patient care.

The application for an injunction was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario finding that it had discriminated against the respondent in terminating his employment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, noting that the Tribunal had not yet decided the question of remedy in the bifurcated proceeding.

The Court also held that the parties must exhaust the reconsideration process available at the Tribunal before seeking judicial review.

The applicant, a financial analyst, alleged that his employment was terminated because of his disability (depression and anxiety) and age.

The respondent claimed the termination was solely due to performance issues and compensation, and that the decision-maker was unaware of the applicant's disability.

The Tribunal found that the applicant's disability caused or contributed to the performance concerns (lack of initiative, failure to work collaboratively) relied upon for his termination.

The Tribunal also found it was more probable than not that the respondent knew about the disability prior to termination, as the applicant had placed a memo detailing his condition in his personnel file.

The Tribunal concluded the termination was discriminatory based on disability, but dismissed the age discrimination claim.

The hearing was bifurcated, with remedy to be determined separately.

The applicant requested a second adjournment of the hearing, citing the departure of associate lawyers from the firm representing him.

The Tribunal noted that the lawyer with carriage of the file remained at the firm and that most hearing preparation should have already been completed.

Finding that the applicant had not established exceptional circumstances, the Tribunal denied the adjournment request and ordered the hearing to proceed as scheduled.

The respondent was employed by the appellant for 16 years under a series of one-year contracts.

When her employment was terminated without cause, the appellant offered only the minimum statutory notice, arguing she was on a fixed-term contract or, alternatively, that the contract limited her to statutory notice.

The trial judge found she was an indefinite-term employee entitled to reasonable notice, set at 16 months but reduced to 12 months for failure to mitigate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the employer's appeal and the employee's cross-appeal, holding that the contract lacked the unequivocal language required to establish a fixed term or to rebut the common law presumption of reasonable notice.

The applicants filed applications to terminate the bargaining rights of the responding party union with respect to the intervenor employer.

The sole issue was whether any employees were working within the geographic scope of the relevant collective agreements on the application date.

The employees were working in St. Thomas, which is outside the geographic scope of the agreements (Board Area 8 and Simcoe County).

The Board found that the travel allowance provisions and the union's issuance of clearance slips did not extend the geographic scope of the bargaining unit.

As there were no employees at work in the bargaining unit on the application date, the applications were dismissed.