Court File and Parties
Court File No.: CR-24-00000052-0000
Superior Court of Justice
His Majesty the King v. Jason Nassr
Reasons for Judgment
Before the Honourable Justice J. Stribopoulos
on August 13, 2025, at London, Ontario
Publication Ban
This version has been modified so that it may be published without contravening s. 111(1) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, S.C. 2002, c. 1.
Appearances
T. Mack – Counsel for the Provincial Crown
I. Grant – Counsel for Jason Nassr
Table of Contents
Reasons for Judgment by Justice J. Stribopoulos – Page 1
Transcript Ordered: August 15, 2025
Transcript Completed: August 18, 2025
Ordering Party Notified: August 18, 2025
Reasons for Judgment
STRIBOPOULOS, J. (Orally):
Introduction
In January 2023, Mr. Nassr was on trial before a judge and jury. The current charge against Mr. Nassr stems from his testimony during cross-examination at that trial, where he stated to the prosecutor, Mr. S, that he knew he had a child, and mentioned the child's given name. As a result of that comment, Mr. Nassr now faces a charge:
That he, on the 31st day of January, 2023, at the City of London in the South West Region, did without lawful authority engage in conduct with the intent to provoke a state of fear in J S, a justice system participant, in order to impede him in the performance of his duties, contrary to s. 423.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.
Mr. Nassr's trial on that charge proceeded before me. The evidence presented at trial was relatively brief. The Crown called just one witness, Mr. S. Beyond his testimony, the parties played portions of the digital recording from Mr. Nassr's testimony on January 31st, 2023, and filed the related excerpts from the transcript from that day's proceedings.
The Evidence
Mr. S has served as an Assistant Crown Attorney since 1998 when he began his career at the Crown Attorney's Office in London. Throughout much of his career, up until last fall, he was a prosecutor in that office.
Mr. S is married and has two sons. His youngest son, now ## years old, is named T.
Mr. S first met Mr. Nassr in 2019, through his involvement as a Crown witness in a child luring case that Mr. S was assigned to prosecute against a Mr. Raeside. Mr. Nassr's involvement with that case stemmed from a video web series that he was responsible for entitled "CreeperHunterTV."
To produce that series, Mr. Nassr would pose online as a teenage girl, usually taking on the persona of a 13 to 15-year-old, and while in that role, engage in sexually explicit chats with adult males he encountered on the Internet. Ultimately, he would arrange a meeting between the "child" and their interlocutor in a public place, and videotape these encounters. Mr. Nassr would then edit together videos that documented from start to finish his interactions with the men he targeted, which he would then publish online, initially on YouTube, and later on a webpage he maintained. Mr. Raeside was a target of one of Mr. Nassr's sting operations, and ultimately was subject to child luring charges for his interactions with one of the child personas created by Mr. Nassr.
Mr. S testified that, to the best of his recollection, any communications he had with Mr. Nassr before he testified at Mr. Raeside's preliminary inquiry were by email. He could not remember ever having spoken to Mr. Nassr outside of court during that prosecution. Mr. S noted that he would not have mentioned either of his sons to Mr. Nassr during their dealings relating to Mr. Raeside's case. He emphasized that he never discusses his family during his professional interactions or while at court—even with court staff—a practice he adopted early in his career.
After Mr. Raeside's preliminary inquiry but before the scheduling of his trial, Mr. Nassr was arrested and charged with the offences for which he ultimately went on trial before a judge and jury in January 2023. At that trial, Mr. S, along with a more junior colleague, had carriage of the prosecution against Mr. Nassr on charges of making and distributing child pornography, harassing communications, and extortion.
Those charges came in the aftermath of a police investigation of the suicide of one of the targets of Mr. Nassr's CreeperHunterTV web series, a man named Gerald Christopher. The charge of making child pornography concerned the written communications Mr. Nassr exchanged with Mr. Christopher. The distribution charge concerned the correspondence he exchanged with Mr. Christopher and his subsequent posting of them online. The charge of harassing communications concerned the nature and frequency of Mr. Nassr's communications with Mr. Christopher. Finally, the extortion charge related to the methods used by Mr. Nassr to compel Mr. Christopher to keep communicating with him.
