Roger Anthony Sydney Pinnock

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder on the sole ground that the trial judge erred in dismissing a mistrial application.

The Crown had improperly elicited inadmissible hearsay evidence regarding the appellant's connection to a residential address and inadmissible opinion evidence identifying the appellant in surveillance video from that address.

The trial judge provided a timely and forceful mid-trial corrective instruction and reinforced it in the final charge to the jury.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the mistrial application, finding that the corrective instructions were adequate to remedy any prejudice and that a mistrial was not necessary.

The court emphasized that mistrial is a remedy of last resort and that where corrective instructions can safely repair a compromised trial, they should be employed.

The appellants, Andrew Smoke and Eric Smoke, appealed their convictions for the second degree murder of Andrew “Scruff” Davis.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed both appeals, finding no error in the trial judge’s instructions to the jury regarding aiding and abetting, after-the-fact conduct, and the use of statements attributed to Andrew.

The court also found the verdict against Eric was not unreasonable, given the circumstantial evidence, including DNA and video evidence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Adam Picard’s appeal from his conviction for first degree murder.

The court found that the trial judge did not err in excluding Picard’s prior consistent statements to his first lawyer, in instructing the jury on constructive first degree murder, or in the adequacy of the jury charge.

The decision provides a detailed analysis of the law on prior consistent statements, the requirements for constructive first degree murder under s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code, and the sufficiency of jury instructions in complex homicide cases.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed J.E.'s appeal from his designation as a dangerous offender and the imposition of an indeterminate sentence.

The court found no reversible error in the sentencing judge’s assessment of the evidence, including expert psychiatric testimony regarding the appellant’s risk and treatability.

The court held that the sentencing judge was entitled to conclude that J.E. posed a high risk of recidivism and that available controls and treatments would not adequately manage his risk to the public.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and arson in the death of his intimate partner.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by admitting hearsay statements made by the deceased about their relationship, failing to give a limiting instruction regarding bad character evidence, and permitting lay opinion evidence from firefighters about his demeanour at the scene.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the hearsay statements were properly admitted under the state of mind exception, a bad character limiting instruction was unnecessary given the specific directions provided, and the demeanour evidence was admissible lay opinion.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder, arguing that the trial judge erred in assessing the mens rea required for attempted murder by wrongly attributing the actions of other shooters to him, and that the verdicts on four of the five convictions were unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's consideration of the appellant's specific intent.

The court held that the evidence amply supported the findings that this was a pre-planned, deliberate attack by shooters working in concert, and that the only reasonable inference was that all shooters had the specific intent to kill the victims.

The appellant, convicted of first-degree murder, appealed on three grounds: the trial judge's failure to provide a standalone instruction on collusion, the admission of in-dock identification evidence from an eyewitness who previously failed to identify him, and the refusal to grant a mistrial following prejudicial remarks by the Crown in closing arguments.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's general cautions on witness credibility were sufficient to address collusion concerns, the discretionary decision to admit in-dock identification evidence was not erroneous given the strong corrective instructions provided, and the Crown's improper remarks did not warrant a mistrial as they were adequately cured by the trial judge's clear instructions to the jury.

The appellant, Rachard Holder, appealed his convictions for attempted murder and related firearm offences, and his life sentence.

The conviction appeal challenged the trial judge's jury instruction on prior identification statements, arguing they were not sufficiently close in time to the incident.

The Court of Appeal found no error, affirming that the "entire identification process" is probative, consistent with R. v. Tat.

The sentence appeal alleged errors in considering lack of remorse as an aggravating factor and future dangerousness.

The Court held that the trial judge properly applied R. v. Shah, using lack of remorse to indicate lack of insight and future dangerousness for deterrence, not as an aggravating factor.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, Jamie Dunlop, appealed his conviction for aggravated assault and the indeterminate sentence imposed after being declared a dangerous offender.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals.

The conviction appeal argued the trial judge erred in assessing witness credibility regarding the extent of the appellant's participation in the assault.

The sentence appeal contended the sentencing judge erred by not acknowledging an accomplice's role and by focusing on general future harm rather than specific serious personal injury offences.

The Court found the trial judge's findings on the appellant's role were supported by evidence and that the sentencing judge correctly applied the dangerous offender test, despite not explicitly mentioning the accomplice.

The Crown appealed directed verdicts of acquittal and a stay of proceedings in a multi-accused robbery trial, arguing the trial judge erred in excluding similar act evidence and granting a stay for lost evidence.

The respondents cross-appealed their convictions.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in excluding similar act evidence due to insufficient reasons and in granting a stay without assessing prejudice.

