Roger Anthony Sydney Pinnock

The appellant appealed his guilty plea to manslaughter entered in 2001 for the death of a 13-month-old child.

The appeal arose from the reinvestigation of cases involving Dr. Charles Smith, a pathologist whose evidence regarding cause of death in children was later found to be unreliable.

The appellant had pleaded guilty based significantly on Dr. Smith's opinion that the child died from asphyxia caused by the appellant.

Fresh evidence established that Dr. Smith's conclusions were flawed and unsupported by the autopsy findings.

Multiple independent pathologists concluded the cause of death was unascertained.

The Crown conceded that Dr. Smith's flawed opinion played a significant role in the appellant's decision to plead guilty and agreed that it was in the interests of justice to set aside the conviction and order a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the death of his wife at his second trial, following a hung jury at his first trial.

The appeal was allowed on the basis that the trial judge erred in law by refusing to remove trial counsel from the record when counsel sought removal on grounds of ethical concerns and breakdown of the client-solicitor relationship.

The trial judge's refusal to grant the removal application created an appearance of unfairness and constituted a miscarriage of justice, requiring a new trial.

The court also addressed several other grounds of appeal relating to the admissibility of third-party suspect evidence, demeanour evidence, police officer opinion evidence, and hearsay statements, providing guidance for the retrial.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted by the trial judge for unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The accused was charged with first degree murder in December 2012 and the trial was scheduled to commence in November 2016, resulting in a total delay of 48 months.

The trial judge found that after deducting defence delay and discrete events, the net delay of 40 months exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan and was not justified by case complexity or the transitional exceptional circumstance.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in her complexity analysis and her application of the transitional exceptional circumstance.

The court held that the delay was justified under the transitional exceptional circumstance because the case was prosecuted almost entirely prior to Jordan's release and would not have resulted in a stay under the previous Morin framework.

The appellant was convicted by jury of second degree murder of his common law partner and sentenced to 17 years parole ineligibility.

He appealed both conviction and sentence.

Amicus raised two grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge erred in failing to declare a mistrial when new evidence emerged during jury deliberations regarding the blue bathrobe used as a murder weapon, and (2) the trial judge improperly limited cross-examination of the officer-in-charge regarding information from a confidential informant about the appellant's alleged ties to organized crime.

The appellant also raised additional arguments regarding Charter violations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's handling of the new evidence, the evidentiary rulings, or the sentence imposed.

The appellant appealed convictions for assault and sexual offences against child complainants, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The court held that trial counsel's performance fell far below the standard of reasonably competent representation, including inadequate trial preparation, failure to use prior inconsistent statements, failure to bring or properly address a s. 276 application, and failure to respond competently to similar fact or discreditable conduct evidence.

The Crown conceded that the convictions relating to one complainant were unreliable, but argued the assault conviction involving another complainant should stand.

The court rejected that distinction, finding the incompetence pervasive and the miscarriage of justice engaged both verdict reliability and trial fairness.

All convictions were quashed and a new trial was ordered on all counts.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder after stabbing his neighbour in a rooming house.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by admitting hearsay statements made by the deceased victim to third parties, which suggested the appellant had previously assaulted and stalked her.

The Court of Appeal found that the hearsay statements lacked sufficient indicia of reliability and should not have been admitted under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

Because the improperly admitted evidence was central to the Crown's case on intent and animus, the appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed a declaration that the restriction on enhanced pre-sentence custody credit in s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code was unconstitutional.

The Court held that denying enhanced credit to offenders denied bail primarily because of prior convictions is overbroad under s. 7 because the provision captures persons unrelated to the public safety objective and affords limited meaningful review of endorsements.

The infringement was not saved by s. 1, as the measure was not minimally impairing and its deleterious liberty effects outweighed its benefits.

The Court also rejected the proposition that proportionality in sentencing process is an independent principle of fundamental justice under s. 7.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and importing cocaine, but the jury could not reach a verdict on a trafficking charge.

During deliberations, the jury asked if a guilty verdict on importing required a guilty verdict on trafficking.

The trial judge answered 'no' without further explanation, contradicting his earlier instructions that the key issue for all charges was whether a specific transfer of cocaine occurred.

The Court of Appeal held that this incomplete and unhelpful response compromised trial fairness and left the jury adrift to assess conflicting bases of culpability.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and sentenced to five years' imprisonment, with pre-sentence custody credited on a 1:1 basis.

The sentencing judge denied enhanced credit on the mistaken belief that the appellant's bail had been revoked.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found this was a material factual misunderstanding.