By the time of his trial in January 2023, Mr. S testified that Mr. Nassr was "not a fan" of his, and that he had made that quite clear. By way of explanation, Mr. S referenced an abuse of process application that Mr. Nassr's lawyer at the time had mentioned she was considering bringing when the case was still in its early stages.
Mr. S understood that the application would focus on his conduct, and allege that during the prosecution of Mr. Raeside, he had encouraged Mr. Nassr to keep up his efforts with the CreeperHunterTV series. However, Mr. S testified that after he shared certain information with Mr. Nassr's lawyer, she disavowed any intention of pursuing an abuse of process application. As a result, Mr. S decided to retain carriage of the prosecution against Mr. Nassr. Had the abuse of process application remained on the table, he testified that he would have withdrawn because he would potentially have been a witness.
Mr. S testified that despite the position taken by Mr. Nassr's counsel at the time not to pursue the abuse of process application, during his cross-examination on January 27th, 2023, Mr. Nassr appeared intent on raising the very claims that his lawyer had agreed to abandon. Mr. S testified that after the court granted Mr. Nassr's lawyer leave to speak with him while under cross-examination, she successfully applied to be removed as his counsel. After that, as the cross-examination continued, Mr. Nassr was self-represented.
Mr. S testified that Mr. Nassr's demeanour towards him grew increasingly hostile during cross-examination. He described Mr. Nassr oscillating between civility and hostility as the cross-examination progressed.
Mr. S testified concerning the events in court on January 31st, 2023. He explained that on that day, he had decided to confront Mr. Nassr with his theory that Mr. Nassr did not have an altruistic motive for his online activities associated with the CreeperHunterTV series. Mr. S testified that based on his review of the extensive evidence gathered by police after scouring Mr. Nassr's electronic devices, he was struck by how much time and effort he had devoted to his online investigative efforts. In that regard, Mr. S formed the opinion that Mr. Nassr derived sexual gratification from the sexualized chats he engaged in with his targets while posing as a teenage girl.
Mr. S testified that during his cross-examination on January 31st, 2023, he decided to put that theory to Mr. Nassr. To do so, he initially played a video recording made by Mr. Nassr who used software that permitted him to record everything that appeared on his screen during his online interactions. The recording showed the sexually explicit texts Mr. Nassr exchanged with a man in Michigan and recorded a video that the man had sent to him as they texted, which Mr. Nassr played after receiving it. The video showed the man masturbating. At one point during this recording, the camera flips from recording Mr. Nassr's screen, to briefly recording him instead. At the time, he was shirtless, and appeared to be in his apartment.
During the cross-examination, Mr. S questioned Mr. Nassr regarding why he clicked on the masturbation video to play it. Mr. Nassr explained doing so to memorialize what it depicted, because if he did not, given that the man had sent it using Snapchat, it would disappear. Mr. S pointed out that Mr. Nassr had clicked on the video of the man masturbating a second time, thereby playing it again. He suggested Mr. Nassr did so because he found it sexually gratifying. Mr. Nassr objected. He referred to a provision in the Criminal Code that he said precluded such questioning (an apparent but erroneous reference to s. 276). The judge directed him to answer the question. Mr. Nassr disagreed with the suggestion.
Mr. S returned to the video recording and noted that Mr. Nassr replayed the video of the man masturbating a third time. He again suggested that Mr. Nassr did so because "You may be getting some sexual gratification out of it?" Mr. Nassr again disagreed. It is apparent from the audio recording of this exchange that the suggestion angered Mr. Nassr; his upset is audible in his voice from the court recording. He responded, "It's reprehensible that you would even try to call my own sexuality into question." When Mr. S pressed on, suggesting to Mr. Nassr that he derived sexual gratification from posing as a 13-year-old girl and texting "dirty messages" with a man, Mr. Nassr responded, "I'm going to hold back calling you a bad name right now, but I think you're way off base."
Mr. S continued to play the recording from the exchange with the man in Michigan, noting again that Mr. Nassr clicked on the images and videos the man sent him, and suggesting he did so because he enjoyed the process of creating "child pornography." Mr. Nassr objected to Mr. S's characterization that he had created "child pornography" because "The jury is the decider of the fact."
