J. C. MacPherson J.A.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering her transfer to the Brockville Mental Health Centre.

She argued the order was unreasonable due to delays in the transfer and that it was not the least onerous disposition.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence showing the transfer had recently occurred, rendering the delay arguments moot.

The Court found the Board's conclusion that the transfer was the least onerous and least restrictive disposition was reasonable and supported by psychiatric evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, unlawful confinement, and uttering threats, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence, rendered inconsistent verdicts, and failed to consider the defence theory of consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no material errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence.

The Crown appealed the conditional sentence of two years less a day.

The Court agreed the sentence was a marked departure from similar cases involving sexual assault and intimate partner violence.

However, the Court dismissed the sentence appeal, concluding it was not in the public interest to incarcerate the offender given his 14 months of strict house arrest, prior bail conditions, and fresh evidence of a serious motor vehicle accident requiring ongoing rehabilitation.

The appellant appealed a decision declining to quash a municipal by-law.

The municipality had failed to provide proper notification to the appellant that the by-law had been passed.

The application judge found no bad faith on the part of the municipality and no prejudice to the appellant, and thus declined to exercise his discretion under s. 273(1) of the Municipal Act to quash the by-law.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's reasoning and dismissed the appeal.

Two insurers, Wawanesa and Lombard, appealed preliminary arbitration decisions regarding a priority dispute over accident benefits.

Wawanesa, the first insurer to receive the application, deflected it to Lombard.

Lombard paid benefits but later disputed priority without providing the required 90-day notice.

The arbitrator ruled that Wawanesa's breach of the regulation prevented it from relying on Lombard's failure to give notice, but also ruled that Wawanesa was not permanently precluded from disputing priority.

The applications judge upheld both decisions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no error in the reasoning below.

The appellant appealed an order allowing the respondent to access $370,000 from frozen accounts to fund legal fees for an ongoing reference.

The Court of Appeal held that while the motion judge had jurisdiction to hear the motion, she erred in granting the relief.

The respondent failed to meet the burden of establishing that he had no other assets available to pay his legal fees, particularly given his son's refusal to answer questions about family resources during cross-examination.

The appeal was allowed and the underlying motion dismissed.

The accused was convicted at trial of sexual assault and sexual exploitation of a person with a disability.

The summary conviction appeal court quashed the convictions and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge had drawn an impermissible adverse inference against the accused's right to silence.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the appeal court justice misinterpreted the trial judge's reasons, which, when read in context, permissibly inferred that the accused and his wife manipulated the complainant into fabricating evidence.

The convictions were restored.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault against his separated wife, which occurred in the lobby of her brother's apartment building.

He argued the trial judge erred in rejecting his self-defence claim, misapplied the W.(D.) test regarding credibility, provided insufficient reasons under Sheppard, and reached an unreasonable verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered and rejected the self-defence claim, appropriately assessed credibility, and provided adequate reasons for the conviction.

The appellant appealed his convictions for historical indecent assault and sexual assault against three sisters, as well as his 18-month custodial sentence.

He argued the verdicts were unreasonable due to an inconsistency with an acquittal on one count, and that the trial judge erred in admitting similar fact evidence of him exposing himself and masturbating.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the verdicts were based on a careful assessment of the evidence and the similar fact evidence was properly admitted to rebut the defence's attacks on the complainants' credibility.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the custodial sentence was appropriate given the breach of trust and psychological harm.

A young person appealed both a finding of guilt for sexual interference and the custodial disposition imposed after a cadet camping trip incident.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law by treating an evidentiary burden as having shifted to the accused and by linking the accused's failure to meet that burden to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, contrary to the W.(D.) framework.

The court also accepted that it was an error to permit use of the accused's statement to police without first holding a voir dire on voluntariness.

A new trial was ordered, rendering the disposition appeal moot.

The young person appealed a conviction for dangerous driving and the resulting disposition of 30 days open custody, 18 months probation, and a one-year driving prohibition.

The young person, who was self-represented at trial with assistance from a parent, argued that the representation was inadequate, full answer and defence was prevented, and the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed the overwhelming evidence of dangerous driving, which included evading a police roadblock and running multiple red lights.

The disposition appeal was allowed in part, reducing the community service requirement from 75 to 25 hours due to the practical hardship it caused the young person's family, with the Crown's consent.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent the balance of a contract price for constructing and installing cabinets, while awarding the appellant damages on its counterclaim for repair costs.

The appellant argued that the respondent's failure to supply defect-free cabinets constituted a fundamental breach and that the trial judge erred in quantifying replacement costs.

The respondent cross-appealed the trial judge's decision to award no costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal, finding no evidence of fundamental breach, sufficient evidence to support the trial judge's damages quantification, and that the trial judge's costs disposition was within his discretion.

The appellant, who operated a residential home, sought a declaration that his insurers had a duty to pay for his legal representation at a coroner's inquest following the death of a resident.

The appellant argued the inquest constituted a 'claim' under his insurance policy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while an inquest is an investigation, it does not involve a claim because it cannot establish civil responsibility or liability.

The appellants were convicted of attempted murder, aggravated assault, and unlawful use of a firearm.

They appealed their convictions on several grounds, including the trial judge's charge to the jury on identification evidence and section 21(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these grounds but allowed the appeal based on the Crown's closing address.

The Crown had improperly invited the jury to speculate on why one co-accused did not testify and to use that silence as positive evidence of the other's guilt.

The trial judge also erred in instructing the jury that a statement made by one co-accused to an undercover officer could be used against the other.

The appeals were allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault against a 15-year-old complainant.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, misapprehended evidence, and reached an unreasonable verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessment careful and the verdict reasonable.

On the sentence appeal, the Court found that despite a potential error in principle regarding conditional sentences based on pre-Proulx case law, the sentence of one year imprisonment and two years probation was fit given the breach of trust and the complainant's age.

The appeal was dismissed.