The Crown's appeal was granted, setting aside the acquittals and stay, and ordering a new trial on those counts.

The respondents' cross-appeals against conviction were dismissed as the similar act rulings had benefited them or were consented to, and other grounds lacked merit.

The appellant, Miguel Chacon-Perez, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder.

The appeal raised four grounds: unreasonable verdict, improper Crown closing address, failure to instruct the jury on manslaughter, and error in denying a jury request for witness testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the first three grounds but allowed the appeal on the fourth ground, finding that the trial judge erred by effectively refusing the jury's request for a read-back of crucial witness testimony related to the identity of the assailant, which was the central contested issue.

A new trial was ordered.

The accused was convicted at trial of incest and sexual interference against the complainant, his daughter.

The accused appealed on the basis that the trial judge improperly extended or relied upon principles from governing cases regarding the timing of complaint, thereby sidestepping inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, and that the trial judge failed to provide sufficient reasons on how he resolved those inconsistencies.

A majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the convictions.

The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously dismissed the further appeal, substantially for the reasons of the majority of the Court of Appeal.

The appellant was convicted of four counts of murder relating to four victims killed over 75 days using the same handguns.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by refusing to sever one murder count from the other three, delivering an unbalanced jury charge, and admitting unusual motive evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's discretionary refusal to sever the counts, concluding the jury charge was fair and balanced, and holding that the motive evidence was properly grounded in the record.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder and indignity to human remains after confessing to undercover officers during a 'Mr. Big' operation.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the confession was obtained through police coercion amounting to an abuse of process under the Hart framework.

He also appealed his 17-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably concluded the police conduct was not coercive and the appellant's will was not overborne.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the parole ineligibility period was not demonstrably unfit given the horrific nature of the crimes and the aggravating factors.

The appellant, Marc Vickers, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, seeking a new trial based on fresh evidence.

The proposed evidence consisted of unsworn, unrecorded hearsay statements from C.B. (the victim's son, also convicted of the murder) recanting his trial testimony and claiming sole responsibility for the killing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the fresh evidence did not meet the admissibility requirements of necessity and reliability under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, nor the cogency requirement.

The court emphasized that C.B. was available to testify, and his inconsistent recantations lacked inherent trustworthiness and adequate procedural safeguards.

The appellant, Abdulaziz Al-Enzi, appealed his conviction for aggravated assault and his 30-month sentence, which arose from a jailhouse altercation.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's decision to proactively invite submissions and grant a defence motion to reopen the case after noticing discrepancies in video evidence during judgment preparation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals.

The court affirmed the trial judge's judicial exercise of discretion in reopening the trial, finding it was done in the interest of fairness and consistent with the Hayward test.

The court also found the sentence fit, citing serious aggravating factors including the assault's occurrence in a correctional facility, the use of a concealed weapon, and the complainant's permanent injuries.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault following a six-day trial.

He raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the trial judge improperly relied on the complainant's absence of motive to lie in assessing her credibility; and second, that the trial judge impermissibly allowed a speculative theory that the complainant had been drugged with GHB into the trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds, finding that the trial judge's analysis of the absence of motive was consistent with established precedent and that the GHB issue, while arising from defence counsel's error, did not compromise trial fairness or affect the conviction, which was based on the complainant's credibility and corroborating evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for party liability in the use of a firearm during a drive-by shooting.

The trial judge found that the appellant, who was driving the vehicle, knew of the shooting moments before it occurred and assisted by positioning his car alongside the victim's vehicle before driving away evasively.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge's findings were amply supported by evidence and sufficient to establish party liability under section 21(1) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant's argument that he lacked the requisite mens rea was rejected as an unreasonable verdict argument.

The appellant was charged with 14 offences and convicted of four.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the complainant was not a credible witness.

The court found that the convictions on counts 1, 3, and 13 were not based solely on the complainant's testimony.

The trial judge made no finding of guilt on count 5, and the conviction on that count was set aside.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The appellant, convicted of first-degree murder in 2001 and sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole for 25 years, challenged the constitutionality of judicial screening provisions introduced into the "faint hope" clause.

When the appellant committed the murder in 1995, she had an automatic right to apply directly to a jury for a reduction in her parole ineligibility after serving 15 years.

By the time she was eligible to apply in 2013, legislation required her to first satisfy a judge that there was a "substantial likelihood" her application would succeed before a jury could hear it.

The Court of Appeal held that the retrospective application of the 2011 judicial screening amendments violated her Charter rights under section 11(i), as the amendments increased her punishment by substantially decreasing her chances of obtaining a reduction in parole ineligibility.