As the cross-examination about the recording involving the exchange with the man in Michigan continued, after some back and forth, Mr. Nassr eventually identified himself as the person shown when the camera stopped filming the screen, acknowledged that he was in his apartment at the time, and that he was not wearing a shirt. However, he strongly disagreed with the suggestion that when the camera briefly recorded him he was "all sweaty."
When Mr. S again suggested this exchange was "sexually appealing" to Mr. Nassr, he again objected and said, "I believe I have the provision in the Criminal Code that if you're going to ask me questions about sexuality, that I have a right to representation." The judge directed him to answer the question, and Mr. Nassr once again disagreed with the suggestion. The judge reminded him that suggestions are not evidence, and that he could accept or reject them.
When the cross-examination continued, Mr. S suggested to Mr. Nassr that the process of exchanging sexually explicit texts with men "turns you on and makes you, in your words, 'cream your pants.'" Mr. Nassr appeared somewhat perplexed by that suggestion, responding by asking, "What?" With that, Mr. S proceeded to play a video retrieved by police from one of Mr. Nassr's devices entitled, "Catch Child Predators, Risks Versus Benefits: Predator Chat Episode."
During that recording, Mr. Nassr talks about the satisfaction he derives from producing his web series. He explains that his purpose is to educate parents about the risks children encounter online and thereby protect children. He also noted the "incomparable adrenaline rush" he obtains from the encounters when he finally confronts his targets. Additionally, he talks about the immense gratification he receives from the process of producing the videos, particularly by ensuring the quality of the audio, video, and editing. In the context of discussing that, he says that process, "makes me cream my pants."
When the cross-examination continued, Mr. S asked if Mr. Nassr had heard the "cream my pants" comment. Mr. Nassr responded, "Yeah, producing," and later, "The act of producing content." Mr. S noted, "Content involving a chat between you as a 12 or 13-year-old girl and an adult male?" Mr. Nassr responded by complaining that Mr. S was "mis-categorizing what's said in this video," and asking him to "please stop."
Mr. S then questioned Mr. Nassr about his "adrenaline rush" comment in the video, and suggested, "That's what turns you on, at the meets, anyway." Mr. Nassr took exception to that characterization, and denied that the adrenaline rush he was referring to had anything to do with sexuality. With that, Mr. S asked about the meaning of "cream your pants," and Mr. Nassr complained that Mr. S was "trying to pervert this into something it's not."
Immediately after that, the following exchange, most relevant to this prosecution, took place between Mr. S and Mr. Nassr:
Question: What I'm getting at, sir, is that what motivates you—and I'm suggesting to you—is that you enjoy the highly sexualized dirty talk where you role play as a teenage girl talking to an adult male and you get the adult male to masturbate and then come down and meet you either at Tim Hortons or at a McDonalds, and that you really, really enjoy that process...
Answer: Please...
Question: ...right?
Answer: ...point out in that Jay Jacobsen video, where it was requested from Jay Jacobsen of Minnesota, where we were requesting to have him masturbate, point it out, confront me with this, please.
Question: How about the dirty talk, you know? Because you've done this before...
Answer: I know you have a kid named T. Now I...
THE COURT: Sorry?
Answer: ...know....
THE COURT: I'm sorry. Could we—I'd like the jury excused, please.
According to Mr. S, when he made the comment referring to his son, Mr. Nassr looked him straight in the eyes and was seething. It is apparent from the audio recording of this exchange, based on Mr. Nassr's raised voice and his tone, that he was undoubtedly angry during the exchange that culminated in his comment about Mr. S's son.
After the jury left the courtroom, the presiding judge instructed Mr. Nassr not to mention anything personal about Mr. S, to maintain civility, and not to raise his voice. Mr. Nassr said nothing to explain his comment referencing Mr. S's son. Instead, his focus was on the judge's concerns about the need for civility, and the tone and tenor of his voice. He told the judge that he was "attempting" to maintain civility while giving his evidence. He explained that "It's work. I have—as I've stated, I have a mental disorder, so sometimes I don't understand how the world around me perceives me."
The jury then returned to the courtroom and the cross-examination continued. The court did not take a break before Mr. S's cross-examination of Mr. Nassr continued.
