Ingrid Grant

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, two counts of assault, and threatening death committed against his 12-13 year-old step-daughter, as well as his indeterminate sentence as a designated dangerous offender.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's credibility findings regarding the complainant and argued the trial judge erred in principle by misapprehending expert evidence regarding age-related attenuation of violence and reoffending.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's reasoning or application of the law.

The accused was charged with intimidating a justice system participant contrary to section 423.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

During cross-examination at a prior trial, the accused made a comment indicating he knew the Crown prosecutor had a child and mentioned the child's name.

The Crown alleged this was intended to provoke fear and impede the prosecutor in his duties.

The trial judge found that while the accused engaged in conduct directed at a justice system participant, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intended to instill fear or impede the prosecutor.

The accused's statement was incomplete, interrupted by the trial judge, and the accused's mental health issues and peculiar manner of responding during cross-examination created reasonable doubt as to his intent.

The accused was acquitted.

The appellant, Ashton Turnquest, appealed a global four-year sentence, specifically challenging the three-year probation order imposed following his release from custody.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario found no error in principle and held that, given the seriousness of the domestic offences, the three-year probation term was not demonstrably unfit.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Tyson Peti, appealed the sentence imposed after pleading guilty to assault with a weapon, mischief, and failing to comply with an undertaking.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge’s decision to impose the Crown’s proposed sentence of 18 months, despite the judge’s reservations about its leniency.

The Court recognized the appellant’s rehabilitative efforts but concluded the sentence was fit given the seriousness of the offence and the appellant’s criminal record.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, Andrew Smoke and Eric Smoke, appealed their convictions for the second degree murder of Andrew “Scruff” Davis.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed both appeals, finding no error in the trial judge’s instructions to the jury regarding aiding and abetting, after-the-fact conduct, and the use of statements attributed to Andrew.

The court also found the verdict against Eric was not unreasonable, given the circumstantial evidence, including DNA and video evidence.

The court sentenced William Gallerno for aggravated assault under section 268 of the Criminal Code.

The unprovoked attack caused significant injuries to the victim, Ms. Assenza.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the severity and randomness of the assault and Gallerno’s criminal history, as well as mitigating factors including his Indigenous heritage, addiction, and harsh pre-trial custody conditions.

The court imposed a sentence of one year and six months, after credit for pre-sentence custody, and recommended placement in a treatment facility.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime weapons ban, DNA order, and a non-contact order with the victim and her family.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder following a fatal stabbing during an altercation.

At trial, he relied on self-defence and the partial defence of provocation.

During deliberations, the jury asked several questions seeking clarification on the elements of provocation, specifically the meaning of 'sudden' and 'sufficient'.

The trial judge's answers failed to adequately clarify the issues and amounted to misdirection regarding what conduct had to be sudden.

The Court of Appeal found the answers deficient, allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of assault and sexual assault against his former romantic partner and sentenced to three years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by admitting a screenshot of a text message exchange without independent authentication and by failing to give adequate limiting instructions to the jury regarding its reliability.

The appellant also appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to give sufficient weight to Gladue and Morris factors relating to his Black and Indigenous ancestry.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the complainant's testimony was sufficient to authenticate the screenshot and the jury instructions were adequate.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge made no error in principle in weighing the mitigating factors against the gravity of the offences.

The accused, William Gallerno, was tried for aggravated assault under section 268 of the Criminal Code.

The main issue was identification, as the victim, Ms. Assenza, could not identify her assailant.

The court considered the authenticity and chain of custody of a surveillance video showing the assault, as well as corroborating evidence from police, the victim’s husband, and subsequent police interactions with Mr. Gallerno.

Despite gaps in the chain of custody and the victim’s inability to identify the accused, the court found the video authentic and the identification evidence overwhelming, concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Gallerno was the assailant.

A finding of guilt was entered.

The appellant, convicted by a jury on three counts of sexual assault, appealed his convictions.

He argued that the trial judge erred in the jury charge by improperly expressing opinions, overemphasizing the Crown's theory, and instructing on vitiation of consent through abuse of authority.

He also contended that the verdict on one count was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury charge fair and balanced, and the verdict reasonable, particularly in light of the similar fact evidence.

The appellant, convicted of first-degree murder, appealed his conviction on two grounds: improper cross-examination by the Crown regarding blood spatter evidence and improper cross-examination regarding a gun.

The Court of Appeal found no error or unfairness in the first ground, ruling that the Crown was entitled to challenge the appellant's version of events with contradictory reliable evidence.

Regarding the second ground, while the Crown conceded the questions should not have been asked, the court found no trial unfairness given the brevity of the exchange, the lack of objection from defence counsel, and proper jury instructions on the burden of proof.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed convictions for various criminal offences, arguing that he was entrapped by police.

