Milica Potrebic

The applicant, sought for extradition by the United States on serious drug trafficking and money laundering charges, applied for a review of a detention order denying him judicial interim release.

The application judge had denied bail primarily on the primary ground, finding a high risk of flight due to the applicant's unexplained wealth and the unreliability of his proposed sureties.

The Court of Appeal found no reviewable error in the application judge's assessment of the evidence, including the applicant's finances, the bail letter, and the proposed sureties.

A motion to adduce fresh evidence of an arthritis diagnosis was also dismissed.

The application for review was dismissed.

The applicant, sought for extradition to the United States on charges related to money laundering for a violent drug trafficking organization, applied for a publication ban on the identities and identifying information of his proposed sureties prior to his bail hearing.

The Attorney General opposed the ban on names, occupations, and relationships to the accused, arguing it infringed the open court principle.

The court applied the Sherman Estate test and found that the applicant established a serious risk to the safety of the sureties and the public interest in ensuring safe participation in the justice system.

The court granted the publication ban, subject to review upon the conclusion of the bail hearing.

Ashley Keenan, facing extradition to the United States for murder, brought a motion for extensive disclosure from various Canadian and foreign authorities.

The court, acting as a case management judge, emphasized the limited role of an extradition judge and the narrower scope of disclosure required for an extradition hearing compared to a trial.

The motion was largely dismissed, with the exception of disclosure related to Ms. Keenan's interactions with Toronto Police Service officers upon her surrender, specifically concerning the accuracy of her statements and potential Charter violations regarding her right to counsel.

The court found no air of reality to other broad disclosure requests or allegations of abuse capable of supporting a stay of proceedings.

The Attorney General of Canada, on behalf of the United States, brought a motion for directions seeking to close case management hearings in an extradition case to the public and impose a publication ban.

The applicant argued that rules governing judicial pre-trial and case supervision conferences, which mandate confidentiality, should apply.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that as a case management judge, its role was akin to a trial judge exercising trial management powers, which are generally open to the public, and that the open court principle was not displaced.

The appellant appealed his conviction for conspiracy to import heroin and possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking, as well as his sentence of 11 years and 3.5 months.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal regarding conviction: (1) inadequate jury instruction on the limited use of a co-accused's out-of-court statement, and (2) failure to hold a jury inquiry due to alleged juror bias.

The appellant also appealed the sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to give effect to rehabilitation and failed to consider the lower purity of the heroin as a mitigating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's instructions, no reasonable apprehension of bias, and no manifest unfitness in the sentence imposed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking heroin and sought leave to appeal his sentence of seven years' imprisonment.

The Crown's case was circumstantial, based on surveillance evidence showing the appellant handing a coffee cup to another individual in a parking lot, which was subsequently found to contain approximately 100 grams of heroin.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to consider reasonable alternative inferences, including that the cup found in the vehicle might not have been the one exchanged and that the heroin could have been placed in the cup by the driver.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding it was open to the trial judge to conclude that the only logical and reasonable inference was that the cup contained heroin when delivered.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the seven-year sentence, while at the high end, fell within the established range for trafficking such quantities of heroin and contained no error in principle.

The appellant appealed his conviction for drug-related offences, challenging the trial judge's assessment of eyewitness identification evidence and the lawfulness of police entry into his home.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the evidence was not based solely on eyewitness identification but rather on a combination of circumstantial evidence and observations by experienced police officers conducting surveillance.

The court also found that exigent circumstances justified the initial police entry to prevent destruction of evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of unlawfully importing cocaine into Canada contrary to s. 6(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

He appealed on two grounds: that the trial judge failed to address his defence meaningfully and failed to undertake proper analysis under the third step of the R. v. W.(D.) inquiry.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge adequately addressed the defence theory that the appellant was an unwitting "blind mule" and properly applied the reasonable doubt standard.

The evidence established that cocaine was found in the appellant's luggage, and the only live issue was knowledge.

The trial judge rejected the defence assertion that unknown baggage handlers planted the drugs, finding it speculative and unsupported by evidence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued the convictions were unreasonable because no cocaine was seized during the transactions and the substance could have been methamphetamine.

He also argued the trial judge erred by admitting intercepted communications without a Carter ruling.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the circumstantial evidence, including intercepted communications, police surveillance, and physical evidence found upon arrest, overwhelmingly established the substance was cocaine.

Although the trial judge erred in failing to make a Carter ruling, the error was harmless given the strength of the other evidence.

The appellants appealed their convictions for numerous drug, proceeds of crime, and firearms offences following a jury trial.

The appellant Duncan also appealed his sentence.

The appellants argued that the trial judge's jury instructions were inadequate, particularly in relating the evidence to the legal issues and presenting the defence's position.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals regarding the drug and proceeds of crime convictions, finding the jury instructions adequate.

However, the Court allowed Duncan's appeal on the two firearms convictions, finding the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury on the elements of trafficking by offer and conspiracy to possess an unauthorized firearm, and erred in applying a reverse onus for the conspiracy charge.

The firearms convictions were set aside and a new trial ordered.

Duncan's global sentence was reduced from 15 years to 14 years to reflect the overturned convictions.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine after two pounds of the drug were found in her luggage upon returning from Panama.

She appealed her conviction and four-year sentence, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding her credibility and seeking to admit fresh evidence of photographs to corroborate her story.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fresh evidence application, finding it related to a non-essential aspect of her testimony.

The conviction and sentence appeals were also dismissed, as the trial judge made no errors in his credibility assessment and the sentence was within the acceptable range.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine after arriving at Pearson International Airport with cocaine dissolved in wine bottles.

On appeal, she argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the knowledge requirement and in admitting opinion evidence from a border services inspector regarding her ticket purchase.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the first ground but allowed the appeal on the second ground, finding the inspector's testimony about cash payments and short-notice bookings was inadmissible, highly prejudicial opinion evidence.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for conspiracy to traffic and import cocaine, arguing the trial judge failed to provide a limiting instruction on bad character evidence and gave an insufficient Vetrovec warning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the defence made a tactical decision to put bad character in issue and specifically requested that no limiting instruction be given.

The court also found the Vetrovec warning was sufficient to alert the jury to the dangers of relying on the unsavoury Crown witnesses.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding the police officer's evidence reliable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that there was no basis to find the officer's evidence unreliable.

The applicant, sought by the United States for the attempted murder of a police officer in 1969, applied for a review of a detention order pending his extradition hearing.

He had previously jumped bail twice in the US and lived in Canada under an assumed name for 30 years.

The applicant proposed a revised release plan including electronic monitoring and supervision by his mother-in-law.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding no error in principle in the application judge's conclusion that the applicant remained a significant flight risk and that electronic monitoring would not ensure his attendance in court.