Mr. S testified that when Mr. Nassr mentioned his youngest son's name, "It stopped me dead in my tracks," and said he felt "stunned" by the comment. He described feeling as though he had been "punched in the stomach," experiencing the comment like a "gut punch," and noting that it was "gut wrenching."
In that regard, Mr. S testified that he was not concerned that Mr. Nassr would physically harm his son. Instead, Mr. S's fear, given the behaviour Mr. Nassr had engaged in with his targets, was that he would "dox" him and members of his family, including his children. In other words, search for and publish private or identifying information about them on the internet, and subject them to harassment.
Mr. S testified that after Mr. Nassr mentioned his youngest son's name, he had to leave the courtroom to gather his thoughts. (However, I note parenthetically, that the record from the proceedings that day does not bear this out.) Mr. S testified that he quickly decided not to seek an adjournment, explaining that he reasoned that if the cross-examination continued, Mr. Nassr would be far too busy to do anything that could harm him or his family.
Mr. S testified that after court that day, he engaged the protocol that governs when justice system participants are subject to a threat. When he went home, he told his wife about what happened. Mr. S described feeling "shaken" by what had transpired that day, and contemplating the "what-ifs."
Mr. S testified that at the time, his youngest son was only ## years old, and not on social media. In terms of where his name might have been available online, he testified that his son played competitive hockey and baseball, and that his name could have been online because of his involvement in those activities, given that the teams' rosters are posted online. However, Mr. S testified that his son's name does not come up when he Googles his name, but agreed that it does produce a Google result if one searches "S and London." Further, during cross-examination, defence counsel, Ms. Grant, produced a Google search of "J S London," which generated a result from an online obituary dated August 3rd, 2021, which provides: "S, J; sons S, T."
During his evidence, Mr. S acknowledged the possibility that, despite his established practice of not doing so, he may have mentioned his youngest son's name while in court with Mr. Nassr. In that regard, he confirmed that at a later point during the trial, while on the record, Mr. Nassr had said that he had overheard Mr. S talking about "his son or sons."
Mr. S testified that he recognized that Mr. Nassr would not appreciate him suggesting that he derived sexual gratification from his CreeperHunterTV online activities. He agreed that at one point during the testimony, Mr. Nassr had mentioned that his daughter was harmed by an online predator when she was only ten years old. If that were true, Mr. S acknowledged that Mr. Nassr could have been offended by the suggestion that his motivation was not altruistic, and that he had an ulterior sexual motivation for his actions. Finally, Mr. S testified that during the trial, he had heard Mr. Nassr mention having various mental health issues, including potentially PTSD. However, Mr. S denied pursuing the line of questioning suggesting Mr. Nassr derived sexual gratification from his online exchanges in the hope that Mr. Nassr would lose his cool while testifying.
Law and Analysis
The indictment charges Mr. Nassr with committing an offence contrary to s. 423.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code. That provision provides:
No person shall, without lawful authority, engage in any conduct with the intent to provoke a state of fear in a justice system participant ... in order to impede him or her in the performance of his or her duties.
Most of the precedents interpreting s. 423.1 precede the amendments Parliament made to the provision in 2015. Those amendments broadened the scope of the potential conduct that could occasion an offence, eliminating the requirement that the accused have used violence against a justice system participant, or anyone known to them, caused damage to their property, or threatened to engage in such conduct: see Victims Bill of Rights, Statutes of Canada, 2015, c. 13, s. 12.
However, the precedents, particularly the British Columbia Court of Appeal's decision in R. v. Armstrong, 2012 BCCA 248, 322 B.C.A.C. 279, leave to appeal refused [2012] S.C.C.A. No. 529, continue to be instructive concerning the mens rea requirements for the specific intent offence created by s. 423.1(1)(b): see R. v. Blackman, 2022 ONSC 2735, at paragraphs 120 to 122; see also R. v. Treleaven, 2012 ONSC 6930, at paragraphs 80 to 88.