The trial judge had previously found him guilty of 11 counts, staying 3 on entrapment grounds, and convicting on 8.

The appeal specifically challenged 5 of the remaining 8 convictions, alleging errors in the trial judge's analysis of both the "opportunity" and "inducement" branches of the entrapment test.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's application of entrapment law, including her assessment of police conduct and the appellant's independent actions in committing the offences.

The appellant, Devon Dinall, appealed his convictions for trafficking cocaine, conspiracy to traffic cocaine, and possession of proceeds of crime.

His defence at trial was that he was involved in a marijuana trafficking conspiracy, not cocaine.

The primary ground of appeal argued that the trial judge erred in jury instructions on conspiracy and the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule, specifically by failing to instruct on the possibility of multiple overlapping conspiracies and misrepresenting his admission.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury charge, viewed functionally and as a whole, clearly conveyed that conviction required proof of participation in a cocaine conspiracy, despite one misstatement.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's instruction regarding expert evidence on drug slang.

The defendant, Marco Gutierrez, was found guilty by a jury of two counts of sexual interference against his stepson and step-nephew.

The Crown and defence jointly proposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by three years of probation.

The court rejected this joint submission, finding it demonstrably unfit as it failed to prioritize denunciation and deterrence as mandated by s. 718.01 of the Criminal Code and Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence (R. v. Friesen).

The court emphasized the gravity of the offences, the abuse of trust, and the profound harm to victims.

An 18-month term of incarceration was imposed, followed by three years of probation and ancillary orders.

The Crown brought an application under s. 715(1)(a) of the Criminal Code to admit the preliminary inquiry testimony of a deceased witness at the accused's trial for historical sexual offences.

The accused argued the evidence should be excluded under the trial judge's residual discretion, claiming its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value and that the witness suffered from dementia.

The court found the evidence had probative value as it could corroborate the complainant's testimony, and its admission would not result in moral or reasoning prejudice.

The court also rejected the unsworn expert opinion regarding the witness's dementia.

The application was granted.

In a criminal trial for sexual offenses, the Crown brought an application for a similar fact instruction, seeking to allow the jury to consider the evidence of one complainant in determining the credibility of the other.

The court dismissed the application, finding an "air of reality" to the allegation of conscious or unconscious collusion between the two complainants.

The Crown failed to discharge its onus to prove on a balance of probabilities that the complainants' testimonies were not tainted by their detailed discussions of the alleged incidents prior to reporting to the police.

The Crown appealed a Court of Appeal decision that set aside the accused's conviction for sexual offences against a young child and entered an acquittal.

The trial judge had admitted the child's unsworn videotaped police statement under the principled exception to the hearsay rule after a psychologist concluded the child could not testify without undue trauma.

The Court of Appeal majority found the trial judge erred in the threshold reliability analysis by failing to address the role of cross-examination and making a positive finding of no motive to fabricate.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, substantially adopting the reasons of the Court of Appeal dissent, and restored the conviction.

The appellant, Gurkirat Rai, appealed his conviction following guilty pleas to multiple driving-related offences, including dangerous operation and driving while disqualified, which resulted in a permanent licence suspension by the Ministry of Transportation under the Highway Traffic Act.

The appellant argued his pleas were uninformed because his counsel erroneously advised him that his licence could be reinstated after 10 years, and he was unaware of the automatic lifetime suspension under the HTA or the cumulative effect of consecutive two-year suspensions.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to admit fresh evidence but dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to establish subjective prejudice.

The court concluded that it was not credible that the appellant would have acted differently had he received accurate advice, given his primary motivation to be released from pre-trial custody quickly, his willingness to plead guilty despite knowing a lifetime Criminal Code prohibition was possible, the strong Crown case, and his subsequent conduct of re-offending.

The appellant, Ian Bullens, appealed his sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by not granting a "Downes credit" for stringent bail conditions that allegedly prevented him from seeing his children.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle, noting that the issue was not fully brought to the sentencing judge's attention and that Downes credits are reserved for "stringent" conditions, which were not met in this case.

The conviction appeal was abandoned, and the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent, Francis Norman, on charges of drug trafficking and breach of probation.

Norman had conceded smuggling drugs into a correctional centre but claimed duress due to threats against him and his brother by another inmate.

The trial judge found an air of reality to the duress defence and that the Crown failed to disprove it.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred in finding an air of reality to the "no safe avenue of escape" element, given Norman's opportunities to seek help.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the modified objective standard for duress, considering the specific circumstances of the prison environment and the threats to the respondent and his brother.