Milica Potrebic

Ashley Keenan, facing extradition to the United States for murder, brought a motion for extensive disclosure from various Canadian and foreign authorities.

The court, acting as a case management judge, emphasized the limited role of an extradition judge and the narrower scope of disclosure required for an extradition hearing compared to a trial.

The motion was largely dismissed, with the exception of disclosure related to Ms. Keenan's interactions with Toronto Police Service officers upon her surrender, specifically concerning the accuracy of her statements and potential Charter violations regarding her right to counsel.

The court found no air of reality to other broad disclosure requests or allegations of abuse capable of supporting a stay of proceedings.

The Attorney General of Canada, on behalf of the United States, brought a motion for directions seeking to close case management hearings in an extradition case to the public and impose a publication ban.

The applicant argued that rules governing judicial pre-trial and case supervision conferences, which mandate confidentiality, should apply.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that as a case management judge, its role was akin to a trial judge exercising trial management powers, which are generally open to the public, and that the open court principle was not displaced.

The appellant appealed his conviction for conspiracy to import heroin and possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking, as well as his sentence of 11 years and 3.5 months.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal regarding conviction: (1) inadequate jury instruction on the limited use of a co-accused's out-of-court statement, and (2) failure to hold a jury inquiry due to alleged juror bias.

The appellant also appealed the sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to give effect to rehabilitation and failed to consider the lower purity of the heroin as a mitigating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's instructions, no reasonable apprehension of bias, and no manifest unfitness in the sentence imposed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking heroin and sought leave to appeal his sentence of seven years' imprisonment.

The Crown's case was circumstantial, based on surveillance evidence showing the appellant handing a coffee cup to another individual in a parking lot, which was subsequently found to contain approximately 100 grams of heroin.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to consider reasonable alternative inferences, including that the cup found in the vehicle might not have been the one exchanged and that the heroin could have been placed in the cup by the driver.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding it was open to the trial judge to conclude that the only logical and reasonable inference was that the cup contained heroin when delivered.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the seven-year sentence, while at the high end, fell within the established range for trafficking such quantities of heroin and contained no error in principle.

The appellant appealed his conviction for drug-related offences, challenging the trial judge's assessment of eyewitness identification evidence and the lawfulness of police entry into his home.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the evidence was not based solely on eyewitness identification but rather on a combination of circumstantial evidence and observations by experienced police officers conducting surveillance.

The court also found that exigent circumstances justified the initial police entry to prevent destruction of evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of unlawfully importing cocaine into Canada contrary to s. 6(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

He appealed on two grounds: that the trial judge failed to address his defence meaningfully and failed to undertake proper analysis under the third step of the R. v. W.(D.) inquiry.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge adequately addressed the defence theory that the appellant was an unwitting "blind mule" and properly applied the reasonable doubt standard.

The evidence established that cocaine was found in the appellant's luggage, and the only live issue was knowledge.

The trial judge rejected the defence assertion that unknown baggage handlers planted the drugs, finding it speculative and unsupported by evidence.