Based on the current wording of the provision and the case law, the parties agree that for a finding of guilt the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following essential elements:
That the accused engaged in conduct—in other words, that they did or said something, for which they lacked lawful authority;
That the accused directed their words or actions towards a "justice system participant";
That the accused intended to instill fear in the justice system participant through their conduct. In that regard, instilling fear may either be the accused's purpose (i.e. their objective) or what they knew or foresaw to be a certain or substantially certain consequence of their words or actions; and
That the accused engaged in their conduct in order to impede the justice system participant in the performance of their duties. In that regard, effecting such interference may either be the accused's purpose (i.e. their objective) or what they knew or foresaw to be a certain or substantially certain consequence of their words or actions.
The first two elements make up the actus reus of the offence created by s. 423.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, whereas the last two elements constitute the mens rea requirements.
In the circumstances of this case, the first two elements—the actus reus requirements—are straightforward and easily established beyond a reasonable doubt by the evidence adduced at trial.
Beginning with the first element, Mr. Nassr's comment indicating that he knew Mr. S had a child and then mentioning the child's name, easily satisfies the conduct requirement. The evidence proving this, in the form of the transcript and the audio recording of the proceedings, is incontrovertible. Further, since Mr. Nassr's remarks were not in response to any specific question asked of him, he had no legal obligation to make them. Therefore, "lawful authority" cannot provide any justification for his statements.
Turning to the second element, there can be no doubt that, at the time, Mr. S was a "justice system participant." The definition of that term, found in s. 2 of the Criminal Code, includes "a prosecutor." As such, the evidence also establishes the second element beyond a reasonable doubt.
In this prosecution, the mens rea requirements are the main point of contention, and were understandably the focus of the parties' submissions. Before turning to consider those elements in light of all the trial evidence, some general observations relevant to each deserve mention.
Ordinarily, absent a confession or an accused's self-incriminating trial testimony, the evidence relevant to mens rea for a specific intent offence will somewhat unavoidably be circumstantial: see R. v. Robinson, 2017 ONCA 645, 352 C.C.C. (3d) 503, at paragraph 36.
As a result, to prove the mens rea for such an offence, the Crown will invariably need to rely upon the "common sense inference." As the Supreme Court explained in R. v. Seymour, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 252, at paragraph 19:
... if a person acts in a manner which is likely to produce a certain result it generally will be reasonable to infer that the person foresaw the probable consequences of the act. In other words, if a person acted so as to produce certain predictable consequences, it may be inferred that the person intended those consequences.
Additionally, because proof of mens rea usually relies on circumstantial evidence, when assessing whether the Crown has proven it beyond a reasonable doubt, the trier of fact will often need to heed the Supreme Court of Canada's guidance from R. v. Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 1000.
The Supreme Court in Villaroman explained that in a case in which proof of one or more elements of the offence depends exclusively or mainly on circumstantial evidence, to return a guilty verdict, the trier of fact must be satisfied that an inference of guilt is the only reasonable inference the evidence permits: see Villaroman, at paragraph 30.
With these principles in mind, I will now consider the third element in light of all the evidence presented at trial. In short, has the Crown proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Nassr intended his comment to instill fear in Mr. S?
I unreservedly accept Mr. S's testimony that he was immediately overcome with a gut wrenching sense of fear when Mr. Nassr mentioned his youngest son by name during cross-examination. Undoubtedly, any lawyer would react similarly if a witness, somewhat gratuitously, in the heat of a combative cross-examination, stated that they knew the lawyer had a child, and referred to their child by name.
Any reasonable person in Mr. Nassr's position would have appreciated that making such a comment would be understood as menacing, and instill a sense of fear in the lawyer questioning him. That that was Mr. Nassr's intention finds further support in the circumstances preceding the comment. After all, it came after a long series of questions that Mr. Nassr considered to be unfair, and which had clearly angered him. Given this, Mr. Nassr had a motive to mention Mr. S's son to instill fear in him and dissuade him from continuing with the line of questioning he was pursuing.
Nevertheless, to be satisfied that the Crown has proven this element beyond a reasonable doubt, I must be sure, based on all the evidence weighed cumulatively, that it does not support any alternative reasonable inferences: see Villaroman, at paragraph 42; R. v. Hudson, 2021 ONCA 772, 158 O.R. (3d) 589, at paragraph 70; R. v. Gibson, 2021 ONCA 530, 157 O.R. (3d) 597, at paragraphs 78 to 79. In that regard, an alternative inference, "must be based on logic and experience applied to the evidence or the absence of evidence, not on speculation": Villaroman, at paragraph 37.
