Connie Reeve

The respondents requested that the human rights application be dismissed as an abuse of process, arguing the parties had reached a binding settlement agreement.

The Tribunal found that the applicant had not accepted an essential term regarding the tax treatment of the severance payment, meaning no binding agreement existed.

The respondents' request was denied.

A separate request by the applicant for document production was resolved after the respondents confirmed they had produced all arguably relevant documents.

The applicant sought to add a newly created corporation, New Bata, as a respondent to her human rights application under the common employer doctrine, following the insolvency of her former employer, Old Bata (now Athletes World Limited).

The Tribunal found that New Bata was a successor employer, not a common employer, and since the Human Rights Code lacks successor employer provisions, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to add New Bata.

The Tribunal also dismissed the application against the personal respondent, Sonja Bata, finding that she was protected by a Release and Indemnity the applicant had signed as part of a settlement with Athletes World Limited.

The applicant alleged discrimination in employment on the basis of record of offences after his employment was terminated because a criminal background check revealed pending criminal charges.

The Tribunal dismissed the application, finding that the definition of 'record of offences' under the Human Rights Code only applies to convictions, not pending charges.

The Tribunal also found that conducting a background check after employment commences does not, on its own, breach the Code.

The applicant filed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of disability.

Following a corporate restructuring and CCAA proceedings involving the respondent employer, the applicant sought to add a newly created corporation as a party respondent and requested extensive production of documents relating to the restructuring.

The Tribunal issued an interim decision ordering the new corporation and the personal respondent to disclose specific documents and information relevant to the restructuring and their relationships, and set a schedule for further evidence and submissions on the preliminary issues.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing his claim for constructive dismissal and finding him liable for competing with his former employer using confidential information.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant's transfer to a new position did not constitute a material change or constructive dismissal.

The Court also upheld the finding of liability for breach of duty regarding confidential information.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment enforcing a settlement agreement.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the motion judge's conclusion that all essential terms of the 'clean break' scenario were settled by June 16, 2003.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $10,000.

The respondent was employed by the appellant for 16 years under a series of one-year contracts.

When her employment was terminated without cause, the appellant offered only the minimum statutory notice, arguing she was on a fixed-term contract or, alternatively, that the contract limited her to statutory notice.

The trial judge found she was an indefinite-term employee entitled to reasonable notice, set at 16 months but reduced to 12 months for failure to mitigate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the employer's appeal and the employee's cross-appeal, holding that the contract lacked the unequivocal language required to establish a fixed term or to rebut the common law presumption of reasonable notice.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding the interpretation of a contract, specifically concerning the absence of a cost cap relating to a retirement under clause 8(b).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the lower court's interpretation and noting that such a retirement was entirely within the appellant's control.