Applying the principles from Summers, the Court held the appellant was entitled to enhanced credit of 1.5:1, as there was no evidence to rebut the inference that he had lost eligibility for early release.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence reduced accordingly.

The appellant appealed the probation conditions imposed following a conviction for breach of probation, arguing that the requirements to remain in Ontario and report weekly were improper.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge properly exercised their discretion.

The conditions were necessary to monitor the appellant, particularly because the underlying breach occurred while he was outside the province, and did not unduly restrict his mobility rights since he could seek permission to travel or vary the reporting frequency.

The appellants were acquitted of first degree murder and convicted of second degree murder.

They appealed their convictions on the basis that the trial judge erred during jury selection by unilaterally ordering the use of static triers for challenges for cause, despite the appellants' requests for rotating triers and the absence of an application under s. 640(2.1) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal held that the improper use of static triers deprived the appellants of their statutory right to rotating triers, rendering the court improperly constituted to try them.

The curative proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iv) could not apply.

The Court also found the trial judge erred in failing to answer a jury question regarding closing arguments.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered for second degree murder.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder, arson, and rendering an indignity to a body after he and two accomplices tortured the victim and burned down the house to conceal the crime.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in dismissing an application for the production of a Crown witness's third-party psychological records, and in his jury instructions regarding accomplice evidence (Vetrovec warning) and fabricated statements.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred at the first stage of the third-party records analysis, production would not have been ordered at the second stage.

The court also found the jury instructions were adequate and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant applied to re-open his sentence appeal and introduce fresh evidence regarding the immigration consequences of his 26-month sentence for fraud over $5,000.

The fresh evidence demonstrated that a sentence of two years or more would deprive him of the right to appeal a deportation order.

The Court of Appeal granted the application, admitted the fresh evidence, and reduced the sentence to two years less a day, noting the appellant's long-term residence in Canada, family ties, and lack of connections to his homeland.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, which occurred during a car theft.

The Crown's case relied heavily on a confession the appellant made to three associates, one of whom recanted his preliminary inquiry testimony at trial.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in admitting the recanted testimony under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, in instructing the jury on collusion, in refusing to grant a mistrial when another witness refused to testify, and that the first-degree murder conviction based on unlawful confinement was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions, and concluding that it was open to the jury to find the murder was committed during a distinct act of unlawful confinement.

The accused appealed his convictions for drug and firearms offences, arguing arbitrary detention and racial profiling.

The Crown appealed the sentence, challenging the trial judge's finding that s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code, which limits pre-sentence custody credit to 1:1 when bail is denied primarily due to a previous conviction, violates s. 7 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals.

The Court upheld the conviction, finding no arbitrary detention or racial profiling.

On the sentence appeal, the Court held that s. 719(3.1) violates the principle of proportionality in sentencing under s. 7 of the Charter by subjecting identically placed offenders to different periods of incarceration based on bail outcomes, and is not saved by s. 1.

The provision was declared of no force and effect.

The appellant, who had a long-standing history of mental illness, was found NCRMD on a charge of assault with a weapon after chasing his neighbour with a pick axe.

At his initial hearing before the Ontario Review Board, the Board ordered his detention in a secure forensic unit.

The appellant appealed, arguing for a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Board did not give adequate consideration to whether a conditional discharge was the least onerous and least restrictive disposition in the circumstances, and directed the Board to reconsider its decision.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference arising from allegations by a child complainant.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law by treating the appellant's failure to give an immediate unequivocal denial to a vague police allegation as a basis to reject his testimony, and by applying different standards of scrutiny to the complainant's evidence and the defence evidence.

While the court rejected the argument that the verdict was unreasonable, it found the credibility analysis legally flawed and capable of producing a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the Crown's closing address to the jury undermined the principle of jury unanimity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the argument was contrary to established jurisprudence and noting that the only live issue at trial was consent.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting police investigative narrative evidence and that the Crown improperly cross-examined him on his alibi, infringing his right to silence.

The Court of Appeal held that the investigative narrative evidence was properly admitted in reply because the defence had attacked the integrity of the police investigation.

The Court also found that while some of the Crown's cross-examination and jury address regarding the appellant's right to silence and false alibi were problematic, the trial judge's instructions adequately protected the appellant's fair trial rights.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder following a stabbing during a drug deal.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge made errors in instructing the jury.

The Court of Appeal found two significant errors: failing to provide a limiting instruction on the hearsay portion of a witness's police statement, and improperly instructing the jury that post-offence conduct could be considered in determining the appellant's state of mind for murder versus manslaughter.

The cumulative effect of these errors required a new trial.