Ultimately, after considering all the evidence, I am less than sure that Mr. Nassr's purpose in referring to Mr. S's child was to instill fear in him. Similarly, I am left in a state of doubt concerning whether Mr. Nassr subjectively appreciated the likely impact on Mr. S of referring to his child. I have a few reasons for having a reasonable doubt concerning the third element of the offence.
First, I agree with Ms. Grant's submission that Mr. Nassr never completed the statement he was making in which he referred to Mr. S's youngest son. Recall that Mr. Nassr said, "I know you have a kid named T. Now I....", and that before he could complete his sentence, the trial judge understandably interjected saying, "Sorry?" And Mr. Nassr continued speaking, saying "know," when the trial judge cut him off again by saying, "Sorry. Could we—I'd like the jury excused, please." As a result, Mr. Nassr never finished saying whatever he planned to after mentioning Mr. S's child. However, it is readily apparent that he had been trying to say something.
It is impossible to know what Mr. Nassr intended to say before the trial judge interrupted him. For instance, he might have been planning to say, "I know that as a father of a young boy, you wouldn't appreciate me suggesting that you enjoy sexting with pedophiles." However, it is also quite possible that he intended to say something far more menacing. The challenge lies in the fact that, regardless of how poorly conceived his comment may have been, I am unsure that whatever Mr. Nassr ultimately planned to say was meant to instill fear in Mr. S.
Second, there were some peculiarities in things Mr. Nassr said during the cut-and-thrust of cross-examination. His answers were not always responsive to the questions asked, and he sometimes veered off on odd tangents. For instance, his comments about a Criminal Code provision that he mistakenly believed shielded him from questions about his sexuality. When combined with Mr. Nassr's apparent mental health issues, I cannot be sure whether his interrupted comment about Mr. S's son was building towards something more sinister, or far more innocuous. Potentially, some point that, given Mr. Nassr's somewhat peculiar way of thinking, he believed relevant, but that would have removed any malevolent gloss on the reference to Mr. S's son. It is impossible to know where Mr. Nassr was heading, given that he was interrupted before he finished speaking.
Finally, there was what Mr. Nassr said and did not say when speaking to the trial judge immediately after she excused the jury following his comment about Mr. S's son. To be sure, as Mr. Mack pointed out during his submissions, Mr. Nassr did not say anything to suggest he had some innocent purpose for making that comment. However, equally telling, is that to the extent that he responded to the trial judge's concerns during that exchange, Mr. Nassr did not say anything that would betray any thought on his part that his comment about Mr. S's son had some malevolent purpose, or somehow crossed a line. That is consistent with Mr. Nassr believing that he was in the middle of making some relevant point by referring to Mr. S's child before he was interrupted.
Ultimately, based on the cumulative effect of all the evidence, I am not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Nassr intended for his comment to instill fear in Mr. S. Given that conclusion, there is no need to consider the fourth and final element. However, for essentially the same reasons that I harbour a reasonable doubt about the third element, I also have a reasonable doubt regarding whether Mr. Nassr intended to impede Mr. S in discharging his prosecutorial functions.
Conclusion
Accordingly, Mr. Nassr is found not guilty of the charge of intimidating a justice system participant.
...REASONS FOR JUDGMENT CONCLUDED
Electronic Certificate of Transcript
Form 3
Evidence Act (Subsection 5(2))
I, Helena Tsapoitis-Barbesin, certify that this document is a true and accurate transcript of the recording of R. v. Jason Nassr in the Superior Court of Justice, held at 80 Dundas Street, London, Ontario, taken from Recording No. 2311_CrtRm17_20250813_092046__10_STRIBOJ.dcr, dated August 13, 2025, which has been certified in Form 1 by Lori Van Osch.
August 18, 2025
Helena Tsapoitis-Barbesin
ACT ID# 2372561617
416-889-6054
Transcriptsontario.ca
A certificate in Form 3 is admissible in evidence and is proof, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the transcript of the certified recording of evidence and proceedings in the proceeding that is identified in the certificate.
